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FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 



THE STRUGGLE EOE THE BALANCE OF POWER 



BY 

ANDRE TARDIEU 

HONORARY FIRST SECRETARY IN THE FRENCH 
DIPLOMATIC SERVICE 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
1908 

All rights reserved 






LIBRARY of CONGRESS 
Tv.'o Copies Received 

OCT 27 1908 

Copyright tntry 

CLASS O^ XXc, No. 

COPY G. 



Copyright, 1908, 
By the MACMILLAN COMPANY. 



Set up and electrotyped. Published October, 1908. 



Nnrtooolr ^wgg 

J. 8. Gushing Co. — Berwick & Smith Co. 

Norwood, Mass., U.S.A. 



PREFACE 

Having been requested, in 1908, to deliver, under 
the auspices of the French Circle of Harvard Univer- 
sity, the annual course of lectures there, founded by- 
Mr. James H. Hyde a dozen years ago, I explained in 
my eight lessons the subject treated of in this book. 
Although to-day, in its published form, my subject 
contains developments which would not have been 
possible in a three weeks' series of lectures, I have 
modified neither its spirit, nor its plan, nor its conclu- 
sions. 

Its spirit first. Cultivated Americans, who have 
in their universities such an admirable instrument of 
work, are all acquainted with France of the past ; her 
history, her literature, and her art. To show them 
France of to-day, in presence of Europe and the world, 
such as she has been shaped, after painful experiences, 
by thirty-eight years of sustained effort and diplomatic 
action, is the aim that I have proposed to myself. 

The plan resulted from the subject itself. It was 
through the Russian Alliance that France issued from 
the isolation in which she had been placed by defeat. 
It was by her understandings with Great Britain, Italy, 
and Spain that she subsequently pursued the satisfac- 
tion of her interests. It is in presence of the Triple 
Alliance, dominated by Germany, that she has raised 
the edifice of her agreements. It is against Germany 
that she has been compelled to defend and complete it. 
Such is the woof of this book of contemporary history, 
which is supplemented by a necessary study of Franco- 
American relations. 



vi PREFACE 

My conclusions come out on eacli page from the nar- 
ration of events. In this diplomatic drama, the unity 
of which is equal to that of the antique tragedies, 
France has fought for the balance of power. Both 
militarily and politically destroyed in 1871 by Ger- 
many's triumph, this equilibrium has been gradually 
reconstituted. It exists to-day. But it is unstable. 
The heirs of Bismarck have not yet resigned themselves 
to the loss of the hegemony which — though it could 
be only temporary — he had secured for his country. 
Will they accept the new order of things which, through 
symmetric groupings of Powers, expresses the necessity 
for stability in the various international elements? 
This is a question that, in the near future, will be set- 
tled either by peace or war. 

A Frenchman could not treat such a subject other- 
wise than from a French point of view. But to try 
to understand one's adversaries is already to do them 
justice. With this spirit of justice I have endeavoured 
to inspire myself, yet not seeking to hide errors, which 
indeed do not fundamentally affect the whole of the 
French achievement. 

If Americans should see in this book, which has been 
written in good faith, fresh reasons for loving and 
esteeming France, then I shall have attained my object. 
The historic souvenirs which unite the two Republics 
have created imperishable ties between them. Being 
convinced that they may find in the study of the present 
time a positive justification for their old sympathies, 
I have striven to the best of my ability to make this 
justification clear, by telling, in the field of diplomatic 
action, the struggles of France for peace through the 
balance of power. 

Paris, September 1, 1908. 



CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Preface v 

CHAPTER I 

France and the Russian Alliance 1 

I. Geographical necessity of the Franco-Russian Alli- 
ance — Hindrances — Mistakes of the Second Empire — In- 
stitutions — Men — Bapprocheme nt — European equilibrium 

— Scare of 1875 — Bulgarian incident of 1887 — Russian loans 

— Nihilists — Weapons and arms ordered — Cronstadt — 
Protocols of 1891 and 1892. 

II. Eranco-Russian Alliance judged by contemporary 
opinion — Speeches of the Baron de Mohrenheim, Mr. de 
Ereycinet, and Mr. Ribot — Practice of the Alliance — 
Eranco-Russian f§tes — Their exaggeration — Subaltern posi- 
tion of Erance. 

III. Deviation of the Alliance — Trans-Siberian Railway 

— Chinese question between 1895 and 1902 — Eranco-Rus- 
sian note of March 19, 1902 — Mr. Delcass^ and the Russo- 
Japanese war — French disappointment — Mr. Combes' 
mistakes in tact — Manchuria and Morocco — Eranco-Rus- 
sian set-back. 

IV. Future of the Alliance — Veering of French opinion 
in favour of Russia — Mr. Isvolsky and the return to Europe 

— Mr. Isvolsky and the Alliance of the Three Emperors — 
Mr. Bompard superseded — Financial and economic rela- 
tions — Russian Army and the reforms necessary — Lasting 
necessity of the Alliance. 

CHAPTER II ' 

France and the English "Entente" 35 

I. Franco-English rivalry — Three centuries of war — '/-""'^^ 
Attempts at an understanding, and their failure — Algeria 

— Tunis — The Niger — The Congo — The Upper Nile and 
Egypt — Eashoda. 



viii CONTENTS 

PAGE 

II. Causes of the Franco-English raviorochement — ^Ger- 
giany and England — : Bismarck's policy — German progress 
— CommCTcial..compjetition — EhglisTT merchants and con- 
suls — Political distrust — British impeachment — France and 
the balance of power — Franco-English commerce — End of 
the colonial quarrel. 

III. Entente Cordiale — Eole of Edward VII — Visit of 
1903 — Negotiations — Agreement of the 8th of April, 1904 
-rJigypt — Morocco — Value of the arrangement — Franco- 
English manifestations — German policy and the evolution 
of the Entente Cordiale — Anglo-Russian rapprochement. 

IV. Entente or Alliance — Military problem — Weakness 
of the English Army — Mr. Haldane's reforms — Their in- 
sufficiency — State of English opinion — French interests — 
Policy of neutrality — Conditions of an Alliance — Failing 
these conditions, friends, but not allies. 



CHAPTER III 

France and the Mediterranean Understandings . . 81 

I. Franco-Italian understanding — France and the Medi- 
terranean — Italy and the Mediterranean — Franco-Italian 
hostility — Tunis and the Triple Alliance — Crispinism — 
Causes of the Franco-Italian rapprochement — Tunisian 
treaties — Treaty of Commerce — Political agreements — 
Morocco and Tripoli — The rapprochement and the Triple 
Alliance — England and the rapprochement — The rapproche- 
ment and African problems — Conclusion. 

II. Franco-Spanish understanding — Spain after the war 

— Economic situation — Moroccan aspirations — Penal settle- 
ments — Spain and France — Period of the Triple Alliance 

— Difficulties in coming to an understanding with regard to 
Morocco — First negotiations — Spain and the Franco-Eng- 
lish agreement — Franco-Spanish agreement — Trans-Pyre- 
nean railways — Alfonso XIII and the "Western Powers. 

III. France and Morocco — Moroccan exclusiveness — 
Early reign of Abd el Aziz — Moroccan wealth — Franco- 
Moroccan commerce — Morocco and Algeria — Franco-Mo- 
roccan relations — R^voil — Guebbas agreements — French 
programme of reforms — Pacific penetration. 



CONTENTS ix 

CHAPTER IV 

FAOB 

France and the Triple Alliance 123 

I. Formation of the Triple Alliance — Crisis of 1875 and 
the Eussian intervention — Bismarck and the '■'■coalition 
nightmare'''' — Congress of Berlin — Austro-German Alli- 
ance — Italy's accession — Isolation of France. 

II. Hegemony of the Triple Alliance — Kalnoky and 
Crispi — Bismarck and Russia — Triple " Counter-assurance" 
of Skiernevice — Double "Counter-assurance" of 1887 — 
Bismarck and England — Bismarck and French colonial 
policy — Bismarck's threats — Military laws — Speeches of 
the 8th of January, 1888, and the consequences. 

III. Triple Alliance and the Franco-Russian Alliance. — 
German anxiety — German attempt to capture the Dual Alli- 
ance — Advances of William II — Policy of William II — 
Cooperation of the two systems. — Favourable situation of 
Germany — Mr. von Buelow's mistake. 

IV. Triple Alliance and the Western understandings — 
Apprehensions of William II — Economic crisis in Germany 

— Germany and Italy — Italy and Austria — Speeches of 
William II — Policy of reserve — Russian defeats — Conflict 
of the Alliances. 

CHAPTER V 

Conflict of the Alliances 170 

I. German offensive — Mr. von Kuhlmann's statements 

— Cause and pretext — William II at Tangier — Mistakes 
of Mr. Delcass^ — Prince Henckel of Donnersmarck — Scare 
in France — Mr. Delcass6's resignation. 

II. German success — Mr. Rouvier and the conference — 
Acceptance of the conference by France — Moroccan con- 
cessions of Germany — Success of the great German design, 

m. German discomfiture — Situation just before Alge- 
ciras — Germany's error — Fluctuations of German policy — 
Ends and means — "European reprobation" — Failure of 
the German attempt to restore the Bismarckian hegemony — 
Russian Alliance and the Western understandings — Triple 
Alliance — Opinion in Germany — Resignation of Prince von 
Buelow to the inevitable. 



X CONTENTS 

^- CHAPTER VI 

/j/^ PA6B 

The New Asiatic and European Understandings . . 210 

I. Asia and the German policy — Sino-Japanese war — 
Combined action of Germany, France, and Russia — The 
"break-up of China" — Crisis of 1900 — Russo-Japanese 
war — German profit — Three risks of France, 

II. Asia and the French policy — Russo-Japanese 
reconciliation and the agreements of 1907 — Franco-Japan- 
ese reconciliation — Anglo-Russian reconciliation — Persia, 
Afghanistan, Thibet, the Persian Gulf — France and the 
Anglo-Russian agreement — French profit accruing from it. 

III. European developments — Evolution of the Anglo- 
Russian understanding — Germany's attitude — Interview at 
Revel — Anglo-Russian understanding in Macedonia — End 
of the Austro-Russian understanding — Anglo-Spanish and 
Franco-Spanish agreements — Tendency to an equilibrium. 

CHAPTER VII 

France and the United States 266 

I. Sentiment and business — Souvenirs of the Inde- 
pendence struggle — Two Sister Republics — Politics and 
the "Imponderable" — Franco- American manifestations — 
Words and Deeds — Franco-American commerce — Com- 
mercial agreements — Possible improvements — France and 
the American financial crisis of 1907. 

II. Politics — France and the Monroe Doctrine — Ameri- 
can affairs — France and the " hig stick'''' — Asiatic affairs — 
United States and the " Open Door" — Mr. Hay and Russia 
— United States and Japan — Franco-Japanese agreement 
and the United States — European affairs — United States 

nd the Moroccan crisis — Conference of Algeciras — Reasons 
oi the American policy — United States and the Entente 
Cordiale — United States and the balance of power in 
Europe. 

CHAPTER VIII 
France and Peace ......... 300 

Conclusion. 

Index of Proper Names . . . . . . . .311 



FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 



CHAPTER I 

FRANCE AND THE RUSSIAN ALLIANCE 

I. Geographic necessity of the Franco-Russian Alliance. — Hin- 
drances. — Mistakes of the Second Empire. — Institutions. — • 
Men. — Rapprochement. — European equilibrium. — Scare 
of 1875. — Bulgarian incident of 1887. — Russian loans. — 
Nihilists. — Weapons and arms ordered. — Cronstadt. — 
Protocols of 1891 and 1892. 
II. Franco-Russian Alliance judged by contemporary opinion. 

— Speeches of the Baron de Mohrenheim, Mr. de Freycinet, 
and Mr. Ribot. — Practice of the Alliance. — Franco- 
Russian fetes. — Their exaggeration. — Subaltern position 
of France. 

III. Deviation of the Alliance. — Trans-Siberian Railway. — 
Chinese question between 1895 and 1902. — Franco-Russian 
note of March 19, 1902. — Mr. Delcasse and the Russo- 
Japanese war. — French disappointment. — Mr. Combes' 
mistakes in tact. — Manchuria and Morocco. — Franco- 
Russian set-back. 

IV. Future of the Alliance. — Veering of French opinion in 
favour of Russia. — Mr. Isvolski and the return to Europe. 

— Mr. Isvolski and the Alliance of the Three Emperors, — 
Mr. Bompard superseded. — Financial and economic re- 
lations. — Russian Army and the reforms necess y. '■ — 
Lasting necessity of the Alliance. 

I 

The Franco- Russian Alliance may be considered 
as a perfect type of the ^'mariage de raison" ; not 
that by this should be understood a bond imposed 



2 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

upon the contracting parties through a will foreign 
to their own, but one which, suggested first by a 
correct appreciation of interests, corresponded, when 
once formed, to the sentiments of each. 

To be convinced of this, one needs only to ex- 
amine a map. From time immemorial, France, as 
a continental power, badly protected on her north- 
eastern frontier, had found herself on land in rivalry, 
if not in open struggle, with her eastern neighbour, 
formerly Austria, to-day Germany. And always 
also, in order to keep this rival or adversary at 
arm's length, she was obliged to seek allies in the 
east of Europe, — Turks, Swedes, Poles, these last 
more recently replaced by Russians. In 1717, Peter 
the Great, during his travels in France, said to the 
Regent Philippe d'Orleans, when offering him his 
alliance, ''I will stand to you in the stead of 
Poland, Turkey, and Sweden." ^ A century and a 
half later, at the close of the Crimean war, Bis- 
marck expressed the opinion that a ''Franco- Rus- 
sian Alliance was in the nature of things." As a 
matter of fact, the Russian Empire and the French 
Republic worked for the increase of their own 
security by fortifying the equilibrium of Europe, on 
the day that they recorded in a treaty of alliance 
the lasting community of their essential interests. 

In order to succeed in concluding this Alliance, 

both French and Russians had a good deal to undo. 

Of the various regimes in power since 1815, the 

Government of the Restoration alone, and notably 

* See Albert Vandal in his Louis XV and Elizabeth of Russia. 



FRANCE AND THE RUSSIAN ALLIANCE 3 

that of Charles X, had clearly understood the profit 
France would derive from a rapprochement with 
Russia. The Due de Richelieu, Chateaubriand, and 
Polignac were the first partisans of the Russian Al- 
liance. And it was largely because he was assured 
of Russia's support that, in spite of England's 
threats, the last mentioned statesman undertook the 
Algerian expedition. On the other hand, the reign 
of Napoleon III had a deplorable influence on French 
relations with Russia. The Crimean campaign was 
a mistake ; and the policy followed in the affairs of 
Poland was another. When the war of 1870 broke 
out, Russia did nothing to defend us. During his 
stay in Saint Petersburg, Thiers obtained neither 
'^ understanding nor engagement." The Czar saw 
in our disasters nothing more than an opportunity 
to bring about the revision of the Treaty of Paris. 
Gortchakoff had full confidence in Prussia; and this 
confidence was destined to last until the Congress 
of Berlin. The diplomatic combination known un- 
der the name of the Alliance of the Three Em- 
perors left France isolated. Vanquished and alone, 
she had only herself to rely on. 

Many circumstances, indeed, then prevented the 
hope of her being able to escape from this isolation 
by an alliance with Russia. An initial obstacle ex- 
isted in the wide difference between the two countries' 
domestic regimes. For the Republican form of 
government the Russian Court felt very little sym- 
pathy. And if communications were set up between 
Paris and Saint Petersburg, it was usually between 



4 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

the respective oppositions, Russians blaming the 
Radical trend of French politics, Frenchmen pray- 
ing for the success of Russian Liberals. Already, 
before the end of the Franco-Prussian war, one of 
the members of the Government of the National 
Defence, put forward the absurd proposal of a par- 
don for Berezowski/ Ten years later, the refusal to 
extradite the nihilist Hartmann, who had taken 
refuge in Paris, grievously offended the Czar's 
Government.^ A no less unfavourable impression 
was produced by the pardon granted to Prince 
Kropotkine. These incidents turned to the advan- 
tage of Bismarck, who openly declared himself 
opposed to a Franco-Russian rapprochement. "I 
won't live," he said, '' between two enemies." 

Personal reasons were added to those arising 
from circumstances. In choosing diplomatists to 
represent France in Russia, the French Government 
was not always well-inspired. At Saint Petersburg 
the souvenir still remains of blunders in language 
committed by Admiral Jaures. He it was who, 
seeing in the Palace the portraits of the ancient 
Czars of Moscow, asked a Master of the Ceremonies : — 

''Who are those ugly creatures?" 

He it was also, who, when dining with the Minister 
of the Interior and speaking of certain Nihilist 
outrages, finished up by sententiously remarking : — 



* Berezowski had fired a pistol at the Czar during his stay in 
Paris in 1867. 

^ Hartmann had blown up a train which he supposed to be the 
Czar's. 



FRANCE AND THE RUSSIAN ALLIANCE 5 

''You will only get out of the mess by establishing 
a Republic." 

On the contrary, his successor, General Appert, 
was quite in the Czar's good graces. But the brusk- 
ness of his recall irritated Alexander III, who, by 
way of protest, ordered his Ambassador in France 
to take a long leave of absence from the country. 
Then, there was the Floquet question. Under the 
Empire, Mr. Charles Floquet, a young barrister at 
that time, had greeted the Czar, during his Imperial 
visit to the Palais de Justice, with, "Vive la Pologne, 
Monsieur!^' ^ When the fiery law-student of 1867, 
became Chairman of the Lower Chamber and sub- 
sequently Prime Minister, a regular negotiation had 
to be carried through for relations to be established 
between him and the Russian Ambassador. Mr. 
Grevy, who remained at the EJysee until 1887, was, 
moreover, hostile to any diplomatic action — and 
especially to the Russian Alliance. To him the 
policy of absolute reserve and of isolation alone 
seemed reasonable. He was of the opinion that we 
had nothing to expect from negotiations with auto- 
cratic Russia, and that, in entering upon them, we 
should only alarm Germany without any positive 
benefit accruing. 

Interest, however, which was pushing France and 
Russia nearer each other, was ultimately fated to 
carry the day. As early as 1873, the Due de Broglie, 
uneasy at Germany's attitude, had solicited through 
Comte de Chaudordy an intervention of Prince 

1 " Hurrah I for Poland, Sir." 



6 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

Gortchakoff; and the Russian Chancellor, receiving 
the French envoy, had said to him : — 

"We want France as strong as she was in the 
past." 

Two years later, in 1875, German threats were 
more openly expressed/ It was the time when 
Bismarck thought of exhausting us by a fresh bleed- 
ing, and the Berlin papers spoke without disguise of 
another war. The only thing left to conjecture was, 
whether the war would break out in the spring or 
the autumn. Russia could not overlook the fact 
that, the issue of this unequal struggle would bring 
with it a definite rupture of the European balance 
of power to the benefit of the German Empire, and 
would mean, as the Due Decazes said, "the enslaving 
of the Old World." Prince Orloff, who was then 
Ambassador at Paris, encouraged our Minister for 
Foreign Affairs not to yield an inch. 

"Be firm," he repeated, "be very firm." 

The French Ambassador at Saint Petersburg was 
General Le Flo, who, being in possession of the 
Czar's entire confidence, pressed him to intervene. 
And, Alexander II inclined more every day to the 
idea of intervention. 

"If you are really menaced," he said, "you shall 
know it by me." 

And, in fact, he refused to meet the overtures that 
Mr. von Radowitz, a German diplomatist, was at 
this moment commissioned to make him ; and con- 
veyed to General le Flo, through Gortchakoff, that 

* See Hanotaux' History of Contemporary France. 



FRANCE AND THE RUSSIAN ALLIANCE 7 

France had nothing to fear. On the 10th of May, 
he arrived in Berhn, and, in an interview with 
Bismarck, spoke out so plainly that, a few days 
later, the cloud passed away/ 

The Eastern question and the Congress of Berlin 
— which Gortchakoff called the darkest page of 
his history — completely loosened the ties of Russo- 
German intimacy. Even in the Conference of 
Constantinople, that is to say, before the commence- 
ment of the Russo-Turkish war, Bismarck had 
played a double game. He continued doing so 
during the Congress. On the morrow of this Euro- 
pean assize, Russia was as isolated in the East as 
France was in the West. The Russian newspapers, 
the Moscow Gazette, for instance, preached the 
French AUiance. On the 7th of October, 1879, the 
conclusion of the Austro-German Alliance, two years 
subsequently, transformed into a Triple Alliance by 
Italy's adhesion, and directed even more against 
Russia than against France; brought an extra 
argument to the Francophile campaign. The Rus- 
sian Czar and the German Emperor continued their 
reciprocal assurances of ''cordial affection"; but 
the old confidence was lacking. During his ephem- 
eral premiership of 1881, Gambetta felt that the 
moment had arrived to profit by this change. And, 
in appointing Comte de Chaudordy Ambassador at 
Saint Petersburg, he said to him : — 

* See Hanotaux' History, already cited. The Czar said to Mr. 
de Gontaut-Biron, the French Ambassador at Berlin: "I hope 
our relations will become increasingly cordial. We have common 
interests. We must remain friends." 



8 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

'^Leaning on Russia and on England, we shall be 
unattackable." 

Another five years, however, elapsed without 
any advantage being taken of such favourable 
conditions. By another diplomatic masterpiece, 
Bismarck had, indeed, contrived, in 1887 first, and, 
subsequently in 1888, to form with Russia a counter- 
assurance which warded off all danger of a Franco- 
Russian alliance. To Mr. Flourens, who was ap- 
pointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Goblet 
Cabinet on the 13th of December, 1886, the honour 
belongs of having for the first time turned the sug- 
gestions of interest into acts. The Eastern crisis 
supplied him with an occasion. Bulgarian delegates 
had come in January, 1887, soliciting the support 
of the great Powers against Russia. Mr. Flourens 
declared to them that their first duty was to reach 
an understanding with the Saint Petersburg Cabinet. 
The German campaign on behalf of the military 
Septennatj and the warlike ardour it aroused in Ber- 
lin, enabled the French Government to ascertain 
that their attitude with regard to Bulgaria had been 
appreciated in Russia. Important movements of 
troops on the Polish frontier, showed that the Czar's 
Government, while not yet making alliance with us, 
yet intended to be in a position to have a word to 
say in the matter, if France were attacked. A week 
after, the Czar, in annotating a confidential report 
of Mr. de Giers, his Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
wrote on the margin, "We must not let France be 
diminished." 



FRANCE AND THE RUSSIAN ALLIANCE 9 

At this date, owing to tie clear-sighted initiative 
of her financiers, France was able to gain a fresh 
hold on Russia's gratitude/ With a trend more 
and more directed towards an intensive policy of 
economic development, the Russian Empire needed 
capital. In order to procure it, she had, up to then, 
applied to bankers who, after subscribing the loans, 
sometimes found, sometimes did not find, people to 
invest in these values, of whose Exchange rates 
they thus remained masters. In reality, it was 
especially on the Berlin market that such operations 
were effected. A group of French financiers, at the 
head of whom was Mr. Hoskier, a banker of Danish 
origin, thought it would be to the interest both of 
France and of Russia to substitute for this system, 
precarious in its principle and limited in its exten- 
sion, that of floating the Russian loans on the French 
market and among the French public. In the month 
of June, 1888, Mr. Hoskier opened negotiations 
for this purpose with Mr. Wichnegradski, the Rus- 
sian Minister of Finance. In the following December, 
after the scheme had been thoroughly dealt with, a 
first loan of 500,000,000 francs was issued in Paris, 
of the 4 per cent type, at 86 fr. 45 c, which was 
subscribed by more than a hundred thousand per- 
sons. Other loans followed: in 1889 (700,000,000 
and 1,200,000,000 francs), in 1890 (300 millions and 
41 milhons), in 1891 (320 milHons and 500 miUions), 
in 1893 (178 miUions), in 1894 (454 miUions, 166 

^ See Ernest Daudet's Diplomatic History of the Franco-Russian 
Alliance. 



10 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

millions, 400 millions), ir 1896 (400 millions), in 1901 
(424 millions), in 1904 (800 millions), in 1906 (1,200 
millions). And France thus became Russia's credi- 
tor for a sum which may be estimated, with municipal 
loans and industrial enterprises, at twelve billions 
of francs/ It was a new principle of solidarity 
between the two countries, and, from 1889, offered 
to political combinations the broad, solid basis of 
financial interests. 

The French Government resolved to take advan- 
tage of it. On his nomination to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, which he held till the 11th of Janu- 
ary, 1893, Mr. Ribot resolutely lent his efforts to 
the forming of an alliance with Russia. His chief 
agent was our Ambassador at Saint Petersburg, 
Mr. de Laboulaye, one of the most remarkable of 
our diplomatists of the Third Republic, for qualities 
of shrewdness, firmness, and tact. Moreover, the 
whole Cabinet were in agreement on the subject. 
In 1890, Mr. Constans, the Minister of the Interior, 
placed a trump card in the Ambassador's hand, by 
effecting the arrest of a band of Nihilists that were 
manufacturing in Paris bombs intended to serve 
against the Czar and his family. At the same date, 
Mr. de Freycinet, the Minister of War, rendered 
Russia a service of another kind, no less appreciated, 
by putting our Chatellerault Arms Factories at her 

' To the loans above mentioned must be added the 5 per cent loan 
of 1822, quoted on the Exchange, on and after February 22, 1890 ; 
the Interior loan, admitted on 'Change June 2, 1894; and, last of 
all, the Austrian portion of the 1900 loan, which has remained on 
the Paris market. 



FRANCE AND THE RUSSIAN ALLIANCE 11 

disposal. Every day the atmosphere grew more 
favourable.^ With statesmanlike perspicacity, Mr. 
de Laboulaye saw that the time had come for action, 
and that only the approval of the people was required 
to bring to a successful issue these combinations, 
previously conceived in the secret councils of the 
two Chancelleries. In the summer of 1890, he or- 
ganized the visit of the French fleet to Russia ; but, 
for reasons of opportuneness, the project was not 
realized until the next year. On the 25th of July, 
1891, Admiral Gervais' squadron arrived off Cron- 
stadt. 

The memory of this triumphal visit is so recent 
that I need not dwell upon it. All Europe was 
astounded at the Russian nation's enthusiasm. 
All at once, in spite of distance, in spite of a past of 
mistrust, in spite of differences of every sort, political, 
intellectual, and moral, Russian opinion and French 
opinion, breaking a long silence, united in applaud- 
ing the act which manifested the rapprochement. 
Although the Alliance was not yet made, it was 
already looked upon as certain. A few weeks later, 
in the Reichstag, the Count von Caprivi, Chancellor 
of the German Empire, said in the course of an 
Army speech: '^There can be no doubt that a close 
rapprochement has come about between France and 
Russia. It has been in preparation for a long while. 
But to-day, everything, Cronstadt included, seems 
to indicate that an alliance is intended." This 
Alliance was signed on the 22d of August, 1891, by 
^ See Ernest Daudet's book already cited. 



12 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

Mr. Ribot, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Baron 
de Mohrenheim, who was the Russian Ambassador 
at Paris. At the end of June, 1892, General de 
Boisdeffre, being at the head of the Army Staff, 
went to Saint Petersburg, for the purpose of nego- 
tiating a military arrangement completing the initial 
protocol, and gave the Cabinet's seal to a defensive 
pact between France and Russia.^ The two coun- 
tries thus abandoned their isolation, and thereby 
reestablished the balance of power in Europe. 

II 

During four years longer, the signatory Govern- 
ments forbore to render their Alliance public ; but, 
in the meantime, they determined its character 
more precisely. On the 31st of August, 1891, at a 
fete given in his honour at Cauterets, the Russian 
Ambassador, Mr. de Mohrenheim, said : — 

Mr. Prefect, you have just alluded to the mutual current of 
sympathy set up throughout Russia and France. . . . There 
are many reasons why this should be so. 

A few days later at Vandeuvre, Mr. de Freycinet, 
who combined with his Premiership the Ministry 
of War, held in his turn the following discourse : — 

Don't let us tire of improving and strengthening our Army. 
It is one of the elements, and not the least, of our influence in the 
world. It has its share in the events that are a joy to our patri- 
otism. Its progress, which Europe sees and France applauds, 
inspires some with confidence, others with respect. Such prog- 

* See Jules Hansen's book. The Baron de Mohrenheim' s Ambas- 
sadorship at Paris. 



FRANCE AND THE RUSSIAN ALLIANCE 13 

ress, moreover, proves that the Government of the Republic, in 
spite of superficial changes, are capable of long designs, and 
that in the accomplishment of national tasks, they manifest a 
consistency that is not inferior to a Monarchy's. No one to-day 
doubts our strength. Let us show that we are prudent. We 
shall know how to maintain, in a new situation, the coolness, 
dignity and moderation which, during days of misfortune, pre- 
pared our recovery. 

Finally, on the 29th of September at Bapaume, 
Mr. Ribot, Minister of Foreign Affairs, said : — 

After hesitating for some time, Europe has, at last, done us 
justice. A Sovereign, who is far-seeing and firm in his designs, 
and pacific like ourselves, has publicly demonstrated the deep 
sjnmpathies uniting his country and our own. (Enthusiastic ap- 
plause. Cries of: 'Long live the Czar! Hurrah for France! 
Hurrah for Russia ! ') 

The Russian nation have joined their Emperor in giving us 
proofs of cordial friendship. (Fresh applause.) 

You know how well we reciprocate these sentiments. (Yes! 
Yes!) 

The events of Cronstadt have had an echo even in our small- 
est hamlets, our tiniest villages. ... 

From them has resulted, as Justly remarked, a new situa- 
tion, which does not mean that a new policy needs to be adapted 
to it. . . . 

. . . Just at the moment when we are able to practice peace 
with more dignity, we are not likely to expose ourselves to its 
being compromised. Conscious of her strength and confident 
in her future, France will continue to exhibit the qualities of 
prudence and coolness which have gained her other peoples' 
esteem and have helped to restore her to the rank due to her in 
the world. 

In other words, to a state of forced peace succeeded 
one that was voluntary. Doubtless, the Franco- 
Russian Alliance was not an alliance formed for 
revenge. Its object was not to give us back Alsace- 



14 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

Lorraine. But it insured us in Europe a moral 
authority which, since our defeats, had been want- 
ing to us. It augmented our diplomatic value. 
It opened to us the field of political combinations, 
from which our isolation had excluded us. From 
mere observation, we could pass to action, thanks 
to the recovered balance of power. 

To prove that such was the character of the 
Franco-Russian Alliance, I cannot do better than 
quote the Chancellor of the German Empire. Re- 
turning from Saint Petersburg to Paris early in 
June, 1902, I had the honour of a long interview 
with Count von Buelow at Berlin. After speaking 
to me of the journey Mr. Loubet had just made, as 
President of the Republic, to Russia, he added: — 

''The Triple Alliance and the Dual Alliance are the 
chief supports of the European balance of power." 

This was implicitly admitting that, until the latter 
was an accomplished fact, the equilibrium did not 
exist, Mr. Jaures, in his sacrilegious letter on the 
Triplice, as being a necessary counterweight to 
Franco-Russian jingoism, stands alone in ignoring, 
despite history and geography, this plain truth. 
By uniting their previously isolated forces, France 
and Russia had made Europe stable again. 

For some years, the two Allies would seem to 
have been too exclusively absorbed in contemplat- 
ing the fact of their union, and multiplied outward 
manifestations that might convince the world at 
large of its reality. In June, 1892, the Grand Duke 
Constantino came in the Czar's name to Nancy, to 



FRANCE AND THE RUSSIAN ALLIANCE 15 

pay his respects to President Carnot. In the ensu- 
ing September, Messrs. Ribot and de Freycinet 
had a meeting, at Aix-les-Bains, with Messrs. de 
Giers and de Mohrenheim. In November, the 
Grand Duke Vladimir was Mr. Carnot's guest. 
In October, 1893, Admiral Avellan's sailors were 
boisterously feted at Toulon, and afterwards in 
Paris. In September, 1895, Prince Lobanoff, Min- 
ister of Foreign Affairs, and General Dragomiroff 
paid us a visit in their turn. In October, 1896, the 
Czar and Czarina, amidst extraordinary ovations, 
made a stay in France, which was terminated by 
the admirable Chalons review. Then came, in 
1897, Count Mouravieff's journey to Paris as Prince 
Lobanoff's successor, and Mr. Felix Faure's visit 
to Russia; in 1899, Mr. Delcasse's journey to Rus- 
sia, and that of Count Mouravieff to Paris; in 
1901, Admiral Birilev's call at Villefranche with 
his squadron, Mr. Delcasse's second visit to Saint 
Petersburg, and the Czar and Czarina's stay at 
Compiegne; lastly, in 1902, Mr. Loubet's journey 
to Russia, that of Count Lamsdorf to Paris; and, 
more recently (in 1906 and 1907), the two stays 
in our Capital of Mr. Isvolski, appointed, on 
Count Lamsdorf's retirement, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. 

That all these official comings and goings, accom- 
panied by an abundant exchange of telegrams, in- 
creased the practical value of the Alliance, is not so 
certain as some have maintained. At most, may it 
be said, that Mr. Felix Faure's journey to Russia, fur- 



16 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

nished the Czar and himself with an auspicious oc- 
casion to define publicly the ties subsisting between 
their two '^friendly and allied" countries. With 
that exception, these frequent meetings, amid much 
ado, produced no result of immediate utility. A 
policy of parade may satisfy vanities; it can also 
offend them; rarely does it serve interests. And 
I am inclined to share the opinion expressed to me 
by Count Witte, when he said to me one day : — 

"For ten years you have been making Franco- 
Russian manifestations, in season and out of season." 

I have seen the principal of these manifestations 
close to. I was at Compiegne in 1901, at Tsarskoie- 
Selo in 1902. And the impression they have left 
upon me is, that it is neither necessary nor profitable 
to celebrate alliances with the help of protocol and 
ceremonial. One is exposed in so doing to incidents 
comical or painful. Was it indispensable to Franco- 
Russian politics for the Czarina Alexandra to hear 
at Compiegne, — without any pleasure, — the re- 
peated, "Oh! oh! c'est une imperatrice^' with which 
Mr. Edmond Rostand had thought fit to greet her? 
Was it opportune to offer a certain Russian diplo- 
matist, at the time belonging to the Russian 
Embassy at Paris, the occasion to behave discour- 
teously towards the Republican Government, and 
then to put ourselves forward in order to secure him 
a pardon that was not justified? Ought we to have 
given our guests the spectacle of ridiculous quarrels 
between the wives of our Ministers and those of our 
Ambassadors? And later, could it be thought an 



FRANCE AND THE RUSSIAN ALLIANCE 17 

edifying sight, when a Secretary of the French Em- 
bassy at Saint Petersburg, — who claimed to possess 
President Loubet's entire confidence and that of 
Mr. Delcasse, — entered into open conflict with his 
hierarchic superior, the Marquis de Montebello? 
A Republic never finds it advantageous to measure 
itself with a Monarchy on the ground of protocol 
observance. The lack of habit therein leads to 
errors, on this or that side of the mean, to omissions 
or excess-commissions of zeal. Thence results for 
the Democratic regime, thus induced to lavish 
complaisances of somewhat servile character, an 
embarrassed and, as it were, subaltern situation, 
which creates a factitious inequality between two 
governments called upon to treat political questions 
on the same footing. Too many fetes — too many 
flowers, might one say — have been loaded upon 
the Franco-Russian Alliance. Neither on the one 
hand nor on the other have they yielded matter for 
congratulation.^ 

Between 1893 and 1902, the combined action of 
the two allied countries was wanting in intensity and 
consistency. Each of them looked after their own 
affairs, while profiting by the moral credit which the 
Alliance brought, yet without developing the credit 
by a methodical cooperation. Thanks to the assist- 
ance afforded by French capital, Russia was able to 
carry out her Railway programme and her conver- 
sions, to construct the Trans-Siberian, and to 
devote herself more and more exclusively to ques- 

^ The same thing may be said of Franco-English relations. 
c 



18 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

tions interesting her in the Far East. France, after' 
giving herself up for three years to the Dreyfus 
Affair, managed to paralyze her activity through 
religious struggles. A few years later, Russia found 
herself engaged with the armies of Japan; France 
with the diplomacy of Germany. Manchuria in 
the one case, Morocco in the other; such were the 
assets of the Alliance. How had it been possible 
for such consequences to issue from a right prin- 
ciple ? How was it that the pact of 1891, instead of 
protecting its signataries from reverses and humilia- 
tions, had left the way open to this double and 
astonishing set-back? 

Ill 

The reply to this question is easy. If the Alliance 
had become sterile, the reason was, that Russia's 
wilful blindness and France's weakness, had allowed 
it to deviate from its aim. Instead of keeping 
Europe for its sphere of action, it had gradually 
drifted towards Asia. So that, finally, instead of 
reminding our Allies, for their good and our own, 
of the respect they owed to the fundamental pact — 
respect of the letter and respect of the spirit — we 
had, with sheeplike docility, made ourselves the 
accomplices of their imprudence. 

On the day when Mr. Witte, by modifying the 
track of the Trans-Siberian, directed Russia's money, 
Army and Navy, towards the seas of China, France ' 
ought to have protested. And this she did not do. 
In 1895, she joined Russia and Germany, in order jT 



FRANCE AND THE RUSSIAN ALLIANCE 19 

to stop Japan on the threshold of victory, in the 
name of the Chinese Empire's integrity. Two years 
later, with singular incoherence, she violated this 
integrity — again imitating these two powers — 
by seizing Kouang-Tcheou-Ouan, as Germany had 
taken the Chantung, and Russia, Port Arthur/ 
In 1900, during the negotiations that followed the 
Pekin expedition, she passively accepted Russia's 
lead. In 1901, she made no attempt to show the 
Russians the mistake they were committing in 
neglecting the Japanese Alliance which the Marquis 
Ito had come to offer them. Last of all, in 1902, 
when Japan had turned to England and had signed 
the Treaty of the 30th of January, 1902, she was"^ 
rash enough to reply to this treaty by the declara- 
tion of the 19th of March, which, if it had any 
meaning, extended to the Far East the action of 
the Dual Alliance. 

This declaration was thus conceived : — 

The allied Governments of France and Russia, having re- 
ceived communication of the Anglo-Japanese Convention of 
the 30th of January, 1902, concluded with a view to assuring the 
status quo and general peace in the Far East, and to maintain the 
independence of China and Corea, which should remain open to 
the commerce and industry of all nations, were fully satisfied 
to find therein affirmed the essential principles which they them- 
selves have on several occasions declared to constitute and to 
remain the basis of their policy. 

The two Governments deem that the respecting of these 
principles is at the same time a guarantee for their special inter- 
ests in the Far East. However, being themselves obliged to 
provide for the case in which either the aggressive action of 

^ See Rene Pinon's book. The Struggle for the Pacific. 



20 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

third Powers, or new troubles in China, raising the question of 
the integrity and free development of this Power, should become 
a menace for their own interests, the two allied Governments 
reserve to themselves the right eventually to provide means for 
their preservation. 

A few days afterwards, Mr. Delcasse, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, denied in the Chamber that, in 
signing the above text, he had intended or accepted 
an extension of the Alliance to Eastern Asia. But 
then, what was the meaning of the declaration? 
Was it a mere surface manifestation for the purpose 
of make-believe? Such kinds of '^ bluff" are re- 
doubtable snares, in which those who have recourse 
to them are usually caught. The joint note of the 
19th of March misled Russian opinion by allowing 
it to count on France's eventual aid. It irritated 
Japanese opinion by leading it to dread a double 
European hostility. It accustomed everybody to 
the idea of a war by opposing to one another the 
two groups, Japan and England, Russia and France. 
At the very least, it was an encouragement to the 
Russian colonial party, who, through greedy specu- 
lation or ignorance of the facts, refused to perceive 
the inevitable issue of the movement towards 
Corea. It favoured the plans of men like Bezo- 
brazoff ^ and other risk-alls, who precipitated Russia 
into the war of 1904. 

France, who, in 1902, had not foreseen the danger, 

* Mr. Bezobrazoff had succeeded in interesting a number of big 
manufacturers in the Yalu Company. His intrigues were one of 
the causes of the war. See Kouropatkin's revelations (McClure's 
Magazine, September, 1908). 



FRANCE AND THE RUSSIAN ALLIANCE 21 

continued her scepticism until the day when it 
burst. Three months before the war, while all our 
agents in the Far East were declaring it to be un- 
avoidable, Mr. Dele ass e asserted that it was im- 
possible. Instead of listening to our ministers and 
consuls, who said, ''Japan means war," he paid 
attention only to the Czar, whose language was, ''I 
desire peace." When it was still time to restrain 
our Allies on the eve of a rupture, and to say to 
them, ''You are not ready," he allowed himself to 
be the dupe of certain civil or military personages, 
who, having staked their whole career on the Alli- 
ance, were to him the Leboeufs of this second Sedan, 
and guaranteed that everything would be ready, 
even to the last gaiter-button. Instead of reminding 
Russia, that her contribution to the Alliance was her 
strength in Europe, we let her sacrifice at once her 
pledges and her interests. 

Both morally and materially, the Alliance risked 
wreck in this storm. The French pubhc, who for 
twelve years had been accustomed to count on Russia, 
were deeply disappointed by her repulses and were 
not able to hide their sentiments. That the war would 
necessarily be long and diflB.cult at such a distance; 
that there would be huge obstacles in the way of 
provisioning the army, which had been transported 
to the front at a great expense; that the Staff in 
command had not been suitably prepared for their 
task, — all this was known and expected. What 
was not foreseen, was the continued series of re- 
verses, the implacable development of an irre- 



22 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

mediable inferiority, the demonstration of strategic 
incapacity, surpassed only by administrative care- 
lessness — a misreckoning cruel for the Eussians, 
and almost as cruel for the French, who had put 
their faith and sense of security in the Alliance. 

Then those who, from the outset, had been op- 
posed to our pledging ourselves to Russia, began to 
cast up accounts and strike the balance, with the 
most unfavourable interpretation possible. The 
three loans of 1890 were passed in review, the two 
loans of 1891, those of 1893, 1894, 1896, 1901, 1904. 
To these were added the municipal loans and 
Finlandese loans, the sums invested in metallurgic 
mining, manufacturing or transport undertakings, 
the whole totalling nearly twelve billions, that is 
to say, nearly a fourth of the French capital invested 
abroad; and, while doing justice to the Czar's 
Government for its exact punctuality in paying 
dividends and coupons, the doubt was expressed, 
as to whether the services rendered by Russia were 
worth the price paid for them, as to whether the 
Alliance, so useful to Russia for her conversions, 
the redemption of her railways, the equilibrium of 
her budget, and the construction of the Trans-Si- 
berian, had given France an equivalent in return, 
especially after the Asiatic adventure, , which, on 
the Manchurian soil or in the Chinese seas, engulfed 
the men, ironclads, and millions intended, as we 
hoped, for the safeguarding of European peace. 

This impression was put into words with some- 
what bad taste. Mr. Combes, the Prime Minister, 



FRANCE AND THE RUSSIAN ALLIANCE 23 

made blunt statements to journalists, which a 
Russian diplomatist characterized in an interview 
with me : — 

"It is disagreeable/' he said, "when we ask you 
for nothing, to hear your Premier proclaim from the 
housetops that you don't intend to give us any- 
thing." 

I remember being one evening, after a Russian 
defeat, at the Russian Embassy, where I met the 
German Ambassador, who, prompter or shrewder 
than the French Government, had come to convey 
to his colleague the expression of his sympathy. 
Such things as these were only failures in tact; 
but, under the circumstances, they were deeply 
felt by Russia. They were all the more regrettable, 
as they caused us to lose the benefit of our alto- 
gether correct attitude in the question of neutrality. 
Not only were we assuring to our allies our financial 
help, as in the past ; but, immediately after the North 
Sea or Dogger Bank incident, Mr. Delcasse success- 
fully intervened to prevent the conflict that threat- 
ened to embroil them with England. A few weeks 
later, through the facilities — legitimate indeed in ' 
French Law — which we afforded Admiral Rodjest- 
vensky's squadron at Madagascar and in Indo- 
China, we exposed ourselves to the gravest diffi- 
culties with Japan. None the less, there was a 
general impression — and against impressions dis- 
cussion is useless — that the Alliance was growing 
cooler, that its bonds were loosening and coming 
undone. The moral impetus which had animated 



24 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

its first years of existence, seemed to be checked for 
long to come. 

Materially, the detriment was still more severely 
felt. For Russia, there was not only the disastrous 
end to her dream in Asia; there was her military' 
disorganization besides, coinciding with domestic • 
troubles. For France, there was the annihilation 
of the guarantee that had been gained in 1891., 
In September, 1904, the Russian forces succumbed!! 
at Liao-Yang. In March, 1905, they were crushed:, 
at Mukden. It was in the same month of March 
that the Emperor William, disembarking at Tan- 
gier, played check to the mission of Mr. Saint- Rene 
Taillandier at Fez ; check also to Mr. Dele ass e's 
policy. If, to make use of the Chancellor's ex- 
pression, German diplomacy had been a deductive 
one, it was in 1904 that the objections raised in 
1905 to our treaty with England and our Moroc- 
can projects would have been put forward. But 
being, and flattering itself on being, an opportunist 
one, it had waited until the war in Manchuria and 
the paralysis of the Alliance, should place France 
within reach of its attack.^ 

For having allowed their Alliance to be turned 
aside from its proper object, both Russians and 
French suffered jointly for their joint mistake. 
Military defeats on the one side, diplomatic defeats 
on the other, demonstrated a contrario the necessity 
of a pact which had become useless only by reason 
of its having been tampered with. Would the 
* See Andre Tardieu's Conference of Algeciras. 



FRANCE AND THE RUSSIAN ALLIANCE 25 

lesson be profitable to those who had just felt its 
weight so severely? 

IV 

On the French side first, wise reflections took the 
place of earlier disappointment. Among the Radi- 
cals, Radical-Socialists, and Socialists even, who, 
only a little while before, were criticizing the barren- 
ness of the Russian Alliance, hesitation was visible. 
From the comparison of dates, the truth was per- 
ceived. And when it was realized how closely 
Germany's rough manifestation had followed the 
weakening of Russia's strength, it was better under- 
stood what force and security France had derived 
for thirteen years from the many-times depreciated 
Alliance. 

It was thought that, if Russia had remained pacific 
and preserved her position of advantage in Europe, 
William II, other things being equal, would have 
put less vehemence and brutality into his action at 
Tangier; that, even if uneasy, as he pretended to 
be, at Mr. Delcasse's tendencies, he would have 
found a discreeter way of expressing his uneasiness, 
either to the head of the State or to the head of the 
Ministry. Lulled with pacific songs, the Parliament 
had given itself up to the illusion that the war in 
Manchuria was none of its concern. Being sharply 
awakened, it saw that, from Mukden to Fez, the 
way was not so long as it had believed, and that the 
road between the two places passed through Paris. 

Undoubtedly, the domestic history of Russia 



26 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

during the last few years has added a fresh diffi- 
culty to those already existing. French opinion in 
the majority has, more often than not, disapproved 
the somewhat arbitrary police operations of the 
Czar's Government. Without always taking suffi- 
ciently into account the circumstances surrounding 
each case, people have found that the Autocracy, 
in its halting evolution towards liberty, was for- 
getting the juridical maxim that " Donner et retenir 
ne vaut." ^ The seriousness of this incongruity, 
however, ought not to be exaggerated. The treaties 
binding nations, in view of their foreign relations 
and action, by their very essence make abstraction 
of domestic policy. The similarity of regimes and 
institutions has but little importance, if international 
interests do not agree. On the contrary, the con- 
cordance of these interests suffices to justify a con- 
tract of alliance. Francis I had no objection to 
ally himself with the Grand Turk. Richelieu treated 
with the Protestants, and Mazarin with Cromwell. 
Even Mr. Jaures, who, it is true, has since changed 
his mind, declared on the 23d of January, 1903, that 
he had no fundamental objection to the Russian 
Alliance, and added: ''There was a time when the 
Republican party wondered whether it would be 
possible to establish solidarity of foreign policy 
between two countries so dissimilar in their political 
and social conditions. This is a preoccupation that 
we have no right to entertain. ... It is the duty 

^ Compare the English proverb, Give a thing, take a thing, 
Naughty man's plaything. 



FRANCE AND THE RUSSIAN ALLIANCE 27 

of all Frenchmen to do nothing which can shake 
and destroy the Franco- Russian understanding." 

On the Russian side, fidelity to the French Alli- 
ance was evinced in the most energetic way during 
the Conference at Algeciras. And the appointment 
of Mr. Isvolski to the Russian Foreign Office; was 
followed by his country's becoming once more a 
factor in Europe, which return to the normal state 
of things is a matter for congratulation to France. 
The agreements with Japan in 1907, consolidating 
the Treaty of Peace in 1905, have checked the 
reappearance of the Asiatic mirage.^ The signing 
of an agreement with Great Britain in the same year, 
has accentuated the evolution and freed French 
policy from the awkwardness of having to keep up. 
at once, between a divided Russia and England, 
the Russian Alliance and English friendship.^ At 
the time of his first journey to Paris in 1906, Mr. 
Isvolski, indeed, had an opportunity of testifying 
to the sincerity of his sentiments towards France. 
He had been in the Capital for a few days when he 
received the unexpected visit of Prince Ouroussov, 
the Russian Ambassador at Vienna. The Prince 
came to inform him that it would be appreciated in 
Austria and Germany if, after his call at Paris and 
Berlin, he were to return to Saint Petersburg through 
Vienna. Mr. Isvolski replied : — 

''I shall not do what you propose. I have come 
to Paris, because France is Russia's ally. I shall 
call at Berlin, because, having to pass through this 

^ See below, Chapter VII. ' See below, Chapter VII. 



28 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

city, I owe it to our friendly relations with Germany 
to stop there. But I shall not go to Vienna, because 
I have no reasons for going there, and because, by 
going, I should alter the significance of my journey, 
especially as I have not been to London." 

The Russian Minister thus affirmed his resolution 
not to modify the character of the Franco-Russian 
Alliance, by superimposing on it more or less de- 
terminately a kind of resuscitation of the ''Alliance 
of the Three Emperors." Since then, his policy, 
made increasingly precise by the rapprochement 
with England, has preserved the same character. 
The replacement, long desired by him, of the French 
Ambassador at Saint Petersburg, Mr. Bompard, 
by Admiral Touchard, has tended to confirm him 
in these intentions. 

Brought back to its original scope, the Alliance 
seems, therefore, destined to regain its full value in 
Europe. The mistakes committed have been taken 
to heart on both sides ; and, on both sides also, their 
logical conclusion has been drawn. In spite of 
press polemics which break out from time to time, 
a close understanding remains the norm of the rela- 
tions of the two countries with each other. Whether 
the newspapers discuss military questions or deal 
with financial questions, their arguments are usually 
frivolous. When the Novoie Vremia attacks the 
French Army, it wilfully exaggerates defects that 
are easy to correct, and deliberately leaves out of 
count merits of the highest order. When French 
newspapers criticise the Russian army and claim 



FRANCE AND THE RUSSIAN ALLIANCE 29 

that the war in Manchuria, carried on for two years 
by this army at thousands of kilometres from its 
base, has pronounced against it a verdict from 
which there is no appeal, they are no less completely 
deceived. As for the financial question, and the 
puerile bickering that makes the Russians say, 
''You were only too happy to lend us your money," 
while the French retort, "And you were only too 
glad to keep it," there is no need to dwell on it. 
The essential quality of financial operations is to 
serve the interests of both borrowers and lenders. 
If Russia has borrowed our money, she required it, 
and, therefore, has nothing to reproach us with on 
this score. If we have lent it to her, we did so be- 
cause it suited us, and we have no reproaches to 
make either. 

Economic relations between the countries, more- 
over, are susceptible of being developed. It has 
been seen above what a formidable sum of money 
France has invested in Russia. The amount of 
our loans, quite as much as the interests of the 
Alliance, would have justified on her part a less 
subaltern utilization of the pledges of 1891. But, . 
financially, French . lenders have nothing to regret. 
The financial situation of Russia is not bad. The 
ordinary budgets — deduction made of the expenses 
incurred during the war and by the construction of 
railways — are in a condition of equilibrium. The 
difficulties of the last few years are to be explained 
rather by Exchequer reasons than budgetary. 
They have their origin, as a matter of fact, either 



30 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

in expenses that are directly productive, or in 
reimbursements of debts, or else in exceptional 
circumstances. The capital of the Eussian debt, 
which on the 1st of January amounted to 327,000,000 
francs, represents less than 200 francs per inhabitant, 
— a high figure, it is true, but not excessive. The 
gross expenses of the debt — comprising the amor- 
tizements, that is to say, the counterpart of the 
loan resources — absorb 17 J- per cent of the ordinary 
budgetary receipts, which is a less proportion than 
in many other States. Without doubt, France has 
the duty and the right to desire that a thorough 
reform of the Russian bureaucracy, both in financial 
matters and in other administrations, shall insure 
the regularity, honesty, and competence which 
have so often been wanting. No less legitimate is 
the desire to develop by commercial agreements 
economic relations, which, in spite of a somewhat 
unfavourable Customs legislation, have made appre- 
ciable progress during the last twenty-five years. 
But, without underestimating the importance of 
the services rendered by France to Russia, it is 
altogether unjust to pretend, as some do, that the 
Alliance is liable to have bankruptcy as its counter- 
part. 

In military matters, it is natural that the Russians 
should wish to see the French Army equal to its 
task. The development of our strength, and the 
compensation of the weakness resulting from our 
two years' service by a better utilization of our 
resources, are duties imposed upon us in our own 



FRANCE AND THE RUSSIAN ALLIANCE 31 

interest, still more than in that of our Allies. On 
her side, Russia must make herself capable of 
successfully playing the role incumbent on her, in 
the event of a European war. For that, she has 
still much to do. The Russo-Japanese war has 
certainly diminished her power of attack for some 
time to come. It drew successively on the military 
formations belonging to the Far East, the Reserve 
divisions stationed in the various central provinces, 
and, ultimately, on the several Army corps destined 
to the defence of the Western frontier and, more 
peculiarly, prepared for an intervention beyond this 
same frontier, on those which, consequently, have 
an especial interest for the Franco- Russian Alliance. 
Transported in detachments to the front, these West- 
ern Army Corps were obliged to borrow men, officers, 
artillery, and material from those that were not being 
mobilized. And the latter thus became incapable of 
immediately passing from a peace to a war footing. 
Moreover, domestic disturbances required their 
employment against the Revolutionaries, under 
conditions which had nothing in common with the 
plan of mobilization. In a word, that which was 
left to Russia in the way of military strength at 
the end of the war no longer weighed in the European 
balance of power, and no longer counted in the esti- 
mates of international policy. 

In order for this state of things to end, the drafts 
made by the Far East on European Russia had to 
be restored. The demobilization commenced di- 
rectly after the signing of the Treaty of Ports- 



32 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

mouth. A general strike on the railways retarded 
it, and caused the returning convoys to be almost 
as long on the journey as the outgoing ones had 
been. Not until within the closing months of .1906, 
were the European Army Corps completely rein- 
stalled along the Western frontier. They had lost 
in Manchuria a considerable portion of their units 
and the whole of their belongings, spent their war 
provisions, experienced the fatigues of a hard cam- 
paign, and suffered the demoralization of defeat. 
Their military capacity could only be regained 
through a twofold persevering effort — of recon- 
stitution and reorganization. The reconstitution 
requires considerable expense, and is, therefore, 
subordinated to the state of the finances. It implies 
changes in weapon equipment and military accesso- 
ries. Count Witte recently estimated the cost of 
this necessary undertaking at a billion roubles, or 
nearly three billions of francs. Although these 
figures are enormous, the Government and the Duma 
owe it imperatively, both to Russia and to France, 
to set to work without delay. 

As regards the reorganization, various measures 
have been taken since the conclusion of peace. 
The fundamental military law of March, 1906, has 
reduced the duration of the service to three years, 
instead of the five fixed by the old law, which in 
practice became four. The long time passed by 
soldiers of the active Army under the flag, resulted 
in the Reserves being composed of men compara- 
tively old and numerically weak. These two in- 



FRANCE AND THE RUSSIAN ALLIANCE 33 

conveniences had been keenly felt in Manchuria, 
where the bad component elements of the Reserve 
divisions first transported to the front, were partly 
the cause of the defeat of Liao-Yang. With a 
shorter service, it has been found necessary to 
increase numerically the annual contingents, since 
the active Army will have henceforward to be filled 
up by means of, no longer four, but three contingents. 
The last three levies have been fixed at about four 
hundred and seventy thousand men. This change 
will extend to the Reserve classes, which will become 
younger, more numerous, and more capable of 
homogeneity. Its tendency will be also to bring 
about a modification in the recruiting regulations, 
which date back to 1874, and to diminish the exemp- 
tions. In fine, three years being just sufficient to 
form a non-commissioned officer in Russia, service 
re enlistments will have to be made use of. Although 
certain measures have already been taken, the lack 
of a well-coordinated plan is keenly felt. It is 
indispensable for Russia's security, for her pledges 
exchanged with France, and for the balance of power 
in Europe, that this plan should be clearly defined 
and energetically carried out through a cordial 
understanding between the ancient bureaucracy and 
the young Duma. 

On these conditions, the Franco- Russian Alliance 
will have its full practical effect. To-day, as yester- 
day, and to-morrow, as to-day, this AUiance, if 
sincerely executed, both is and will be equally 
necessary to the two contracting parties. Let us 



34 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

once again repeat that one has only to look at a map 
to be convinced that, in a Continental war, Russia 
alone would be able to immobilize part of our 
adversaries' forces — and reciprocally. It is by 
coming back to this principle that, the whole bearing 
of the 1891 pact is understood. As Count Witte 
said to me in 1905: "The essence of our Franco- 
Russian relations is not modified. The Alliance 
remains in conformity to the interests of the two 
nations. In this Alliance, there is nothing to change, 
and nothing must be changed." For such a change 
to be justified, Europe would have to cease to be 
Europe. 



CHAPTER II 

FRANCE AND THE ENGLISH "ENTENTE " 

I. Franco-English rivalry. — Three centuries of war, — At- 
tempts at an understanding, and their failure. — Algeria. 

— Tunis. — The Niger. — The Congo. — The Upper Nile 
and Egypt. — Fashoda. 

II. Causes of the Franco-English rapprochement. — Germany 
and England. — Bismarck's policy. — German progress. — 
Commercial competition. — English merchants and consuls. 

— Political distrust. — British impeachment. — France 
and the balance of power. — Franco-English commerce. — 
End of the colonial quarrel. 

III. Entente Cordiale. — Role of Edward VII. — Visit of 1903. 

— Negotiations. — Agreement of the 8th of April, 1904. — 
Egypt. — Morocco. — Value of the arrangement. — Franco- 
English manifestations. — German Policy and the evolu- 
tion of the Entente Cordiale. — Anglo-Russian rapproche- 
ment. 

IV. Entente or Alliance. — Military problem. — Weakness of 
the English Army. — Mr. Haldane's reforms. — Their in- 
sufficiency. — State of English opinion. — French interests. 

— Policy of neutrality. — Conditions of an Alliance. — 
Failing these conditions, friends, but not allies. 



Never has a reconciliation been more unexpected 
than the one which, on the 8th of April, 1904, put 
an end to the ancient quarrel between England and 
France; and still more unexpected was the perma- 

35 



36 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

nent character it has since assumed. Now and 
again, during the last hundred years, there were hints 
of an Entente Cordiale, but these incipient under- 
standings were of short duration. In 1801, the 
inhabitants of London unharnessed the horses of 
the First Consul's Aide-de-Camp, Colonel de Lauris- 
ton, who had come to ratify the terms of peace; 
and yet, a few months later, the war began which 
was to finish only at Waterloo. Again, in 1838, 
when Marshal Soult went as Louis-Philippe's repre- 
sentative to the coronation of Queen Victoria, he 
was most enthusiastically received; but, within a 
couple of years after, there was very nearly an 
open rupture between the two countries. Similarly, 
under Napoleon III, both understanding and subse- 
quent alliance were ephemeral; and, with the 
advent of 1860, Queen Victoria counselled a ^'regular 
crusade" against France. The opinion of Albert 
Sorel, as expressed in his writings, was that ''between 
France and England understandings may exist, 
as they have existed in the past, for the purpose of 
preserving the statu quo, but that England has 
never been, and can never be, an ally for France, : 
except on condition of the latter's abandoning her 
foreign expansion." ^ The same thing had been 
said by Lord Chatham a century earlier in some- 
what different words, ''England's only fear here' 
below is that France should become a naval, com- 
mercial, and colonial power." 
After the fall of the Stuarts, the habitual relations 

» See the Temps of December 24, 1903. 



FRANCE AND THE ENGLISH "ENTENTE" 37 

of France and England were those of war ; ^ follow- 
ing each other, came the war of the League of 
Augsbourg (1688-1697), the war of the Spanish suc- 
cession (1701-1711), the war of the Austrian suc- 
cession (1742-1748), the Seven Years' War (1756- 
1763), the American war (1778-1783), the wars 
of the Revolution and Empire (1793-1815) ; and, 
in between these periods of fighting, there were 
intervals of precarious peace overshadowed by deep 
reciprocal mistrust. Such is the record of the past, 
explained by the fact that England regarded France 
as her most dreaded adversary in Europe, and more 
especially outside of Europe, and that she was 
defending, against contingent successes of our own 
country, the naval supremacy which is the sine qua 
non of her existence. ''Beware," said Mr. Urquhart, 
a Member of Parliament, in 1862, ''the sea threatens 
while it serves you; it bears you, but it environs 
you. The position of this island is such that, there 
is no via media for her between being all-powerful 
and being nothing at all. This is why she waS* 
always conquered until, having subjugated the sea, 
she in turn became mistress of the worla^ England 
will be the sea's victim on the day sh§ ceases to 
be its queen." From the conviction of ^^h neces- 
sity arose the adoption of the two-r^w^s standard, 
"England's fleets must be superior* to those of the 
two strongest naval Powers inr^i^cTlpe combined." 
And from it also was born the ^nti-French policy. 

* See Mr. Jean Darcy's excellent volume, A Hundred Years of 
Colonial Rivalry. 



:-iL 



■it 



38 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

Throughout the nineteenth century, without in- 
terruption and without hesitancy, England opposed 
the expansion of France. She began with disputing, 
step by step, the execution of the treaties of 1815, 
which restored to us Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, 
Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guyana, our factories in 
Senegal and Guinea, the isle of Bourbon and the 
five towns in India. In 1830, for months, she 
threatened us with war, at the time when we were 
installing ourselves in Algeria. In the preceding 
years, she had boldly supported the Barbary pirates 
against France; and, when Prince de Polignac 
decided on a military expedition, she brought to 
bear on him a pressure which can only be compared 
to that exercised by Germany in 1905 with regard 
to Morocco. At Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, her consuls 
set the Mussulmans against us: ''The French are 
mad," cried Wellington, "a terrible reverse awaits 
them on the coast of Algeria." A few days later 
Algiers was in our hands. Then all through Europe 
and in Africa, English diplomacy turned against 
France. At Gibraltar, the forces were mobilized. 

To the Due de Laval, French Ambassador at 
London, Lord Aberdeen, the Prime Minister, said : — 

"I wish you good-bye, Monsieur le Due, with more 
than ordinary regret, since I fear we shall not see 
each other again. Never, even in the days of the 
Republic and Empire, did France give us such reason 
to complain." 

To which the Ambassador replied : — 

''My Lord, I am unable either to tell or to foresee 



FRANCE AND THE ENGLISH "ENTENTE" 39 

what you may be hoping from the moderation of 
France ; but what I do know is that you will obtain 
nothing from her by threats." 

The conquest continued ; and, as long as it lasted, 
England's attitude was violently hostile. Mr. St. 
John, the English consul at Algiers, made a number 
of defamatory accusations against our troops; 
nor was it until 1851, when applying for the exe- 
quatur of this official's successor, that the English 
Cabinet reluctantly acknowledged the fait accompli. 
For no direct cause of local enmity, through simple 
hatred of French expansion, ''without any fixed 
plan other than that of acting everywhere and, on 
all occasions, in an interest opposed to that of 
France," England had thwarted our policy and 
weakened our influence. 

In the Tunis affair, she it was, on the contrary, 
who at the Berlin Congress made us the first advances, 
for reasons of general policy, and in order to render 
her occupation of Cyprus more palatable. However, 
some years later, when Jules Ferry tried to realize the 
profit which Lord Salisbury had, of his own accord, 
held out as an inducement to Mr. Waddington, 
objections of various kinds were raised by the British 
Foreign Office; and the Sultan, in particular, was 
advised that carte blanche had not been given to 
France. True, the English Government turned a 
deaf ear to the Bey when he begged aid. But regret 
was publicly expressed ''that France should have 
thought fit to open a fresh Eastern question to her 
profit"; and the English press assumed a denun- 



40 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

ciatory tone when the success of the French arms 
was decisive. On the 14th of May, 1881, Lord 
Lyons, the British Ambassador at Paris, handed a 
note to Mr. Barthelemy Saint-Hilaire, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, protesting in advance against Bizerta 
being made into a fortified town; and, a few weeks 
later, Lord Granville said to our Ambassador, Mr. 
Challemel-Lacour, ''I should lack frankness if I 
were to leave you under the impression that the 
action of France in Tunis has produced a favourable 
impression here." Indeed, England emphasized 
her opinion by abstaining for sixteen years from any 
revision of the treaties of commerce, which secured 
her exorbitant privileges in the Regency. 

In West Africa, the question of the Niger also 
brought British interests and our own into conflict. 
Our situation in the basin of the Niger was, in 1882, 
if anything, superior to theirs, and at any rate not 
inferior. Yet, in a few months, our fellow-country- 
men were ousted by the National African Company, 
soon transformed into the Royal Niger Company, 
with its charter and sovereign powers, thoroughly 
supported by the British Government. In spite 
of the successes of our explorers, and notwithstand- 
ing the protectorate treaties they signed with native 
chiefs, our diplomacy, through its shortsightedness 
and lack of energy, lost ground and was held in 
check under a campaign of systematic intimidation. ; 
The treaty of the 5th of August, 1890, set the seal . 
to this policy; and, through its defective drawing 
up, became the cause of subsequent difficulties. 



FRANCE AND THE ENGLISH "ENTENTE" 41 

Between 1890 and 1894, we made no effort to react 
against the aggressive behaviour of the Royal Niger 
Company towards our fellow-countrymen, and, in" 
particular, against Lieutenant Mizon. Our victo- 
ries over Rabah, Samory, and Behanzin even did 
not suffice to give us a due consciousness of our 
strength. When these successes were followed by f 
a more active pacific penetration. Sir Edward Grey 
replied in a tone of serious menace, which was more 
loudly echoed in the English press ; and we decided 
to evacuate one of our most important posts, the' 
Royal Niger Company's troops at once occupying 
it. Thereupon negotiations were entered into, which 
enabled us to gauge Great Britain's intransigence. 
The Pall Mall Gazette accused our officers of con- 
ducting themselves like ''vulgar brigands"; and, 
in his speeches, Mr. Chamberlain announced that 
he was asking for military preparations to be made.< 
On the 14th of June, 1898, a treaty was signed 
which, in reality, favoured England by shutting 
us out from the Lower Niger. Through a contin- 
uous forward policy, helped by the supineness of 
our statesmen, our implacable rival seized, in the 
most brutal way, on the great way of penetration 
into West Africa. 

In the Congo, Savorgnan de Brazza's successes 
had provoked in London both surprise and irrita- 
tion. As early as 1884, England signed a treaty 
with Portugal, intended to cut off both the French 
and Belgian Congo from their outlet on the Atlan- 
tic. In presence of protests from Belgium, France, 



42 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

and Germany, the Cabinet of Saint James yielded, 
and forbore to carry the treaty to its conclusion. 
On the other hand, no recognition was forthcoming, 
of the right of preemption conceded to France 
over the Belgian Congo. At the same date, as 
our explorers were displaying their activity on the 
Obanghi, Great Britain determined to shut us out 
from the Nile route. She proceeded to negotiate j 
an agreement with the Free State, which "made, 
as it was said, the Congo the mandatary of British 
policy, and introduced this State as England's ten- 
ant into the Nile Valley." Such a treaty was mani- 
festly directed against France ; and Mr. Hanotaux, 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, said so in Parlia- 
ment, adding: "This agreement places the Inde- 
pendent State in a condition of rupture — pacific, • 
I am willing to allow, but rupture none the less — 
with the signatory powers that gave their consent 
to its formation ; it is in formal contradiction with 
African international law." King Leopold gave 
way; and, some weeks later, signed another treaty 
with France which practically cancelled the pre- 
vious one. Here again. Great Britain had concen- 
trated her efforts against us, and, in her policy, set 
our enfeeblement as a goal to be attained. 

" The acute stage of the conflict between the two • 
countries was reached with the affair of Egypt. 
Since the cutting of the Suez Canal, the importance 
of the route to India had doubled for England. On 
the 9th of February, 1877, Lord Beaconsfield, act- 
ing on his own authority, bought for a hundred 



FRANCE AND THE ENGLISH "ENTENTE" 43 

million francs the hundred and seventy-seven thou- 
sand shares held by the Khedive in the canal prop- 
erty. Four years later, through an inconceivable "'^ 
error, the French Government allowed the English 
to install themselves alone in the Nile Valley, where, 
from 1882 to 1885, they carried on a sanguinary 
struggle against the Dervishes, and lost the Soudan, 
but strengthened their position on the Lower Nile. 
On the 14th of January, 1883, profiting by the weak- 
ness of Mr. Duclerc, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
they induced the French Government to abandon 
the condominium, which, indeed, then had a merely 
theoretic value. In 1884, they announced their 
intention of evacuating Egypt, the date mentioned 
being 1888 ; but this promise, as all the others of 
the same reference, made diplomatically or in Par- 
liament, remained unfulfilled. Between 1891 andp 
1894, they established themselves strongly on the ' 
Upper Nile and over all the plateau extending be- i 
tween Lake Albert Nyanza and Lake Victoria. At 
the end of 1895, Lord Salisbury informed the French 
Government confidentially that he had decided to 
crush the Mahdi and reconquer the Soudan. Eng- 
land's hold over Egypt grew tighter every day. 

Now, at the same time, though with insufficient 
means of execution, the lack of which could not be ■ 
supplied by the heroism of their agents, and, more- 
over, with deplorable vacillation in their manner of 
giving instructions, the French Government sent 
out expeditions with a view to reopening the Egyp- ■ 
tian problem for European consideration. Cap- 



44 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

tain Marchand's force started from the Ubanghi, 
and that of Mr. de Bonchamps from Djibouti. 
Unfortunately, a French Deputy, speaking in the 
Chamber on the 28th of February, 1895, had the 
imprudence to say: '^To-day the English dream of 
possessing the whole of the Nile is, I believe, once 
for all spoiled." Certain members of the Govern- 
ment thought that, by anticipating Great Britain, 
we should be in a position to enter into negotiations 
with her on the whole question under favourable 
conditions. . . . Three years after. Captain Mar- 
chand arrived at Fashoda; but, instead of finding 
himself able to communicate from there with Abys- 
sinia, and backed up by previous diplomatic action, 
he encountered Sirdar Kitchener's Anglo-Egyptian 
army victoriously camped on the battle-field of 
Omdurman. 

What the morrow was is in the memory of all: 
a painful, breathless, humiliating discussion between 
Mr. Delcasse, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Sir 
Edmund Monson, the English Ambassador, blunt 
demands from the British Government, Lord Salis- 
bury, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, and Mr. Ritchie ; 
finally, on the 4th of November, 1898, the evacua- 
tion of Fashoda under the direct threat of a war 
for which our Navy was unhappily far from being 
prepared. Between 1894 and 1896, we had lost 
two years. In 1896, we had made up our minds 
to act, but had left to a single officer and two hun- 
dred men the task of reopening the Egyptian ques- 
tion. We suffered the just penalty of so much lack 



FRANCE AND THE ENGLISH "ENTENTE" 45 

of foresight. Strengthened by our mistakes, Eng- 
land had pursued us without mercy. Thencefor-"" 
ward, she was preponderant in Eastern Africa. On 
the 21st of March, 1899, we signed a treaty recog- 
nizing her hold over the Bahr-el-Gazal and Darfour 
regions. No special mention was made of the Nile ; 
but what was true of the Darfour region was a for- 
tiori true of Egypt. In reality, Great Britain re- 
quired us, by abandoning Bahr-el-Gazal, to yield to 
her a country into which she had never penetrated, 
and where we had concluded treaties with the 
natives and created some thirty posts. Once again, 
the English had treated us as enemies ; and the 1899 
convention was a suitable culmination to centuries 
of hatred. 

If, to these grave motives of conflict, be added 
secondary questions of dispute in Newfoundland, 
Zanzibar, Madagascar, Siam, and Morocco, a fair 
idea may be gained of what Franco-English rela-| 
tions were up to the day when the Entente Cordiale 
was concluded. Now victorious over English op- 
position in Algeria, Tunis, the Congo, now van- 
quished, on the Niger, in Egypt, and the Soudan, 
we might say with Lord Salisbury: ''Not every 
cause for controversy has been removed; and 
certainly, in the future, we shall have many things 
to discuss." Peace had been maintained, but an 
armed peace, characterized by alarms, distrust, 
rancour, and irritation. How came it that within 
five years a sincere understanding was established 
between the two hereditary enemies ? 



46 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

II 

Neither in England nor in France is the prin- 
ciple of the understanding to be sought. Rather 
was it the fear of Germany which determined 
England — not only her King and Government, 
but the whole of her people — to draw nearer to 
France. 

During the twenty years that followed the foun- 
dation of the German Empire, . Anglo-German re- 
lations remained correct. And German diplomacy 
also, under Prince Bismarck's direction, made a 
special point of being on good terms with London, 
and of pursuing outside Europe no design calcu- 
lated to arouse anxiety at the British Foreign Office : 
''I am "an Englishman in Egypt," the Chancel- 
lor once said; adding on another occasion: ^^Eng- 
land is of more''importance to us than Zanzibar and 
the whole eastern coast of Africa." In spite of po- 
lemics caused by the Germans' installing themselves 
on various parts of the African coast, in spite even 
of the diplomatic intervention which prevented 
Great Britain from ratifying her Congolese treaty 
with Portugal, there was a systematic effort of Wil- 
helmstrasse to preserve cordial relations with Down- 
ing Street. On the 14th of June, 1890, an Anglo- 
German treaty was signed, acknowledging Great 
Britain's supremacy over all the basin of the Nile.' 
A second treaty, on the 15th of November, 1893, 
marked a fresh English success by stipulating that 
the German Cameroons should not extend east- 



• FRANCE AND THE ENGLISH "ENTENTE" 47 

ward beyond the basin of the Chari, and that the 
Darfour, Kordofan, and Bahr-el-Gazal regions should 
be excluded from the German sphere of influence. 
Even the Emperor William's telegram to Mr. Kj'U- 
ger provoked only a temporary storm, and did not 
hinder the conclusion of a secret treaty which, in 
1898, in conditions but little known, disposed of 
the future of the Portuguese colonies. Whilst the 
German press made violent attacks on England 
throughout the Transvaal war, the Emperor paid 
a visit to his grandmother and negotiated an Anglo- 
German agreement relative to Samoa. A few 
■"months later, there was a further treaty between 
the two countries relative to China ; and, at the "f^ 
end of 1901, a triple naval demonstration associated 
together the English, German, and Italian fleets 
against Venezuela. 

From this time, however, the Entente policy was 
definitely abandoned, the cause being, as Bismarck 
said, ''cousin land-rat's taking it into his head to 
turn water-rat," and obtaining, within a few years, 
such prodigious success that England was both 
confounded and exasperated. On the morrow of 
the Treaty of Frankfort, no Englishman foresaw this . 
lightning transformation. 

A soil with badly worked riches ; ways of communication still 
incomplete ; irregular shallow rivers with silted-up harbours at 
their estuaries, and flowing into a sea shut up between conti- 
nents, where, for eight months out of the twelve, both climate 
and fog interfered with navigation ; a defective economic organi- 
zation ; anarchy in production ; insufficiency in capital ; in fine 
and above all, a population of soldiers, savants and peasants ; 



48 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

everything seemed to forbid Germany's aspiring to the brilliant 
destiny of the United Kingdom.' 

Freed from French competition, the latter power 
was incontestably the carrier of the seas, the neces- 
sary intermediary between the two worlds. Her 
security was absolute. 

And yet the security was deceitful. Never was 
economic progress more prompt, steady, and lucky 
than that of the German Empire. Never was there 
a better exemplification of the proverb that ''Iron 
calls forth gold." In 1870, the population of Ger- 
many was 41,000,000 inhabitants. Between this 
date and 1907, it advanced to 63,000,000. During 
the same period, the railways increased their length 
from 20,000 kilometres to 58,000 kilometres. Thanks 
to the carrying out of a magnificent river improve- 
ment scheme, the country's interior navigation has 
gone beyond the watersheds, and drained the prod- 
ucts of Central Europe towards her ports. These 
latter, to which Belgian Antwerp and Dutch Rot- 
terdam serve as auxiliaries, are the best fitted up 
in the world. German ship-building yards have 
a universal reputation. German docks monopolize 
the major portion of Europe's exportation. The 
trading fleet of Hamburg alone surpasses in tonnage 
the whole of that of France. German commerce 
(importation and exportation) amounted to six 
billion marks in 1878, seven billions in 1892, ten 
and a half billions in 1900, and fifteen billions in 
1906. 

^ See Maurice Lair's German Imperialism. 



FRANCE AND THE ENGLISH "ENTENTE" 49 

Parallel in its progress, Germany's Navy has de- 
veloped in formidable proportions. In 1898, it 
comprised only nine small iron-clads. Under the 
programmes of 1898, 1900, and 1906, as finally 
amended, and with the further increase anticipated 
for 1912, the Empire will possess in 1918, according 
to the well-known military writer. Colonel Gaedke's 
computation, eighty iron-clads or iron-clad cruisers 
of 20,000 tons, these without counting a reserve 
fleet of twenty-five ships either of less strength or 
of less recent construction. She will therefore be 
capable of coping on sea with any enemy whatso- 
ever. That this adversary must be England, no one 
takes any trouble to hide, whether it be the sailors, 
or the Navy League with its nine hundred thousand 
members and its annual budget of 1,000,000 marks. 
And a moral transformation has accompanied the 
material one. To the Emperor's appeal, saying: 
'^Our future is on the sea," the German people have 
replied with their usual discipline. ''As my grand- 
father worked for the reconstitution of this Army," 
added the Kaiser, ''so I will work, without letting 
myself be checked, to reconstitute this Navy, so that 
it may be made comparable to our land army and 
permit the Empire to rise to a greater degree of 
power." While her merchants were sailing forth 
to conquer fresh markets, Germany began to pre- 
pare herself for this new role. Read the statutes 
of the Naval League : — 

The Naval League considers that Germany cannot do with- 
out a redoubtable fleet, both for defending her coasts and for 



50 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

maintaining her rank among the great World Powers, both for 
protecting her general interests and commercial relations, and 
for defending her citizens abroad. Consequently, it proposes to 
arouse and strengthen throughout the country an opinion fa- 
vourable to the increase of the fleet ; and it assumes the duty of 
coming to the help of sailors belonging to the fleet and colonial 
army in case the Admmistration should be miable to grant them 
sufficient assistance. 

Next, listen to Chancellor von Buelow. You 
will see that both Government and nation are in 
perfect accord. On his speaking for the first time 
in the Reichstag, he claims for Germany her share 
of room. Two months later, he sets forth what is 
required by the economic, maritime, and moral prog- 
ress of Germany ''as shft passes through the world 
with her sword in one hand^ and her spade and 
trowel in the other." And his ensuing speeches, 
whether treating of Samoa, East Africa, Kiao- 
Tcheou, or the Carolines, all assert the necessity 
of the Empire's exercising anr action outside of 
Europe. Each time, he brings out the close connec- 
tion between the successive steps of this forward 
movement. Each time, he shows his fidelity and 
zeal towards the colonial policy so often railed at 
fifteen years previously. Soon, indeed, he pro- 
nounces the decisive words, ''Like the English, 
French, and Russians, we claim the right to a greater 
Germany." 

Then by the despatch of numerous circulars, the 
Imperial Chancellery is seen taking a preponderant 
part in the negotiations with China, and, assuming, 
during the repression of the Pekin disturbances, a 



FRANCE AND THE ENGLISH "ENTENTE" 51 

still more important Tole through the appointment 
of Count Waldersee to the head command of the 
international troops. 

We shall not let ourselves be thrust out from an equality 
with other Powers. We shall not suffer ourselves to be denied 
the right to speak as they do in the world. There was a time^ 
when Germany was only a geographical expression, when she I 
was denied the name of a great Power. Since then, we have 1 
become a great Power ; and, with the help of God, we hope to 
remain so. We shall not permit the abolition or limitation of 
our claim to a world policy based on reflection and reason. 

The expression was out at last. Henceforward, 
we shall meet with it continually, and, on each 
fresh occasion, backed up with greater precision. 
As a matter of fact, the expansion phenomenon is 
one that is general, so that Germany, as a great 
Power plresent and future, participates in it, perforce. 
Read over the speech of the 3d of March, 1902, the 
Budget discussions of 1903, and 1904 ; everywhere 
you will find the same affirmation; everywhere, 
the Gerrilan adaptation of this thought of President 
Roosevelt that a nation cannot remain huddled up 
like a petty tradesman in a narrow shop. 

So, imperialist Germany aspires to fulfil Treitsch- 
ke^s prophecy : '' When Germany's flag covers 
and protects this huge empire, to whom will the 
sceptre of the universe belong? Who will impose 
her will on other nations enfeebled or decadent? 
Is it not Germany who' will have the mission of 
assuring peace to the world? Russia, a huge giant 
in process of formation, and with feet of clay, will 
be absorbed by her internal and economic difficulties. 



52 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

England, stronger in appearance than in reality, 
will doubtless see her colonies separate from her, 
and will wear herself out in barren struggles. France, 
a prey to her domestic strife and quarrels, will sink 
more and more into final ruin. As for Italy, she 
will have enough to do, if she wishes to bestow 
tranquillity enough on her children. The future, 
therefore, belongs to Germany, with whom Austria 
will unite, if she has a desire to live." 

The appearance of so formidable a competitor 
could not fail to disturb England. Chatham's 
saying, "Our first duty is to see that France does 
not become a naval, commercial, and colonial Power," 
applied now much more accurately to Germany 
than to France. Thenceforward, therefore. Great 
Britain's efforts had to turn themselves against 
Germany. Long since, indeed, her merchants, con- 
suls, and politicians had uttered a cry of alarm.^ 
In 1886, at the Commission of Inquiry into the 
decline of British Commerce, the Birmingham 
delegates said : — 

Germany has found the way to our markets, the addresses 
of our customers, and, seeing our profits, has fabricated our 
trademarks. She has sent her cutlery everywhere; has even 
pirated the names of our manufacturers. . . . Sometimes, she 
has employed simple imitation : the Malta cross and the star, 
with the name Rodgers, is one of the favourite marks with our 
customers : here are German knives with two Malta crosses and 
the name Rotgens. . . . The Germans of Westphalia have the 
advantage over us of water-transport on the Rhine right down 
to the sea. . . . The Germans also have the enormous advan- 
tage over us of technical education ; and are discreet into the 

* See Victor Berard's English Imperialism. 



FRANCE AND THE ENGLISH "ENTENTE" 53 

bargain. They have spread over the world and have swarmed 
into oiir country, flooding it with their imitations. In the City 
of London I know firms which, ten years ago, used to supply 
the colonies and foreign countries with English products, and 
which, to-day, ship nothing but German inferior articles. These 
articles arrive with the Sheffield mark ; and, when the consumer 
finds that he has been taken in, he accuses us. After two or 
three of such experiences, he refuses to deal further with us, and 
applies direct to the Germans, . . . who then offer him good 
stuff. 

Ten years later, all the official reports made 
similar statements in more precise language. 

Our market, wrote the English Consul at Cherbourg, in 1897, 
is overrun with German hardware and toys. The region lives 
mainly by its trade with England ; and yet the shopkeepers buy 
nothing in England. At the big bazaar, where I asked the reason 
of this, the manager handed me articles in wood and fayence 
made in Germany from models he had given, and in sizes suited 
to the taste of our population, with views of Cherbourg and 
scenes from Norman history. 

The same note is struck in reports from the 
British consuls in Italy, Sweden, Norway, Greece, 
Roumania, Portugal, and Spain. In 1898, the Eng- 
lish consuls in Germany summed up their impres- 
sions thus : — 

The year of 1897 has been an admirable success for Germany. 
In every industry, progress has continued, and the net result can 
be expressed in three words, "All fires alight," and not only 
those of the manufactory and well-to-do citizen, but those, too, 
of the peasant and workman. . . . Everything evinces this 
country's gigantic effort to take the lead of the world's industrial 
development and surpass all its rivals. 

If the English ports were declining in importance, 
this also was Germany's fault : — 



54 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

Li the last twenty-six years Germany has made enormous 
strides in every direction. The estabUshment of productive 
industries has given work to an ever increasing population, which 
between 1872 and 1897 has gained thirty per cent. The creation 
of a flourishing commerce has bestowed on the population a 
growing proportion of the comforts of life ; and, during the last 
twenty years, this commerce has improved twenty per cent, 
while the traffic in German ports has gone up a hundred and 
twenty-four per cent. 

When one reads these reports, it is easy to under- 
stand the fear felt by all these English that they 
will be commercially ousted by Germany, just as, 
two centuries ago, they themselves ousted the Dutch. 
They are unanimous in acknowledging the superiority 
of German methods. Germany carries off the palm 
by the quality of her economic mobilization. She 
possesses a magnificent system of commercial, ele- 
mentary, secondary, and higher schools. Her clerks 
assimilate the habits and needs of foreign markets. 
When serving their apprenticeship, they prepare, 
at the same time, the success of the firms into which 
they will later enter. ''The Germans have conquered 
South America," writes the Consul at Rio de Janeiro, 
''by the peculiar study they have made of its require- 
ments." And the Consul at Riga says in his turn, 
"A German seizes every opportunity of pleasing 
his customers." To this the Consul at Havre adds : — 

The Germans have secured the contract for supplying the 
industrial school at Elbeuf with all its material. They have 
laid down all the machinery at a merely nominal price. . . . 
What was paid was for the sake of form only. . . . They have 
thus gained the town's good graces. And this gift will be amply 
requited by their obtaining the future custom of aU the pupils 



FRANCE AND THE ENGLISH "ENTENTE" 55 

leaving this school, who wiU have been accustomed to the 
articles, methods, tools, and skill of the Germans. 

This economic menace was bound to provoke a 
chronic state of nervousness, which soon developed 
into an obsession. The English grew to think that' 
Germany's policy was everywhere aimed against 
them. And facts frequently justified the deduction. 
Sometimes, however, they drew unwarranted con- 
clusions from the course of events. As an example, 
may be quoted what was written, in September, 
1897, by an English politician who has been one of 
the men most intimately associated with the events 
of the last twenty years. It will show the gradual 
formation of England's impeachment of Germany.* 

Up to 1895, he said, our relations with France and Russia, 
which left much to be desired — Prince Bismarck took good 
care of that ! — and, on the other hand, our old ties of friend- 
ship with Austria, and especially with Italy, rallied to the Triple 
Alliance, and consequently to Germany, not only English policy, 
but English opinion in general. Already, however, before the 
telegram to President Kruger, the Emperor William's visit to 
Cowes, in the previous summer, after the general elections of 
1895, which restored Lord Salisbury to power, had produced 
disappointment in Government circles on both sides. An al- 
most open hostility with regard to South Africa was manifested 
during Sir Edward Malet's last interviews in Berlin, before the 
Ambassador quitted his post ; and the Jameson raid did no 
more than furnish German policy with the pretext for a cou-p de 
thedtre which was bound to occur sooner or later. 

The coup failed in its effect, first because Portugal refused to 
lend herself to Germany's tactics, and next because greater ,- 
Powers than Portugal turned a deaf ear to the proposals for a : 
European coalition against England emanating from Wilhelm- 

^See the Temps of September 21, 1907. 



56 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

strasse. Moreover, both the Government and the English people 
themselves had reacted with a firmness that made Berlin under- 
stand the time was not yet come to "administer a correction" 
to us. Germany made a volte face and, some few months later, 
countenanced the recapture of Dongola by the Anglo-Egyptian 
troops. 

But the order to march on Dongola was given at the sugges- 
tion of Italy, in order that a diversion might be created in her 
favour and the Caliph and his dervishes be prevented from 
threatening the Italian positions on the Red Sea, just at the 
moment when the Italian army in Africa had been almost 
wiped out by the disastrous issue of its Abyssinian campaign. 
Could the Emperor William do otherwise than back the appeal 
addressed to England by King Humbert, his ally as well as our 
friend? Besides, he knew that by urging England to recon-^ 
quer the Soudan, he would not fail, under then existing circum-\ 
stances, to aggravate the friction between England and France. 

It was for the same reason that, three years later, the Em- 
peror addressed his congratulations to the conquerors of Omdur- 
man, on the very eve of Captain Marchand's arrival at Fashoda, 
If the agreement come to between England and Germany with 
regard to certain colonial questions in Africa gave us, as has 
been asserted, without its being established, carte blanche in the 
Transvaal, it was only a small instalment compared with the 
price exacted at various times by Germany for her complaisance. 
Kiao-Tcheou, Samoa, Salaga represent for us so many bribes 
we have had to pay in order to secure Berlin's ever malevolent 
neutrality. But we have kept a remembrance of it, as well as 
of the tone of contempt assumed towards our army not only by 
the German press, but by the German Chancellor himself in 
the midst of the Reichstag, during the painful war of the Trans- 
vaal. Nor have we forgotten the discourteous behaviour of 
Marshal von Waldersee in China, nor the way in which, immedi- 
ately after the Chinese agreement of September, 1900, had been 
signed between England and Germany, the latter audaciously 
misinterpreted its meaning, so as to exclude Manchuria from its 
scope, and to claim her sphere of influence in the Yang-Tse 
Valley. 

And can it be imagined we have forgotten Germany's tactics 
during all these years at Constantinople, the opposition now 



FRANCE AND THE ENGLISH "ENTENTE" 57 

underhand, now declared, she has always made to our diplo- 
macy in the Armenian question, the Cretan question, and later 
the Macedonian question? Are we perchance so blind as, with- 
out speaking of the Bagdad railway, not to have seen Germany's 
hand behind Turkey both in the region of Aden and on the 
Persian Gulf, and also in the construction of the Hedjaz rail- 
way, which, last year, caused the Anglo-Turkish dispute with 
regard to Tabah? Have we not heard the Emperor William 
proclaim aloud that Germany's future is on the seas. Have we 
not read the preamble, directly aimed at England, of the great 
Parliamentary bill for the increase of the German fleet. 

It was by their cumulative effect that all these incidents, — ■ 
the agreements by which Germany has grudgingly accorded us 
her good graces at a usurious price, as well as the diplomatic 
shocks, which no agreement has attenuated — have, somewhat 
late alas! convinced us that it would be much more simple; 
and advantageous for us to come to an understanding, once forj 
all, with France, and even with Russia, than to remain indefi- 
nitely under the pressure of Germany's exactions. Lord Salis- 
bury had grown too old. in the ancient order of things to take 
the decisive step, although no English statesman chafed under 
the German curb with more bitterness than he, during his last ■. 
years of power. For the Anglo-French Entente, new men were 
needed : King Edward on the throne, and Lord Lansdowne at 
the Foreign Office. Not that they intended to make the Entente 
against Germany. Their sole aim was to put an end to a situa- 
tion which Germany had exploited too long with a view to se- 
curing the predominant power in Europe. It was a measure 
not of aggression but defence. However, for Germany, he who 
is not with her is against her.^ 

In London, therefore, the Franco-EngHsh rap- 
prochement appeared to be the best means of coping 
with Germany for the joint good of ''Trade" and 
the ''Empire." On the French side, economic 
interests counselled this rapprochement, and political 
interests were not opposed to it. Taking one year 
* See the Temps of September 21, 1907. 



58 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

with another, England purchases from us a billion's 
worth of merchandise. On this account, she is, 
as was said one day, ''the oldest, nearest, richest, 
and most constant of our colonies." All the articles 
that we chiefly export (Paris articles, ready-made 
goods, tissues, fashion articles, worked leather, 
chemicals, pottery, and metal goods), compete only 
to an insignificant degree with articles of British 
production. As, on the other hand, England has 
large available capital, and is an excellent buyer, 
capable of appreciating an article of luxury and 
paying for it, French production is to such an extent 
complementary of its neighbour's that it might, if 
it tried, considerably increase its exportation across 
the Channel.^ If it has remained thus long station- 
ary, or nearly so (46 millions in 1875, 35 millions in 
1885, 47 millions in 1895), the fault is rather that 
of the sellers than of the things sold. Our mer- 
chants persisting in a regrettable routine, consider- 
ing that the merits of their goods are equal, the 
requirements of the English market identical, too 
often believe it unnecessary for them to alter their 
methods and to reckon with the modern, growing 
intensity of competition, especially that of Germany. 
There was consequently room for a development, 
which could not but gain by the establishment of 
friendly relations. Such development had been, 
for several years, regarded with a favourable eye 
by the commercial associations of the two countries. 

^See the reports of Mr. Jean Perier, French Commercial Attache 
in London, published by the National Office of Foreign Commerce. 



FRANCE AND THE ENGLISH "ENTENTE" 59 

On the 14th of September, 1901, the Associated 
Chambers of British commerce passed a resolution 
advocating a treaty of Franco-Enghsh arbitration, 
basing their vote on the 'immense advantages that 
would accrue from it to commercial relations be- 
tween the two countries." In 1903, during a visit 
of some French members of Parliament to London, 
Mr. Louis Sinclair, the founder of the Commercial 
Committee of the House of Commons, expressed the 
hope that the rapprochement might bring about an 
economic Entente. Sir Edward Sassoon said on the 
same occasion, '^Our aim should be to arrive at 
the one Entente which is really stable, that based 
on material interests." In France, the various 
Chambers of Commerce had likewise rallied to the 
same idea. All of them, one after another, passed 
resolutions, to which several Municipal Councils 
adhered, calling for the development of the two 
countries' commercial relations. On this point, 
there was entire agreement between the traders on 
both sides of the Channel.^ 

Politically, the repulses even which Great Britain 
had inflicted on France in Africa — the Niger, the 
Upper Nile, and Egypt — had exhausted the ancient 
rivalry. We had nothing more to gain and nothing 
more to lose. A policy of reconciliation, based on 
the recognition of accomplished colonial facts, was 
therefore theoretically possible. At this moment, 
Mr. Delcasse, being resolved to seek in the Mediter- 
ranean, and, more especially in Morocco, compensa- 
^ See Gabriel Louis Jaray's Franco- English Policy. 



60 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

tions for the set-back by which his ministry had 
begun and for which it would be unjust to hold him 
responsible, rightly thought that a Mediterranean 
policy, already facilitated by the rapprochement 
with Italy, could only be carried out in conjunction 
with England. Had he then formed the chimerical 
design since attributed to him of isolating Germany ? 
This is not probable. At any rate, it was legitimate 
for him to seek for further political security on the 
side of England, and to bestow an additional guaran- 
tee on our diplomatic autonomy and through it on 
the balance of power in Europe. And the British 
Government's inspiring thought with regard to the 
balance of power must necessarily have found its 
echo in Paris. Last of all, the analogies, sometimes 
inexact, which can be discovered between French 
and English institutions were, with certain people, 
an additional argument in favour of a rapprochement. 
"We lost a great deal of time with England between 
1882 and 1898," said Mr. Deschanel in 1903. In a 
few months, this lost time was about to be regained, 
and the Entente Cordiale sealed. 

Ill 

The English King was the initiator of the rap- 
prochement. He it was who both conceived and 
facilitated it, while still many believed that the 
moment was premature. 

Edward VII has been both praised and attacked 
without stint. Perhaps he deserves neither the 



FRANCE AND THE ENGLISH "ENTENTE" 61 

'^ excess of honour, nor yet the excess of abuse." 
Among present sovereigns, he has one superiority, 
that of having gained experience in Hfe before 
reigning. The existence of leisure imposed on him 
by the British Constitution during his mother's 
Hfe, a leisure which he freely profited by, enabled- 
him to form his opinion of men and things by close 
personal observation. Madame de Genlis used to 
say that princes are the worst-brought-up people 
in the world. She meant by this that their educa- 
tion is artificial, and that they grow up without 
ever encountering contradiction, which is the leaven 
of the critical mind. Such was not the case with 
Edward VII. And, doubtless, it is for this reason 
that he possesses more consistency of thought, more 
tact, and more shrewdness than other sovereigns. 
He is not afraid of taking the initiative ; and so far 
his initiative has been a success. The boldest 
example of it was his visit to Paris in 1903. Putting 
aside all objections, and being convinced of his 
success, he arrived in France, amidst an atmosphere 
of uncertainty. When the first platoons of cuiras- 
siers rode down the Champs Elysees, embarrassment 
and anxiety weighed on the public. The National- 
ists had declared their intention of hissing. What 
would be the result of a hostile manifestation? 
The King, as far as he was concerned, did not believe 
in the danger, and he was right. The Parisians 
accorded him not an enthusiastic, but, from the 
first, a respectful, and soon a genial, reception. The 
road was clear. Two months later, Mr. Loubet 



62 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

paid King Edward a return visit. And, on welcom- 
ing his colleague, Mr. Delcasse, to London, Lord 
Lansdowne said to him : — 

''Now we are going to have some conversation." 
As a matter of fact, there was conversation both in 
Paris and in London. Lord Lansdowne, Mr. Del- 
casse, Mr. Paul Cambon — the French Ambassador 
in London, — Sir Eldon Gorst, at that time the 
Egyptian Government's financial adviser, were the 
chief interlocutors in this dialogue that lasted eight 
months. On the English side was shown a sincere 
desire to come to an understanding, but also in 
details great minuteness and a wary fear of yielding 
too much; on the French side an equal willingness 
to come to an arrangement, the best intentions, in 
fine, but too much southern imaginativeness, and, 
here and there, carelessness in practical precision. 
On the 8th of April, 1904, the agreement was signed, 
and its immediate publication produced a deep 
impression in Europe. 

The arrangement, which comprised a convention 
relative to Newfoundland and Western Africa, and a 
declaration concerning Egypt and Morocco, formed 
a treaty of liquidation and equilibrium. The con- 
vention had merely a local importance, and settled 
ancient disputes, somewhat to England's advantage, 
with the artificial adjunction of questions of very 
different nature. On the contrary, the declaration 
had a general value, and mapped out the main lines 
of a future policy. As already seen, we had lost 
in Egypt, from year to year, the bigger share of 



FRANCE AND THE ENGLISH "ENTENTE" 63 

our advantages, and our dispossession had been 
practically effected by the Fashoda incident termi- 
nating in the treaty of March, 1899. Yet, theoreti- 
cally, we preserved our liberty to profit by any 
opportunities that might occur, and to draw Europe's 
attention to a problem that was not juridically 
settled. It was, therefore, an appreciable success 
for England to obtain the assurance that ''the Gov- 
ernment of the French Republic would not thwart 
her action in Egypt by asking that a date should be 
fixed for the British occupation to cease or by taking 
measures of another kind." The Egyptian Govern- 
ment, that is to say. Great Britain, regained the 
liberty, besides, to dispose of the savings resulting 
from the conversion of 1890. And she was freed 
from the obligation of devoting to the Debt service 
revenues double the sum annually required. Instead 
of the Debt Exchequer being compelled, in each 
financial period, to make a sort of seizure on the to- 
tality of the Egyptian revenues, it was the land tax 
which became the creditors' pledge. In return, France 
obtained certain guarantees, in particular, that the 
reimbursement of the Preference Debt should be ad- 
journed from 1905 to 1910; that the 1885 Loan, for 
which no limit of reimbursement had been specified, 
could not be reimbursed before the same date ; that 
the Consolidated Debt, three-fifths of which are held 
in France, could not be either converted or reimbursed 
before 1912. These were wise precautions, but of very 
secondary importance compared with the advantages 
of the highest order secured by Great Britain. 



64 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

This being'so, the agreement concerning Egypt com- 
prised also a reciprocal liberty of action for ourselves 
in Morocco. One needs only to consult a map to 
see that France, being supreme in Algeria and 
Tunis, cannot regard with indifference what takes 
place in the Moorish Empire. It is a necessity for 
her that order shall reign there and that no Power 
shall acquire preponderant influence over the country 
at her expense.^ After being for twenty years our 
most redoubtable adversary in Morocco, England 
now recognized that '4t belonged to France, as 
having territory contiguous to this country over a 
great distance, to have the more exclusive charge of 
its tranquillity and to lend her assistance to it in all 
the administrative, economic, financial, and military 
reforms required." She declared besides, "that 
she would do nothing to thwart French action in 
these matters." A reciprocal engagement, valid 
for thirty years, secured to the two contracting 
parties commercial liberty and equality of treat- 
ment' both in Egypt and Morocco. Last of all, it 
was stipulated that the two signataries ''should 
lend each other mutual help diplomatically for the 
execution of the clauses of the present declaration." 

Is it possible to estimate arithmetically the re- 
spective advantages assured to the two parties by 
this double-barrelled arrangement? It is certain 
that by effacing ourselves in Egypt in England's 
favour, we did no more than acknowledge the force 
of actual facts, whilst British diplomacy abandoned 

1 See below, Chapter III. 



FRANCE AND THE ENGLISH "ENTENTE" 65 

in Morocco designs to which the future was open; 
It is no less evident that our adhesion to Great 
Britain's Egyptian policy confirmed an existing 
situation and constituted a real profit for her, 
whereas in Morocco she granted to us virtual ad- 
vantages, prospects, and possibilities only. France 
paid cash down, England by draft; and Morocco, 
as events proved, was not yet the hatched chicken 
of which one 'could freely dispose. On the other 
hand, it must be acknowledged that what we gave 
up had a greater value for England than for our- 
selves, and reciprocally. The balance of equity was 
undeniable; and, on the whole, its effect was a 
success. The drawing up of the agreement, how- 
ever, left more than one thing to be desired. The 
article relating to Egypt was too vague; and the 
expression, '^by taking measures of another kind," 
was altogether wanting in precision. Moreover, 
certain eventualities had been overlooked, which 
it would have been wiser to provide against. This 
was discovered notably when Mr. Lambert, the 
French director of the Khedive's School of Law, 
resigned and was replaced by a young Englishman, 
Mr. Hill, who had none of the qualifications requi- 
site for presiding over an establishment imbued 
with our spirit. However, in a general way, the 
good was greater than the bad; and Mr. Delcasse 
deserved the praise that was unstintedly bestowed 
on him. 

Furthermore, whatever might be the value of the 
agreement in its reference to Africa, it drew the 



66 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

attention of the world at large rather by its general 
significance. The colonial rivalry between France 
and England had, for centuries, become a common 
property. It was the postulate of European policy^ "^ 
the favourite instrument of the policy of Germany: 
By putting an end to this state of things, the Cabi- 
nets of London and Paris introduced a new weight 
into the international balance of power. They mu- 
tually freed themselves from preoccupations that 
had long been a burden; and they guaranteed each 
other a liberty of action which was equally precious 
to both. France, in particular, who had not been 
able to hold Russia back from the Manchurian ad- 
venture, found an opportune compensation for the 
enfeeblement she incurred through the Japanese vic- 
tories. Preceded by the Franco-Italian agreement 
and soon followed by the Franco-Spanish one, the 
Franco-English arrangement procured us, in Western 
Europe, a moral authority which made us a centre 
of attraction; and, if it was calculated to expose us 
to certain difficulties, it rendered us in return capa- 
ble of solving them. It was, in fact, the second 
phase of the diplomatic evolution which enabled us 
to issue progressively from our position of isolation. 
Of course, there was the fear that it would not be 
easy, in presence of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance, to- 
gether with Anglo- Russian hostility and the Russo- 
Japanese war, to reconcile our necessary alliance 
with Saint Petersburg and our useful friendship with 
London. But, at once, without noticing newspaper 
objections, Russia's official representatives declared 



FRANCE AND THE ENGLISH "ENTENTE" 67 

that their Government took no umbrage at the Anglo- 
French rapprochement} 

Indeed, before long, facts occurred which most 
happily justified the agreement thus concluded. 
And here again, it was neither in London nor in Paris 
that the decisive events happened. The fear of Ger- ^ 
many was responsible for the Entente Cordiale; and 7 
Germany's mistakes transformed and strengthened 
it. Whatever merit may be assigned to the repeated 
Franco-English manifestations of sympathy, — King 
Edward's visits to Paris, the English fleet's welcome 
at Brest, that of the French fleet at Portsmouth, the 
Paris Municipal Council's stay in London, the 
London County Council's reception at our Hotel de 
Ville, and, last of all, Mr. Fallieres' official visit to 
London — the strengthening of the Entente is not 
due to these; all such fetes have been effects, not 
causes. The cause must be sought in Germany. 
On the morrow of the signing of the treaty of 
1904, Germany affected the most serene indiffer- 
ence. A year later, the Emperor William's journey 
to Tangier, strikingly showed that his Government 
had only waited for the Russian defeats to manifest 
the inimical sentiments they had felt from the very 
first. ^ During the Moroccan crisis, Franco-English 
solidarity was cemented by the common peril. The 
identity of French and British interests affirmed it- 
self by an identity of policy ; and, when the Algeci- 
ras Conference closed, no one in Europe could fail 

^ See Andre Tardieu's Diplomatic Questions of the Year 1904. 
* See below, Chapter V. 



68 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

to see that, for the agreement of liquidation signed 
two years previously, an Entente had been substi- 
tuted which, though not set down in treaty form, no 
less counted as a diplomatic security of the highest 
order. 

More recent events have tended only to increase 
the value of this security. The Russo-Japanese war, 
which coincided with our Moroccan embarrassment 
and was partially the cause of it, had made it harder 
for us to fit in the Russian Alliance with our friend- 
ship for England. For a while, when our neutrality 
dispute with Japan was in its acute stage, and more 
especially when the Dogger Bank incident happened, 
it seemed as though France would have to choose 
between one of two dread alternatives. But Mr.^ 
Delcasse, with infinite skill, discovered a remedy in 
the peril itself; and the meeting in Paris of the In- 
ternational Commission of Inquiry, intrusted with 
the task of arbitrating between the English and the 
Russians, was the first step towards the achievement 
of their reconciliation. A year later, negotiations 
were entered into between London and Saint Peters- 
burg; and, on the 31st of August, 1907, an Asiatic 
agreement, with a wider bearing than its actual 
clauses, was signed between those who had been 
adversaries for ages and who, in June, 1908, at 
Revel, set public seal to their recent intimacy.^ The 
grand German design of a ''Continental League" 
against England was definitely ruined. Bismarck's 
trick of using Anglo-Russian hostility to press on 

^ See below, Chapter VI. 



FRANCE AND THE ENGLISH "ENTENTE" 69 

France with all the weight of Central Europe was no 
longer possible. A Triple Entente facing the Triple 
Alliance, gave a new foundation to Europe's balance 
of power. 

IV 

This internal evolution of the Entente Cordiale, — 
as also certain public manifestations, such as the 
toasts in which, in June, 1908, the King of England 
and the President of the French Republic spoke of 
''strengthening" the Entente and rendering it "per- 
manent," — have, in the most natural manner possi- 
ble, placed before public opinion in Europe the ques- 
tion of an eventual transformation of the Entente 
into an alliance. When political questions are dealt 
with, the mind, as Talleyrand used to say, must take 
in the future. It is never too early to scrutinize a 
probability which unforeseen circumstances might 
any day oblige those interested in it to change into a 
reality ; and, in so far as opinions vary, it is impor- 
tant to express them. 

If language has a meaning, what is intended by 
strengthening the Entente Cordiale is the substitution 
of a formal treaty for the moral agreement of 1904. 
At present, France and England are friends, but not 
allies. If it be urged that the distinction is a sec- 
ondary one, in presence of the keenness of mutual 
sympathy, we must reply that, when the relations 
of two great Powers are concerned, precision is a 
duty, and ambiguity a danger. For the moment, 
English policy and French policy run parallel; but 



70 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

they are not bound to each other. They joined, 
four years ago, in negotiating a treaty of liquidation ; 
and this treaty has become the basis of a sincere 
reconciliation. However, neither on one side nor on 
the other were pledges given. It may be admitted 
that, in a time of crisis, such pledges would be 
spontaneously forthcoming from an identity of in- 
terests. But, if this is likely, why not examine the 
question thoroughly in advance, weigh its pros and 
cons, and, in fine, estimate the advantages and in- 
conveniences attaching to such ''strengthening," 
which heads of States and the press speak of contin- 
ually without clearly defining it. 

Diplomatically and preventively, the Entente Cor- 
diale has Justified itself. When it was concluded, its 
.1 object was negative and limited, and recorded merely 
'1 a colonial understanding. Very quickly, so quickly 
indeed that some were surprised, this Entente as- 
sumed a positive value. Perhaps there would be 
exaggeration in saying that to it was owing, in 1905, 
the preservation of peace ; for this peace — analo- 
gous to that of Fashoda and of a kind such that not 
many would be needed in a century to deprive its 
beneficiaries of their right to rank as a great Power — 
we paid for, we and we alone, with an unprecedented 
humiliation, and the sacrifice of a Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, under the threats of a neighbouring country.^ 
On the other hand, during the negotiations that fol- 
lowed the crisis, before, at, and after Algeciras, Great 
Britain supported us with a loyal energy to which the 
1 See Chapter V. 



FRANCE AND THE ENGLISH "ENTENTE" 71 

French owe grateful homage. The weight of Eng- 
lish approval which our proposals constantly met 
with throughout, contributed to insure their suc- 
cess. And this visible unity has exercised an at- 
traction so great that, in the next year, following 
the example of France, Russia concluded with Great 
Britain a pact of reconciliation which opens to our 
policy a wide perspective of safety. 

Does this mean that a Franco-English alliance 
would be justified de piano'} It is certain that one 
of the gravest objections that would have been raised 
not long ago against such an alliance has disappeared 
since our ally, Russia, has become reconciled with "^ 
Great Britain. France would have been false not | 
only to her pledges, but also to her own interests, if | 
she had allied herself with England while the latter / 
Power was inimical to Russia. That is not, how- 
ever, the case to-day. And, as far as this is con- 
cerned, the way is open. For the English, the 
French Alliance is desirable. England has always 
wished to have, in case of difficulties, a Continental 
ally. The history of the eighteenth century proved 
this, and that of the nineteenth likewise. It was 
even possible to say that she got others to fight, and 
herself entered the lists only at the last. The sup- 
port of the French Army in a European war in which 
Great Britain should be engaged, would be of ines- 
timable value to the Cabinet of Saint James. Would 
England's support, in a European war in which 
France should be engaged, be of equal value to our 
own country? 



72 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

To this question — the gravest that our states- 
men have conscientiously to ask themselves — it is 
essential that a candid reply should be given. In 
the present situation, England's diplomatic cooper- 
ation, before a war, would be of infinite service to 
us. When once war were begun, this cooperation 
would be but of small avail. Great Britain's naval 
victories would not hold off a single cannon or 
a single man from our frontiers. They would ren-. ' 
der us none of the services which Russia, and! 
Russia alone at present, is able to render us. In 
a word, a Franco-English alliance would mean for 
us, in the military domain, a minimum of profit. 
And for things to be different, it would be necessary 
for the British Army, thoroughly reformed not only 
in its organization, but in its manner of recruitment, 
to become capable of taking energetic action on the 
Continent, for it to be able to create on land an 
effective diversion, for it to be ready to lessen the 
shock our own army would have to support ; in fine, 
it would be necessary for Great Britain to be, as far 
as France is concerned, a second Russia. 

Unfortunately, the English Army is far from being 
in a position to play this role. Mr. Haldane, the 
Minister of War, has attempted to realize a certain f 
progress bj' means of a reform which came into^ 
force on the 31st of March, 1908. But his attempt 
would seem to be altogether insufficient. Under the 
new scheme, the principle of free enlistment has been 
preserved which is the traditional basis of military 
organization in England for the active army as well 



FRANCE AND THE ENGLISH "ENTENTE" 73 

as for the Reserve forces, including Yeomen and Vol- 
unteers. However, the engagement of the Territo- 
rials, that is to say, of the two latter categories, will 
be of a stricter kind. The Volunteers (infantry) used 
to enlist for any period they wished, and could cancel 
their engagement at will on condition of giving notice 
to their colonel a fortnight beforehand. The Yeo- 
men (mounted infantry) were bound for periods of 
three years, which conferred on their body a relative 
stability. But for both of these classes, the period 
of service in times of peace was only of short dura- 
tion. In times of war, the periods of forced service 
remained variable. The law of the 2d of August, 
1907, completed by ulterior regulations, in particu- 
lar by the Special Navy orders of the 18th and 20th 
of March, 1908, prescribes for both infantry and cav- 
alry a four years' period of service. In order to can- 
cel the engagement, three months' notice must be 
given; and, in addition, the soldier that breaks his 
bargain must pay a fine, and must bring back his 
arms and outfit to the depot of the battalion or 
squadron. The new system, therefore, is stricter 
than the old. 

And its stringency shows itself still more clearly, 
if the provisions are considered that determine under 
the new law the activity of the Territorial Army. 
This army can, as a matter of fact, be called out on 
active service, and the Territorial soldier be then 
kept for a whole year on duty. The object is evi- 
dently, not only to amalgamate the two species of 
auxiliary forces, which, to use Mr. Haldane's expres- 



74 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

sion, had grown up, anyhow, Hke mushrooms, but 
further to give to this amalgam a military value and 
make out of these incoherent elements a compact, 
organic whole, an army in the modern sense of the 
word. For that, these battalions must be disci- 
plined, instructed, and properly trained in their re- 
spective regiments, brigades, and divisions; a field 
artillery must be given them which the auxiliary 
forces did not possess; engineering troops, which 
formerly were also lacking; and behind these must 
be created troops for foraging and revictualling — 
all that provides for the nourishment of an army, all 
that constitutes the framework without which there 
are neither legs for marching nor arms for fighting. 
County associations, local staffs, are commissioned 
to see to this organization. 

Thus remodelled, the new Territorial Army would 
have the sole charge, in the case of a war with a 
European Power, to assure the defence of the Eng- 
lish metropolis. For Mr. Haldane has decided — 
and this is the second characteristic feature of the 
reform — that the Militia shall henceforward be 
required, in time of war, to join the active line regi- 
ments and to cooperate, if need be, with them in a 
campaign abroad. Then, it would be the remod- 
elled Territorial Army which would take the place of 
the old Militia for the defence of the Metropolis, the 
Militia becoming a '^special reserve force," the battal- 
ions of which will encircle the active battalions of 
the line, in order to supply them with additional men 
during a war in the enemy's country. Thus they will 



FRANCE AND THE ENGLISH "ENTENTE" 75 

become the headquarters of the regiments compos- 
ing the expeditionary force. With this end in view, 
the personal obhgations of militiamen are to be ren- 
dered more rigorous — six months' effective services 
in the year following the enlistment, and longer in 
each of the other years, with a fortnight's training 
and six days' rifle practice. The Militia, under its 
new constitution, will yield a hundred and one battal- 
ions, seventy-four of which will fill up the gaps oc- 
curring in the active battalions serving abroad, the 
twenty-seven others being employed as foraging, 
garrison, and auxiliary service troops. Mr. Hal- 
dane hopes to have in this way a body of 166,000 
men capable of disembarking on an enemy's shore, 
and a home army of 315,000. 

All this reads very well on paper; but the ques- 
tion is how far it is realizable. Still now, as in the 
past, what the English Army lacks is a proper sys- 
tem of recruitment; and recruitment is the muscle 
of war, just as money is its nerve strength. Both 
Yeomen and Volunteers were given till the 15th of 
June, 1908, to accept or refuse the new order of 
things ; and it turns out that enlistments have been 
appreciably fewer than was expected. On the other 
hand, grave difficulties crop up, when the question 
of artillery is considered. The Volunteers have in 
the Yeomen a kind of Territorial cavalry. But they 
must have cannons. And Mr. Haldane has asked 
for the authorization to form for this purpose a hun- 
dred and eighty-two field batteries. In the House 
of Lords, such competent authorities as Lord Rob- 



76 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

erts, Lord Denbigh, and Lord Grenfell have sharply 
criticised the project, which can only be carried out 
by dismissing thirty-three active batteries, that is to 
say, by bringing about an important diminution in 
the forces of first line. Writing on this subject, the 
Army and Navy Gazette says: ''The active army has 
been reduced and is threatened with fresh reduc- 
tions; and its reserve force will itself decrease, 
through the operation of the same cause. The Mili- 
tia has been destroyed, and no one can say to what 
extent it will be replaced by the special reserve force. 
The Volunteers have disappeared to the extent of 
two-thirds of their numbers, and are replaced to the 
extent of a third only by Territorials. The Royal 
Artillery force, through the effect of an innovation 
that is nothing less than criminal, is about to lose a 
part of its effective units. We regret to see that the 
Minister is refractory to every argument brought 
forward by the most enlightened authorities in both 
Army and nation." How is it possible to ignore Mr. 
Haldane's own avowal that the English Army ought 
to have eight thousand officers more than it possesses 
at the present time ? 

Such being the state of affairs, it is only prudent 
to conclude that, in a Continental war. Great Brit- 
ain's assistance would have but mediocre value ; 
prudent not to abandon one's self to dangerous illu- 
sions. The polemics that were carried on in the 
month of June, revealed that there are two con- 
tradictory currents of opinion in England. One, 
which was expressed in a remarkable article that 



FRANCE AND THE ENGLISH "ENTENTE" 77 

appeared in the National Review, is favourable to 
an increase of the British Army. "An Anglo- 
French alliance," said the writer, "would be with- 
out profit for France as long as England cannot 
offer her the assistance of a large army in Lorraine." 
The other current, which manifestly represents the 
majority, is opposed to an alliance and to the thor- 
ough military reform which, from our point of view, 
would be its sine qua non. Many English people, 
it is true, seem to think that, in case of war, the 
alliance would come about of its own accord. But 
it is just against such a way that one ought to pro- 
test. International improvisations are perilous. 
Should the day come when, for Mr. Haldane's inade- 
quate scheme, the English authorities would decide 
to substitute a more serious programme and to pro- 
vide their country with a modern army, should the 
day come when they would recollect that Napoleon 
succumbed, not at Trafalgar, but at Waterloo, then 
clear-sighted Frenchmen might be partisans of an 
alliance that would complete and widen the system 
of pacific defence, sealed in 1891, by the Franco- 
Russian Alliance, and the political risks of which 
would be compensated for by military advantages. 
Until then, on the contrary, there can be no ques- 
tion between France and England of pledges for the 
future and military cooperation. And if, while 
things remain as they are, an Anglo-German war 
should break out, our country's sole duty would be 
to safeguard, with all her energy, her diplomatic and 
military autonomy. 



78 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

Here comes in, it is true, the too famous hostage 
theory: Germany, while at war with England, at- 
tacking France in order to have guarantees on the 
Continent. Once more, with regard to this, a clear 
understanding is necessary. The hostage theory 
may well have been menacing, at a time when, 
France being disorganized and Russia vanquished, 
neither Power was able to make use of the alliance 
between them. This time has gone by. If Germany 
were to attack France now, she would set in action 
the chief clause of the military convention signed 
between France and Russia in 1892, and would 
have on her back not only the French but the Rus- 
sian Army, too. Under these circumstances, the 
so-called guarantee to be taken against Great Brit- 
ain would risk being a most unprofitable one. The 
hostage theory to-day is a mere scarecrow, at which 
we can afford to smile, on condition of remaining 
able, in accordance with Russia, to energetically 
enforce our armed neutrality. 

That which our country needs to do is to regard 
the English Entente with a matter-of-fact mind, and 
while having a practical regard for her own interests. 
This Entente has a great political value, not a mili- 
tary one, and we must act in accordance. Having, 
during the last thirty-eight years, made no war on 
account of Alsace-Lorraine, we must not expose 
ourselves to make it for others. In a word, France 
must be decided to reject improvised combinations 
which would drag her from peace into a conflict 
wherein all the risks would be for her. These res- 



FRANCE AND THE ENGLISH "ENTENTE" 79 

ervations are neither offensive nor superfluous, 
since they are inspired by care for French interests 
and by the experience of the past. Already, when 
the practical side of the Russian Alliance was in 
question, some of our fellow-countrymen claimed 
that it should be withheld from discussion, and dealt 
with by an act of faith. To regard the holy ark with 
a critical, independent eye, was deemed sacrilegious 
audacity. What did we gain by such discretion? 
And what did the Russians gain by it? Instead of 
reminding our Allies of their duties towards us — 
which, in the case at issue, were one with their du- 
ties towards themselves — we docilely accepted the 
deviation of the Alliance ; we allowed the money. 
Army, and Navy of Russia to desert Europe for Asia. 
Under our approval, the Saint Petersburg Govern- 
ment, between 1895 and 1902, turned more and 
more in the direction of the Far East. Continually 
deceived in their hopes, they incurred thus the dis- 
asters of Mukden and Tsusima, without our doing 
anything to restrain them. And, a few weeks after, 
we learned to our cost, both at Tangier and in Paris, 
what these defeats meant to us. 

These things must be borne in mind in our rela- 
tions with England. As a Continental Power, 
France needs allies who, in case of war, are capable 
of helping her on the Continent. Good business 
makes good friends, and, still more, good allies. If, 
in the interests of the world's peace, the Anglo- 
French Entente, the foundations of which are already 
laid, is one day to become permanent and '^ stronger," 



80 ^ FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

if, in otiier words, a treaty is destined to confer on it 
the form of a contract, it is only right that this 
treaty, negotiated in a fair spirit, should impose on 
each the sacrifices required, — on France and Rus- 
sia an enlightened attention to their naval power, 
on which Great Britain must be able to count, and 
on Great Britain a thorough reform of her land 
forces, whose development both France and Russia 
are entitled to expect. 

Until then, let us maintain a reserved attitude. 
Friends, but not allies; such is the necessary and 
sufficient programme, the only one calculated to 
ward off alike the dangers that might come from 
our adversaries and those that would risk being 
caused by our friendships. 



CHAPTER III 

FRANCE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN UNDERSTAND- 
INGS 

I. Franco-Italian understanding. — France and the Mediter- 
ranean. — Italy and the Mediterranean. — Franco-Italian 
hostility. — Tunis and the Triple Alliance. — Crispinism. 

— Causes of the Franco-Italian rapprochement. — Tunis- 
ian treaties. — Treaty of Commerce. — Political agree- 
ments. — Morocco and Tripoli. — The rapprochement and 
the Triple Alliance. — England and the rapprochement. — 
The rapprochement and African problems. — Conclusion. 

II. Franco-Spanish understanding. — Spain after the war. — 
Economic situation. — Moroccan aspirations. — Penal set- 
tlements. — Spain and France. — Period of the Triple Alli- 
ance. — Difficulties in coming to an understanding with 
regard to Morocco. — First negotiations. — Spain and the 
Franco-English agreement. — Franco-Spanish agreement. 

— Trans-Pyrenean railways. — Alfonso XIII and the 
Western Powers. 

III. France and Morocco. — Moroccan exclusiveness. — Early 
reign of Abd el Aziz. — Moroccan wealth. — Franco- 
Moroccan commerce. — Morocco and Algeria. — Franco- 
Moroccan relations. — Revoil. — Guebbas agreements. — 
French programme of reforms. — Pacific penetration. 

I 

In the thought of the French Government, the 
Franco-English rapprochement was not only a use- 
ful measure of general interest. It appeared to 
them, also, as the necessary instrument of the Medi-- 
terranean policy dictated to them by their tradi- 
tions and future interests. 
G 81 



82 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

To quote Gambetta's saying, the configuration? 
of our coasts and our establishment of French rule i 
in Algeria have made the Mediterranean, and the 
Western Mediterranean especially, our ''scene of 
action." Historically, France has had a prepon- 
derant role in the three events dominating the 
modern history of the Mediterranean: the unifica-. 
tion of Italy, the opening of the Suez Canal, and 
the Europeanization of North Africa. Geographi- 
cally, she is the only Power who, over a long extent 
of coast, borders on both sides of the Latin Sea. 
Politically, her successes in Algiers and Tunis, her 
repulses in Egypt and on the Continent, have con- 
centrated her activity on the west basin of the 
Mediterranean, which is peculiarly accessible to 
her commerce and her fleets, and is the route to her 
African and Asiatic colonies. But it places France 
in presence of three Powers with whom she has to 
count. One of them. Great Britain, through Gi- 
braltar, Malta, and Egypt, holds the two Gates of .; 
the Central Sea. The two others, Italy and Spain, 
by their situation itself, have interests of the same ; 
kind as France has; and, from this fact, may, in 
pursuit of such interests, come into conflict with 
our own country. The agreement of the 8th of 
April, 1904, liquidated the Anglo-French quarrel. 
How did the reconciliation of France with Rome 
and Madrid come about? 

If nothing in the past had given any reason to ;^ 
hope for a rapprochement between France and Eng- 
land, that between France and Italy was no less 



THE MEDITERRANEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 83 

unlikely. True, we had rendered the Italians sig- 
nal services at the time when they achieved their 
unity; but Napoleon Ill's mistakes, his pre-p 
tension to check at his will the national move- 1 
ment that he had let loose, Rouher's ''Never," and,' 
last of all, Victor Emmanuel's utilitarian policy in 
1870, had separated the two peoples, after their 
bond of union had apparently been sealed on the 
battle-fields of Magenta and Solferino. Moreover, 
young Italy was indulging in dreams of grandeur; 
and it was in the Mediterranean, that is to say, at 
our expense, that she was hoping to realize them. 
As early as 1838, Mazzini had declared: ''Northern 
Africa is Italy's inheritance." And to Mazzini it 
was that Bismarck wrote in 1866 : "Italy and France 
cannot associate to their mutual advantage in the 
Mediterranean. This sea is an inheritance that 
cannot be divided between two kindred nations. 
The empire of the Mediterranean belongs indis- 
putably to Italy, who possesses in this sea coasts 
twice as extensive as those of France. . . . The 
empire of the Mediterranean must be Italy's con- 
stant thought, the aim of her ministers, the funda- 
mental policy of the Florence Cabinet." In 1870, 
not content with taking Rome, many Italians had 
the idea of occupying either Corsica or Tunis. A 
few years later, Fregosa, in his book entitled, II pri- 
mato Italiano, claimed Egypt, Tripoli, Tunis, and 
Algeria as Italy's natural colonies.^ The Policy of 1 

^ See, in reference to this, Rene Pinon's Empire of the Medi- 
terranean. 



84 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

the Consulta justified Thiers' saying that '' Italy's 
gratitude would last just as long as her weakness." ^ 
These tendencies Bismarck, with his superior, 
skill, managed to excite, foster, and utilize. The 
clericalism of the National Assembly, the mainte- 
nance of a French guardship at Civita Vecchia, the 
petition of our bishops for the reestablishment of 
the Pope's temporal power, and the Due de Bro- 
glie's ministry, everything was taken advantage of 
by him for the purpose of keeping Italy in a state 
of alarm. The Tunis affair served to complete the 
Rome Cabinet's distrust and fear of us. To the 
laurels which Signer Maccio, the Italian Consul, 
hoped to gather in the Regency, the expedition of 
General Forgemol replied with the consent of Eu- 
rope in 1881. Hatred of France was rampant. 
Revenge was sought at any price. The moment 
awaited by Bismarck arrived. Strengthened by 
the alliance concluded with Austria in 1879, he had 
no need to solicit Italy to join the coalition. She 
offered of her own accord. She abandoned herself. 
The Triple Alliance was concluded, and Italy's 
armaments at once gave it an aggressive character. 
Crispinism was the order of the day. From 1881 

* It is right to add here that in a speech pronounced on 
the 3d of May, 1894, Baron Blanc, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
attempted to clear his country from this charge. According to 
him, it was out of gratitude towards France that It^ly had not 
anticipated her in Tunis and did not join with England's action 
in Egypt. This somewhat singular theory, as is remarked in the 
book, France and Italy, written by Mr. Billot, our late Ambassa- 
dor at Rome, proves the ingeniousness of Baron Blanc's mind — 
and nothing more. 



THE MEDITERRANEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 85 

to 1896, it weighed on Franco-Italian relations. ' 
In the Triplice, Crispi was the instigating agent 
whom Bismarck was able to restrain or let loose, 
just as he pleased. Franco-Italian relations were 
considerably more strained than those between 
France and Germany. To act against France 
rather than on behalf of Italy, such was the line of 
conduct instinctively followed at Rome, whether 
in Europe or out of Europe; but, as was soon seen, 
at the expense of Italy's interests, both political 
and economic. 

During this period, numerous were the disagree- 
able incidents that occurred between the two coun- 
tries. In the month of December, 1887, the Flor- 
ence police, cynically backed up by Crispi, broke 
open the archives of our Consulate. In the follow- 
ing year, the military commandant at Massowah, 
acting on his own authority, abolished the capitu- 
lations, under the benefit of which, the French re- 
siding there had lived for more than twenty years. 
In February, 1888, the altogether improbable re- 
port was circulated that the French fleet was about 
to attack Spezzia. On the 2d of October, 1891, a 
French pilgrim having written Vive le Pape on the 
register lying in the Pantheon near Victor Emman- 
uel's tomb, there was a formidable outburst of anti- 
French feeling throughout the country. In August, 
1893, the Prince of Naples was present at the Ger- 
man military manoeuvres in Lorraine ; and, in the 
same month, some Italians having been killed at 
Aigues Mortes in a quarrel with French workmen, 



86 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

the Palais-Farnese, which was the residence of our 
Embassy, was attacked by the mob. In Septem- 
ber, 1894, the ItaHan authorities of the frontier 
made several arrests of French oflS.cers, while in the 
December following, a whole series of expulsions 
of French journalists who had been long established 
in Rome, was carried out. Now and again, it is 
true, there were Franco-Italian fetes celebrated 
and exchanges of good-will in one place or another: 
the visit of an Italian squadron to Toulon, in 
April, 1890; the inauguration at Nice of Garibal- 
di's monument, in October, 1891 ; the visit of a 
French squadron to Genoa, in September, 1892; 
manifestations of sympathy, when President Carnot 
was assassinated, in June, 1894; the unveiling at 
Magenta of MacMahon's statue, in June, 1895. 
True, also, between two armament projects, Crispi 
affirmed his attachment to peace and his senti- 
ments of friendship towards France. None the 
less, the tension was great, and Italian policy was 
responsible for this. Add to these things the clash 
of interests embittered by our protectionism and 
the rupture of commercial relations between the 
two countries; and it will be seen how fragile was 
a peace that was at the mercy of every little alarm. ^ 
On the 5th of May, Crispi's megalomania exposed 
his country to defeat at the hands of the Abyssini- 
ans. The morrows of defeat are favourable to 
reflection. Italy reflected. Her grievances in the 
Mediterranean had induced her to throw in her lot 

^ See Billot's France and Italy. 



THE MEDITERRANEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 87 

with the Triple Alliance. However, her Mediterra- 
nean policy had not secured by it the guarantees 
sought, Bismarck, in 1882, granting nothing to 
Mancini on this score. In 1886, Robilant, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote: ''I am quite 
decided not to take the initiative in meeting the 
Chancellor with a view to further negotiations. In 
1882, we seemed rather to be begging the Alliance 
than to be negotiating it ; and, in concluding it, we 
exposed ourselves to a Continental war without 
securing our guarantees against a Naval war." By 
such a policy, what had Italy gained ? With regard 
to Germany, a subaltern position; with regard to 
France, a precarious one, and, as a consequence, 
armaments that heavily burdened her budget. Her 
extraordinary credits ran up: 127 millions in 1882, 
212 millions in 1885, 146 millions in 1886; and, 
finally, in the budget of 1894-1895, a deficit of 180 
millions. The denunciation of the Commercial 
Treaty with France had been ruinous to Italian 
agriculture and industry. Within two years Ital- 
ian exports to France had fallen \ 61 per cent. 
More than 700 million francs had been withdrawn 
in one year by French capitalists from Italian 
undertakings in which they were invested. The 
Exchange rose to 123. As General Corsi wrote: 
''The economic consequences of the alliance with 
Germany were disastrous." And many people, con- 
sidering the state of affairs, began to repeat Robi- 
lant's words : ''Italy is decidedly tired of this barren 
Alliance ; and I am loath to oblige her to persevere 



88 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

in it. For, I am too deeply conscious that, as far 
as we are concerned, it will always be void of results." 
At least, there was good reason to correct its exclu- 
sive, onerous, and burdensome character by a return 
to a policy of equilibrium.^ 

The logical issue from this situation was through 
a rapprochement between France and Italy; and 
circumstances, more than any personal good-will, 
were the active cause of the reconciliation. On the 
28th of September, 1896, Italy gave us a first pledge 
— by accepting a revision of the Tunisian treaties, 
which implied an official recognition of our situation 
in the Regency. On the 1st of October, a Franco- 
Italian treaty of navigation was substituted for the 
one which had expired in 1886. Last of all, on the 
21st of November, 1898, was signed the Treaty of 
Commerce which had long been desired in Rome. 
The Italian commercial balance sheet at once showed 
an increase of 100 millions in imports and of 200 
millions in exports. Our French banks, the Paris 
Comptoir d'Escompte and the Banque de Paris, — 
intervening just when the German economic crisis 
of 1900 put an end to the financial aid that had pre- 
viously been obtained at Berlin, — saved the Rome 
market from a veritable disaster. ''But for the 100 
millions of the Public Debt purchased in 1901 by the 
Paris Market, Italy would in that year have been 
unable to obtain her economic equilibrium; and 
the exchange on foreign countries, instead of disap- 
pearing gradually, would have advanced to pre- 
* See Luigi Chiala's Pagine di Storia contemporanea. 



THE MEDITERRANEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 89 

mium rates." ^ At this juncture, Italy was induced 
to draw nearer to France by the tightness of her 
economic situation; and the Italians themselves 
are the first to acknowledge it, as the following quo- 
tation proves : — 

The German, economic crisis rendered it necessary that Italy 
should seek for a political rapprochement with France. Italy 
would have been forced (in any case) to inaugurate a policy 
altogether friendly to France. If, through a political blunder, 
such as the visit of the Prince of Naples to Metz, the patriotic 
sentiments of the French had been wounded and the Paris 
market had again begun to sell Italian Consols, Italy would have 
been obliged sooner or later to reimburse all the French money 
invested in them ; the exchange would again have advanced to 
its highest rates; Consols would have declined to their lowest 
ebb ; and Italy would have found herself in presence of an eco- 
nomic crisis like the one she had such a terrible experience of in 
1893. The powerlessness shown by the German money market 
to act as Italy's banker, the need of the latter young country's 
continuing her economic development, and having the aid of 
other nations richer than herself, together with the fact that the 
Paris money market has once more assumed the role of banker 
to Italy, impose on the Government a policy which shall be in < 
perfect accord with that of France.^ 

It is therefore allowable to think that commercial 
and financial interests on Italy's side would have 
sufficed to determine the rapprochement, while 
securing to France political advantages that were 
equivalent. Such was not the opinion of Mr. Del- 
casse, who, when commercial relations were resumed, 
seized the opportunity in order to enter into diplo- 
matic negotiations with the Cabinet at Rome. In 

^ See G. M. Flamingo's book, The Financial Reasons for the 
Franco- Italian Friendship. 

^ See G. M. Flamingo's book, above. 



90 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

the month of April, 1901, the Italian fleet, under the 
orders of the Duke of Genoa, came to pay an official 
visit to President Loubet at Toulon. In the same 
year, in consequence of an exchange of views with 
Paris, Signor Prinetti, the Italian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, announced that, to his knowledge, 
''France had no intention, in the regions bordering 
on the vilayet of Tripoli, to go beyond the limits 
fixed by the Convention of the 21st of March, 1899, 
nor yet to interfere with the Caravans." A few 
days later, in an interview, Mr. Delcasse stated that, 
in return for this assurance, Italy had promised to 
do nothing that might hamper French policy in 
Morocco. As a matter of fact, this was the sub- 
stance of the Notes exchanged, in December, 1900, 
between the Governments. In 1902, on the renewal 
of the Triple Alliance, Mr. Delcasse explained in 
Parliament "that the legitimate aspirations of 
both nations clashed nowhere" ; and he added, "that- 
neither directly nor indirectly was Italy's policy 
aimed against France by reason of her alliances. 
They could not, in any case, imply a threat against 
us whether in diplomatic forms, protocols, or in- 
ternational military stipulations. In no case and 
under no form, could Italy become either the instru- 
ment or the auxiliary of an aggression against our 
country." 

What was the value of this rapprochement f What 
was its scope ? In a general point of view, that is to 
say, the European, it made no change in the terms 
of existing treaties. However closely Mr. Delcasse's 



THE MEDITERRANEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 91 

declarations are examined, there is only one affirma- 
tion to be extracted from them; to wit, that the 
engagements imposed on Italy by the Triple Alli- 
ance have not an offensive, but a purely defensive, 
character, and that, in the case of an attack on 
France, Italy would not be associated with it. But 
it does not seem that the constitutive clauses of the 
Triple Alliance ever had any stipulation of the kind. 
What gave them their aggressive character was not 
their wording, but the bias exhibited by Italy in 
their interpretation. And it was the alteration of 
this bias which constituted an important /a^^ nouveau 
in the international order. When Bismarck used 
to speak of '^ exhausting our life's blood," Italy was 
the Power he intended should play the provocative 
agent's role. It was through Italy that the Triplice 
was able to become offensive in its action. Without 
modifying the text that sealed this Alliance, the 
Franco-Italian rapprochement modified therefore 
its nature. Since the rapprochement, the Triple 
Alliance has lost its edge. It is less threatening 
militarily, more peaceable politically. To Ger- 
many, if attacked by France, it leaves the support 
of the Italian Army; but for an attack on France"" 
there is no longer the assistance of Italian provoca- 
tions. 

This evolution assumes still greater precision, if, 
instead of considering the friendly understanding i 
between Rome and Paris by itself, we place it as I 
a function of the Franco-English rapprochement, t 
Between 1882 and 1900, Italy was not only Ger-, * 



92 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

many's ally. She was also bound to Great Britain 
by engagements, the nature of which was not clearly 
declared, but the existence of which was not doubt- 
ful. In February, 1887, Depretis said, "Our situa- 
tion is now secure both on sea and on land." On the 
29th of June, the Marquis di Rudini, who held the 
double office of Premier and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, declared in his turn: — 

What Italy perseveringly and tenaciously wishes is peace, 
because she believes it is necessary for the development of her 
institutions and the improvement of her economic conditions. 

But, on the other hand, Italy also tenaciously wishes for the 
maintenance of the balance of power in Europe, the preserva- 
tion of the statu quo in the Mediterranean especially. 

With a view to realizing these designs, the Government has 
not waited until to-day, in seeking to come to understandings 
and to conclude agreements with the Powers that are in the 
same order of ideas and whose interests are bound up together. 

An exchange of opinions took place only a few years ago with 
England, followed by declarations on the part of Sir James Fer- 
gusson in the English Parliament ; and there remains but little 
for me to add on the subject. 

His language was strictly conformable to the facts of the 
case. Both Italy and England purpose to maintain peace while 
preserving the statu quo. I may say, moreover, that I perceive 
no questions, respecting which, the views of Italy are not in 
accordance with those of England, seeing that their interests 
are identical. 

Last of all, on the 17th of March, 1896, the Marquis 
di Rudini repeated in his ministerial statement that 
the country's traditional friendship with England 
completed Italy's system of alliances. As long as 
England was at loggerheads with France, her inti- 
mate relations with Rome, — "her Alliance of 



THE MEDITERRANEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 93 

Sentiment," to use the Duke of Sermoneta's ex- 
pression, — was not, as may be imagined, of a nature 
to improve Franco-Italian relations. And, on thew" 
contrary, the Franco-English rapprochement, con-| 
eluded in 1894, at once added value to the Franco- 
Italian understanding. It was, so to speak, its 
moral security, increasing its diplomatic efficacy in 
the cause of peace. 

As for the agreements assuring reciprocal absten- 
tion in Morocco and the Tripolitaine respectively, 
they were in harmony with the interests of the two 
countries. It will be seen further on, why France . 
was compelled to intervene in Morocco. And, in 
sooth, to quote a pertinent remark, " the key of the 
Moorish Empire was not to be sought in Rome." 
But still Italy's good-will with regard to projects as 
yet ill-defined might one day be useful. On the other 
hand, no essential interests required the presence 
of the Italians at Tripoli. What they desired, after 
their Ethiopian fiasco, was more especially the 
satisfaction of their amour-propre. The Tripoli- 
taine does not possess the first-class value recently 
attributed to it by Rohlfs when he wrote: ''The 
Power that holds Tripoli will be master of the ' 
Sudan: Tunis as an acquisition is not worth the 
tenth of Tripoli." Indeed, no one, even at Rome, 
nourishes any illusions with regard to the possi- 
bilities of profit in the Tripolitan affair. The Sultan 
has sovereignty over the vilayet, and would only 
abandon it in obedience to armed force. As an 
Italian Minister once said: ''It is proper that our 



94 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

designs on Tripoli should preserve a strictly platonic 
character." Even with this character, certain per- 
sons in France have expressed the opinion that it 
was imprudent to admit the hypothesis of an Italian 
installation at the gates of Tunis. However, while 
granting that the rapprochement with Rome might 
have been negotiated on better terms, it may be 
reasonably presumed that such fears are purely 
chimerical. 

Being convenient in Africa and useful in Europe, 
the Franco-Italian agreement, coupled with the 
Franco-English one, deserves in itself nothing but 
approbation. But the way in which we have made 
use of it is undoubtedly less worthy of praise. 
Thus, for instance, it was imprudent to compromise 
our relations with the Holy See by President Loubet's 
visit to Rome, and thus to prepare the rupture of 
the Concordat. It was for us to understand our 
interests better; and no reproach can be made 
against Italy by reason of our mistake. Similarly, 
Italy has certainly benefited through the weakening 
of our situation in the Far East ; and the agreement 
of January, 1907, was a seal set upon this change to 
her advantage. But here again, we are alone to 
blame, for not seeing that, by breaking with the 
Vatican, we should sooner or later lose the profit 
accruing to us by the exercise of our Catholic pro- 
tectorate in the Levant. The events that have- 
occurred since 1902, have allowed us to estimate 
the price of our good relations with Italy. What 
would have happened notably if the Italy of 1905 



THE MEDITERRANEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 95 

had been in the same frame of mind with regard to 
us as the Italy of 1889? The policy which had 
sought for the rapprochement, and realized it, was 
good and wise in its principle. The errors made in 
applying it cannot induce us to forget that. 

II 

The Franco-Spanish rapprochement was the natural 
complement of the reconciliation between France 
and England and of that between France and Italy. 
It was necessarily inspired by the same principle, 
and necessarily served the same policy. But it 
could not assume the same form. 

The Cuban war and the loss of her colonies com- 
pelled Spain to fall back on herself. This admirable 
country, which a defective administration, content 
to exploit the colonial farm, had for centuries 
permitted to lie fallow, understood from the lesson 
of her defeat that her future would depend on her 
energy. To quote Mr. Victor Berard's just expres- 
sion, Spain is at once a farm and a workshop. To 
this farm and to this workshop, what is lacking? 
Men, money, capital. 

The peasant has no capital to buy the machinery and tools, 
for want of which, he is unable to stand against foreign compe- 
tition. The husbandman has not the capital needed to rees- 
tablish the irrigation works which once transformed the whole 
of Arabian Spain into a garden. The ironmaster, the miner, the 
manufacturer, the tradesman, the commission agent, have found 
on the spot a certain amount of capital which had come back 
from Cuba or the Phihppine Islands and which has enabled 
them to set going a large number of businesses that to-day are 



96 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

thriviBg. . . . But what they want is ten or twenty times as 
much money. Spanish industry finds lenders only at seven or 
eight per cent. And if, after considering private individuals, 
you come to look at the State, what loans would the latter 
have to negotiate if it were only to undertake the repair and 
upkeep of what remains of the national manufacturing appli- 
ances and other machinery or the development of that part 
which is in process of formation! Castile and Aragon demand 
the remaking of the canals given them by Charles V. Cadiz, 
Carthagena, Tarragona, Vigo, beg for docks and dykes. Spain 
throughout needs railways. . . . And, above all, the entire 
country requires a restored coinage, finances that are sound. 
. . . Public finance must first be placed on a good footing, if 
private finance is to be improved.* 

When once in possession of herself, and turned 
towards economic action, Spain is too proud not to 
rely on her future. This future is no longer to be 
sought beyond the seas. She sees it quite near 
to her, within her reach, in the Morocco that she 
herself resembles by the situation of her mountains 
and the aspect of her soil. As the Marquis de 
Segonzac ^ has demonstrated, Morocco, more than 
any other portion of Africa, is like Spain in race, 
history, and civilization. There is striking simi- 
larity between the Sierra Nevada and the Rif 
mountains. The Straits of Gibraltar are a mere 
accidental break. They do not constitute a frontier, 
and have never separated anything, either geographi- 
cally or historically. The Moors still dream of the 
palaces of Granada. And as for the Spaniards, 
ever since Isabella the Catholic assigned them in 
her will and testament the task of pursuing the 

* Victor Berard's book, The Moroccan Affair. 

2 See Marquis de Segonzac's book, Travels in Morocco, 



THE MEDITERRANEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 97 

Mussulmans on to the African shore, they have 'f'" 
considered Morocco as being their peculiar prop- 
erty, over which they claim ^'historic rights." 

To tell the truth, the realization of these rights 
has so far been of a mediocre kind. In 1688, Spain 
obtained the cession of Ceuta. At the time of the 
1720 expedition, and more especially on the occasion 
of that of 1859, which ended in the capture of Te- 
toan, together with the payment of a war indemnity 
and the extension of the Ceuta territory, she at- 
tempted to establish herself firmly on Moorish soil; 
but the result was negative, or nearly so. What 
Spain acquired, to wit, her penal settlement, was 
purely factitious, a mere administrative abstraction, 
nothing more. Ceuta, which has no commercial 
activity, occupies a position of strategic value, but 
is not seriously fortified. Penon de Velas, Alhuce- 
mas, the Isle of Alboran, Peregil, Ifni, and the 
Zaffarine Isles, serve as hulks — when they serve for 
anything at all. Melilla alone, since it has been a 
free port, has carried on a certain trade ; but the 
countries that chiefly benefit by it are France and 
England. The penal settlement costs 2,500,000 
pesetas annually. The trade, which amounts to 
about two millions, yields to Spain a sum of about 
400,000 pesetas; so that the excess of expenditure 
over receipts is more than two millions. Between 
the Spanish residents and the native population 
there is no intermingling. The Moors do not allow 
the Europeans to issue from their fortress. In 
most of the penal settlements everything comes 



98 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

from Spain, even their soft water. Clinging for 
centuries to a few islets and peninsulas of the coast, 
the Spanish have drawn no profit from them, either 
to increase their territory, or even to secure its being 
respected. During this long domination, they have 
gained only the ineradicable hate of neighbouring 
tribes. Such precarious possession of a few rocks 
confers on them no more rights over the bulk of the 
country, than sticking their nests in windows gives 
to swallows the ownership of a house. 

In order to work for their economic development, 
as also in order to give effect to their aspirations 
in Morocco, the Spanish need help. And such help, 
France, better than any other nation, is in a position 
to afford them. The support of French capital can 
be the leaven which shall cause the unexploited re- 
sources of the peninsula to germinate. As for 
Morocco, what Seiior Silvela said in 1901 is true : 
"The present situation of the country, closed to 
commerce, to civilization, to any increase of popula- 
tion, to the working of its mines, to the consumption 
and exchange of productions, is not a source of profit 
or wealth, but rather of poverty, sterility, and stag- 
nation for Spain. ... It is in an understanding 
with France that we shall find the surest aid, not 
indeed for making war but for an equitable and 
reasonable division of interests." Although this 
idea of sharing, which has a very considerable number 
of adherents in Spain, did not correspond with the 
views of French policy, Senor Silvela's language 
deserved to be taken note of, as indicating a dispo- 



THE MEDITERRANEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 99 

sition that, one day or another, we might find it 
advantageous to encourage. 

As a matter of fact, during the last twenty years 
of the nineteenth century, Spain was far from 
showing herself favourable to France. Rather 
towards Berlin than towards Paris it was that her 
sympathies went. The second marriage of Alfonso 
XII with an Austrian princess (1879) harmonized 
with the country's desire to enter into closer rela- 
tions with the Triple Alliance. Four years later, the 
King paid a visit to Germany, where William I 
appointed him Colonel in a Prussian regiment 
garrisoned at Strasburg. And, a few days later, 
on his arrival in Paris, Alfonso XII was greeted in 
the Rue de Rivoli with hisses and groans. In the 
month of November following, when the Crown 
Prince proceeded to Madrid to return the Spanish 
King's visit, all the European press, whether rightly 
or wrongly, spoke of an alliance between Germany 
and Spain. True, in 1885, the conflict which broke 
out over the Caroline Islands, produced throughout 
Spain a strong feeling of irritation ; but, at the death 
of Alfonso XII in 1886, calm was restored, and the 
German leanings of the Government in Madrid 
seemed less doubtful. The minority of Alfonso XIII 
and his mother's regency were a period of quiet 
reflection, which was at last disturbed so tragically 
by the war with the United States (1898). On that 
occasion, the friendliness towards Spain shown by 
the French newspapers, and the clever mediation 
of Mr. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at 



100 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

Washington, during the negotiations for peace, 
effected a rapprochement between Madrid and Paris. 
Although an Austrian, the Queen-Mother, with 
rare clear-sightedness, understood that Spain could 
not, without peril to herself, adhere to a political 
system which would have risked bringing her into 
opposition against France. 

"No country can do our dynasty as much harm 
or as much good as France," she said one day to 
Mr. Loubet. 

Her prudent and circumspect diplomacy, admira- 
bly seconded by Seiior de Leon y Castillo, her Am- 
bassador at Paris, succeeded in keeping the future 
free for a policy which her son, a young man of intel- 
ligent, charming, and liberal mind and a friend to 
our country, resolutely guided, as soon as he came 
of age, towards a friendship with France. 

A Franco-Spanish understanding relative to Mo- 
rocco encountered, notwithstanding, difficulties that 
were serious. Certain Spaniards, who though not 
numerous, made a great deal of stir, had retained a 
hatred of France. Men like Sefior Villanueva, who, 
when he was at the head of the Admiralty in 1895, 
resigned rather than accept the Grand Officer's grade 
in the Legion of Honour, were full of distrust and 
prejudice with regard to us. As far as Morocco was 
concerned, the very largeness of their desires ren- 
dered them hostile to all precision : for, to define is 
to limit. Obsessed by the hope of Moroccan profits 
that were still undivided, they considered any other 
foreign action than their own as a menace, any 



THE MEDITERRANEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 101 

agreement with a foreign Power, and especially with 
France, as prejudicial, France being supreme in Al-^ 
geria. This explains why, between 1899 and 1904/ 
Spanish policy underwent fluctuations, the main 
lines of which, if not the details, are sufficiently well 
known. There were at first, in 1902, preliminary. ^ 
negotiations with Paris, which, while going pretty, 
far, did not issue in the treaty of which an apocry- 
phal text was published. What would seem to have 
been discussed was a method of sharing, as to which 
no agreement could be reached. Next there was a 
double and parallel exchange of views with Great 
Britain and Germany, which doubtless took its rise 
in the sale to Germany of what was left of the Span- 
ish colonies in the Pacific, — the Caroline and Ma- 
rianne isles. Nothing came of this, either. Things 
went on so till 1904, when, on the 8th of April, Ma- 
drid learned that France and England had just comei 
to an understanding on the question of Morocco. 

The news of this understanding caused a disagree- 
able impression in Spain; and the feeling was that 
there had been too much waiting on events. France, 
it was thought, being henceforth in agreement with 
England, would show herself less conciliatory than 
in the past. However, these two Powers had taken -^ 
the precaution to put into the statement of their ' 
arrangement a clause proving their friendly inten- 
tions with regard to Spain. '^The two Govern- 
ments," said Article 8, ''basing themselves on their 
amicable sentiments towards Spain, take into special, 
account the interests she has acquired from her geo- 



102 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

graphic position and her territorial possessions on the 
Moroccan coast of the Mediterranean, with respect 
to which subject, the French Government will ar- 
range with that of Spain." In accordance with this 
pledge, Mr. Delcasse at once entered into negotia- 
tions with Senor de Leon y Castillo, the Spanish 
Ambassador, their exchange of views continuing 
throughout the summer of 1904. Now and again, 
they found it difficult to reconcile the claims of their 
respective countries; but finally a convention was 
agreed upon, and duly announced in the press. Its 
terms were as follows : — 

The Government of the French RepubUc and that of his 
Majesty, the King of Spain, 

Having agreed to determine the extent and the guarantee of 
the interests belonging to France by reason of her Algerian pos- 
sessions and to Spain by reason of her possessions on the coasts 
of Morocco. 

And the Government of his Majesty, the King of Spain, hav- 
ing in consequence given their adhesion to the Franco-English 
declaration of the 8th of April relative to Morocco and Egypt, ■ 
communication of which had been made to them by the Govern- 
ment of the French Republic. 

Declare that they remain firmly attached to the integrity of \ 
the Moroccan Empire under the sovereignty of the Sultan. 

This document was fairly vague. On reading it 
and re-reading it, one experienced a feeling that the 
two Governments had kept the essential part of it 
to themselves. Undoubtedly, Spain, by adhering 
to the Franco-English declaration, affirmed, together 
with the two signataries of the declaration, her at- 
tachment to the integrity of Morocco and to the 
sovereignty of the Sultan. She also recognized that 



THE MEDITERRANEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 103 

'4t belonged to France, more peculiarly as a border 
Power having a long contiguous frontier, to see that 
this country remained tranquil and to lend her assist- 
ance, with a view to all the economic and financial 
administrative reforms required." She also de- 
clared herself equally decided ^^not to hamper France- 
in what might be done for this purpose, and to af- 
ford her the help of Spain's diplomacy for the exe- 
cution of the clauses of the present declaration." 
But if France obtained this precious adhesion from 
Spain, it was ''in consequence" of something else. 
This something was the determination of "the ex- 
tent of Spain's rights and the guarantee of her inter- 
ests resulting from her possessing territory on the 
coasts of Morocco." In other words, Spain's adhe- 
sion corresponded to concessions from France. And 
it was just on the chapter of such concessions con- 
taining the essence of the agreement that nothing 
was openly said. What were these secret clauses? 
What rights — new ones evidently — had we ceded 
to Spain? How and in what measure had the ex- 
tent of these rights been fixed? How and under 
what form had the guarantee of such interests been 
established? These questions were left without an- 
swer. 

In reality, the privileged political position of 
France with regard to Morocco was acknowledged by 
Spain. But France consented to certain restrictions 
in the exercise of her privilege, and these restrictions 
were in favour of Spain, She associated Spain with 
herself in her designs of peaceful penetration within 



104 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

the part of Morocco where such penetration had the 
greatest advantage for Spaniards. However, in this 
same part, any action of Spain, during a limited 
time, was subordinated to previous arrangement with 
France, whereas, on her own ground, France was 
obhged only to notify Spain of her initiatives. There 
was no question of divided shares, but merely of an 
economic cooperation, as also of the contingency of 
concerted measures, with a view to the maintenance 
of order in case of serious disturbance breaking out. 
It was a complicated combination, which, in the 
year following, had to be rendered more precise in 
certain of its terms by a supplementary agreement 
(September, 1905).^ Moreover, it recorded, unlike 
the Franco-English and Franco-Italian arrange- 
ments, a sort of purchase-out in favour of France ; 
and, on the other hand, coupled Spanish projects 
with French. It was positive instead of being nega- 
tive. 

A few months earlier, this political agreement had 
been preceded by an economic understanding, which 
in the future is destined to bear the best fruits, to 
wit, the treaty relative to the Trans-Pyrenean rail- 
ways. There is no journey more uselessly long than 
that from Paris to Cadiz. A plan for remedying this 
state of things had been long under consideration; 
and a Franco-Spanish convention on the subject was 
signed in 1885. After a series of preliminary nego- 
tiations and preparatory surveys superintended on 
the French side by Mr. Mille, Civil Engineer-in- 
* See our book, Diplomatic Questions of the Year 1904. 



THE MEDITERRANEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 105 

Chief, two lines were mapped out, one running from 
Oloron to Jaca through the Canfranc pass, the other 
from Saint Girons to Lerida through the Salau pass. 
It had been decided by the two Commissaries that 
the two lines should be made on the same level. 
Everything, therefore, was apparently settled, when 
an article was published to the effect that the two 
Governments were to come to an understanding as 
to the date on which the convention should be sub- 
mitted for Parliamentary approval. This was equiv- 
alent to an indefinite postponement. The conven- 
tion was never brought before the Chambers. The 
ratification was never accorded. From that time 
forward there were frequent attempts to take up the 
matter again, but always without anything definite 
being done. In 1904, however, a step forward was 
taken. To the two lines first planned, a third was 
proposed from Ax-les-Thermes to RipoU, shortening 
the journey from Toulouse to Barcelona by three 
hours. A treaty embodying the new scheme was 
signed on the 18th of August, 1904, and was com- 
pleted by an additional act in February, 1905. This 
was a first definite effort towards economic coopera- 
tion between the two countries. It would be ad- 
vantageous to have others following. 

The thought may occur that in the case of the 
Franco-Spanish rapprochement, as in that of the 
Franco-Italian, less onerous conditions might have 
been secured. However, Spain, with her haughty 
temperament, would not have accepted the Moroccan 
developments of our Mediterranean policy, unless 



106 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

satisfaction had been granted to her historic claims. 
By refusing her this satisfaction, we should have 
aroused her hostility. And either in Europe, in the 
event of a war, or else in Morocco itself, such hostil- 
ity might have become dangerous. On the contrary, 
the agreement thus opportunely concluded was a 
guarantee for the future, which was further strength- 
ened by Great Britain's intervention. As a matter 
of fact, it is not too much to say that the Franco- 
English Entente was the determining cause of Spain's 
throwing in her lot with Europe's Western Powers. 
The marriage of Alfonso XIII with a princess of the 
English Royal Family, his interviews with Edward 
VII, his visits to London and Paris, confirmed this 
trend of Spanish policy, which indeed was in accord- 
ance with his personal preferences, since he has no 
leanings towards Germany. From his stay at Ber- 
lin he brought back a disagreeable impression. It 
seemed to him as though attempts were being made 
to astonish and daunt him ; and the result was that 
he was annoyed. His presence on the throne, there- 
fore, is the pledge that a policy will be followed 
which, if partially caused by a somewhat naive Pan- 
Latinism, none the less corresponds, in its existing 
form, to the practical interests of those that it binds 
together. 

Ill 

On the 5th of November, 1881, when explaining 
to the Chamber his Tunisian policy, Jules Ferry said : 
"The Tunisian question is as old as the Algerian one. 



THE MEDITERRANEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 107 

It is contemporaneous with it. Can any good French- 
man support the idea of leaving to any but a weak, 
friendly, or subordinate Power the possession of a 
territory which, in the full acceptation of the term, 
is the key of our house ? " The necessity thus clearly 
recognized by the greatest statesman of the Third 
Republic, was bound to become the inspiring princi- 
ple of our policy from the moment when, after the- 
Algerian and Tunisian questions, that of Morocco 
arose. 

Situated at the extreme western end of Africa, 
Morocco has remained down to our own day as a~ 
wreck of antiquity. During the past century, all 
the various Mussulman countries have more or less 
adopted our European civilization. Morocco alone 
has continued a closed country, rigidly preserving 
her peculiar exclusiveness. In no other spot is reli- 
gious life so intense as in the Maghreb el Aksa. In 
no other clime is the national life feebler. It has 
been truly said that Morocco is not an empire falling 
to decay, but an empire in process of birth, an em- 
pire which has not succeeded in imposing a State 
unity on the independent tribes that theoretically it 
governs. The nature of its soil favours such inde- 
pendence, which manifests itself more or less strongly 
according as the reigning Sultan is more or less capa- 
ble of exercising his authority, but which so far has 
never been subdued, Morocco is divided into two 
portions, each varying with the reach of the central 
Power. The Bled el Maghzen, in a general way, com- 
prises the populations of the plain, who yield obedi- 



108 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

ence to functionaries appointed by the Sultan and 
consent to pay a tax, which, however, is irregularly 
collected. The Bled es Siba acknowledges the Sul- 
tan's authority only when imposed by means of an 
expedition. However, what at one moment be- 
longs to the Maghzen country may very well belong 
to the Siba country at another. For the last ten 
centuries, it has been the lot of Moroccan Sultans to 
have continually to conquer their subjects, and the 
special occupation of the subjects has been that of 
disobeying their sovereigns. To tell the truth, the 
notion of sovereignty does not exist. Where there 
is no hierarchy, it is impossible that there should be 
any moral notion attaching to revolt. Morocco is a 
country of feudal and theocratic anarchy; and the 
disturbances that have occurred there in recent 
times are merely a fresh manifestation of tendencies 
that have long existed. It is Europe alone which, 
first through mental assimilation, and subsequently 
through political interests, has created the unity of 
Morocco. In such unity there has never been either 
reality or totality. What does exist is a Moorish 
Empire, with which other Powers treat; but inside 
the empire one finds merely tribes who, in battles or 
else in incessant negotiations, seek their personal 
profit only. 

The Sultan Muley Hassan, who reigned from 1873 
to 1894, was an energetic man who had strength- 
ened his power by making war throughout his 
reign. When he died, still fighting, in the course 
of an expedition in the Tedla, near the Oued el Abid, 



THE MEDITERRANEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 109 

he was succeeded by his son Muley Abd el Aziz, 
who, at the time, was sixteen years of age. The 
Chamberlain of the dead monarch, Si Ahmed Ben 
Mouga, caused the young man to be proclaimed 
Emir el-Muminin, that is to say. Commander of 
the Faithful. Then, thrusting into the background 
the person of him whom he had just proclaimed 
Sultan, he seized on the Government, which he 
exercised alone. Between 1894 and 1900, he was 
the sole ruler of the Empire. '^Gifted with dauntless 
will, an untiring worker, eager for power and wealth," ^ 
he dispensed the Sultan from exercising his king- 
craft, giving him people to entertain him instead of 
teaching him how to reign. Abd el Aziz acquired 
nothing of that virile teaching suitable for scholars 
destined to a throne. When Si Ahmed died, he 
had completed his twenty-second year; but was 
completely lacking in maturity of mind, in method, 
and in consistency. After Si Ahmed's disappear- 
ance, rival influences sought to monopolize the 
Government. There was that of the Sultan's 
mother, that of Si el Hadj el Mokhtar ben Ahmed, 
who was the secretary and successor of the deceased 
vizier, and, last of all, that of Si el Mehdi el Menebhi, 
who was Minister of War. This third influence 
soon contrived to supplant the others. In the 
month of April, 1901, Si Fedul Garnit was installed 
as Grand Vizier. But, under cover of his name, it 
was Menebhi who reigned and held the chief power 
until his disgrace placed the Sultan in other hands. 

• See Dr. F. Weisgerber's book, Three Months' Campaigning in 
Morocco. 



110 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

By his qualities as by his failings, Abd el Aziz was 
utterly unfitted for the task of consolidating an 
authority that was tottering to its fall. This tall 
young man, of sallow complexion, with straggling 
beard just beginning to grow, and a tendency to 
stoutness and a certain awkwardness and timidity, 
remained until he was thirty in this boyish stage. 
He is good-hearted and quick of intelligence, but 
possesses neither patience nor energy. His mind 
is an open one, and more liberally inclined than that 
of most of his subjects. He is favourable to reform 
and progress, and has a friendly feeling towards 
Europe, on occasion showing it. However, in all 
this there is no system nor method, nothing that 
resembles a policy. What Abd el Aziz likes best in 
European civilization are its eccentricities. Every 
one has heard of his useless acquisitions, made at 
the instigation of unscrupulous advisers, to the 
detriment of his budget. Billiard-tables, motor-cars, 
cabs, uniforms, toy railways, balloons, cinemato- 
graphs, ice machines, serving for a day and neglected 
on the morrow, have filled his palace and emptied 
his purse. Such frivolous amusements have shocked 
native sentiment. And Abd el Aziz has been, in a 
large measure, the destroyer of his own authority. 
Even his good intentions have, by his own fault, 
turned against him. In 1901, he tried to reform the 
system of taxation, which, to tell the truth, was 
iniquitous. But he suppressed the ancient taxes 
before settling what could be put in their place. 
The Moroccans have profited by the change, but 



THE MEDITERRANEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 111 

have obstinately resisted the new system; so that 
since 1901, the Moorish Exchequer has had no 
regular revenues to draw on except the Customs. 
Similarly, it is the Sultan's blunders which have 
encouraged successive revolts, first that of the Roghi 
Bou-Hamara, then the one, at present victorious, of 
Muley Hafid/ 

And yet Morocco is a rich country. '^Well 
watered by the rains which are attracted by its high 
mountains from the ocean, irrigated in its driest 
parts by the waters of the ouadi which flow down 
from the summits of Atlas, both its climate and its 
situation make it a country more favoured by nature 
than either Algeria or Tunis. To the east, the basin 
of the Moulouya is barely more than a continuation 
of the Oranie. At the foot of the mountains, the 
oases of the Tafilat and the Oued Draa share in 
the geographic conditions of the Sahara and re- 
semble our finest oases of Southern Algeria. But 
to the west, along the ocean, from Tangier to Atlas, 
a long strip of land stretches, between fifty and a 
hundred kilometres in breadth, composed of black 
soil which, if ploughed by European settlers, and 
if peace with an equitable system of taxation were 
assured by a regular government, might become a 
rich cereal-growing country. Between this coast- 
zone and the mountains, extend grassy steppes 
capable of supporting herds of cattle and horses, 
and also of being here and there transformed by 
irrigation. On the mountain plateaus, in the raised 
* See Eugene Aubin's book, The Morocco of To-day. 



112 



FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 



valleys, where rain is abundant, the olive, vine, and 
other fruit trees of the Mediterranean grow almost 
without any cultivation. More towards the south, 
between the two terminal branches of Atlas, the 
Sous Valley displays its orchards and its fields. 
If to this be added that a geological survey of the 
Maghreb region and various traces found by travellers 
encourage the belief that coal and different metals 
are hidden beneath the surface of the soil, . . . one 
has less surprise in remembering that, according to 
Diodorus, the Phoenicians once established on the 
African coast, beyond the pillars of Hercules, three 
hundred factories from which they derived wealth 
of all kinds." 

It was only natural that France, being supreme 
in Algeria, should bethink herself of the future 
possibilities she saw offered to her in Morocco. 
Between Algeria and the Moorish Empire, there 
really exists no natural boundary. The Berber 
countries form one whole. Mountains and valleys 
cross the frontier; and the races are also similar, 
while religious and family organization is identical 
throughout. Moreover, the economic consequences 
of this situation have been felt ever since a remote 
past, as the following tables will show : — 



1. PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGN TRADE WITH MOROCCO 
1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 



France and Algeria 
England .... 
Germany .... 
Spain 



31.1 
41.6 
9.01 

8.4 



37.7 

41.1 

9.6 

7.2 



30. 

40.1 

11.1 

7.7 



46.3 

29.5 
9.9 
4.02 



50.42 

28.78 

8.41 

4.-6 



43.34 

33.05 

12.98 

4.10 



THE MEDITERRANEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 113 



2. MOROCCAN COMMERCE WITH OTHER POWERS. 

(in millions of francs) 

1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 



Aggregate trade 
France and 

Algeria . . 
England . . 
Germany . . 
Spain . . . 



103,347 

32,900 

43,011 

9,317 

8,723 



109,493 

34,813 

45,036 

10,522 

7,903 



97,689 

29,413 

39,266 

10,900 

7,602 



78,642 

36,467 

23,240 

7,832 

3,163 



84,526 

42,613 

24,332 

7,114 

3,861 



76,928 

34,883 

25,428 

9,983 

3,116 



In the commercial relations of France and Morocco, 
there are two characteristic reciprocal needs. France 
in Africa requires Moroccan labour; and Morocco 
requires French merchandise. Our trade with the 
Moorish Empire consists more and more in sending 
our products there. To a greater extent, therefore, 
than any other Power, France must desire to see 
order established over its length and breadth. She 
must desire this also on behalf of her citizens who 
are settled in the country. The number of French 
firms that have established themselves in Morocco 
is not far short of three hundred. The capita] in- 
vested in trade there, exclusive of navigation com- 
panies, is about thirty million francs. For the most 
part, the French tradespeople residing in the Em- 
pire are modest workers, small folk who have emi- 
grated to get a living, — market-gardeners, bakers, 
restaurant-keepers, grocers, bricklayers, mechanics, 
— who, by dint of toiling hard, earn on the Moroccan 
soil enough to furnish themselves with subsistence. 
The duty of the French Government as regards 
their protection cannot therefore be disputed. 



114 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

Moreover, political interest, still more imperious 
than economic interest, compels France to occupy 
herself with Moroccan affairs. Enough has already- 
been said to show how radical the anarchy is which 
prevails throughout the land. On account of 
Morocco's proximity to Algeria, and the geographic, 
ethnographic, and religious unity of the two coun- 
tries, such anarchy is a constant menace to our 
colony's tranquillity. All the various Algerian 
agitators, Abd el Kader, Ulad Sidi Cheikh, Bou 
Amama, have used Morocco as an operating base 
against us. Order in Morocco is consequently 
necessary for order to reign in Algeria. A fortiori, 
we ought to have the assurance that this already 
redoubtable spontaneous anarchy shall not be 
aggravated by European instigation, using it and 
keeping it up against us. 

Thus is determined the necessary policy which is 
imposed on the French Government. They desire 
that order shall reign in Morocco. They desire 
further that no European Power shall acquire there 
a preponderant influence which might threaten to 
compromise our situation in Africa, and in the 
Mediterranean, and, as a consequence, our situation 
in Europe. The defence of this double interest — 
with the maintenance of order as its positive portion 
and the exclusion of foreign influence as its negative 
one — such, with regard to Morocco, must be the 
rule of French action. 

During many years, our action in the country 
was uncertain in its aim and fluctuating in its , 



THE MEDITERRANEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 115 

methods. On the morrow of the conquest of Al- 
giers, the battle of Isly, the bombardment of Tan- 
gier and of Mogador, demonstrated our military- 
power to the Moroccans. But this work of repres- 
sion was not politically utilized. The Treaty of 
Lalla-Marnia of 1845, indeed, revealed the Govern- 
ment's hesitations by the lack of precision in its 
clauses. In proportion as Oran was more thickly 
colonized, the inconveniences resulting were in- 
creasingly felt. Continual aggressions, which caused 
long controversies, troubled the security of our 
dependent population. And the claims that our 
Ministers in Tangier were each year called upon to 
defend, produced no other effect than that of giving 
the Moorish Power, though without the least prac- 
tical efficacy on our frontiers, an artificial existence. 
By virtue of our "right of pursuit," inscribed in the 
Treaty of 1845, and in agreement with the Maghzen, 
France sent several punitive expeditions into Moroc- 
can territory, that of General de Wimpffen in 1870, 
those of 1881 and 1882, owing to the revolt of Bou 
Amama. For nearly half a century, however, she 
confined herself to isolated measures without seeking 
to reach the evil in its source and to prepare a last- 
ing remedy. Not until 1900, and then only after 
successive rebounds and under the pressure of 
circumstances, did the French Government, by 
deciding to occupy the Touat region, take the pre- 
cautionary measures requisite for the defence of our 
southern frontier. A year later, Mr. Revoil, the 
Governor-General of Algeria, being convinced that 



116 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

this occupation would be without lasting effect, if 
conquest were not followed by organization, entered 
into negotiations with the Moroccan Government 
which resulted in the Treaty of the 20th of July, 
1901, this latter becoming thenceforward the basis 
of our policy. 

The agreement — which, as indicated in the word- 
ing of its preamble, was intended to ''consolidate 
the bonds of friendship existing between the two 
Governments and to develop their reciprocal good 
relations by establishing them, on the one hand, on 
the guarantee of the Moorish Empire's integrity, and, 
on the other, on the improvement of the frontier 
situation, in which both were immediately interested, 
by all such detailed arrangements as the said frontier 
situation might necessitate" — instituted a veritable 
cooperation between the two neighbouring Govern- 
ments. Without seeking to fix an absolutely im- 
movable boundary line amidst limitless sands and 
wandering tribes, an exchange of good offices was 
provided for, both as regards police, and the regula- 
tion of trade and Customs. A Franco-Moroccan 
Commission proceeded to the place ; and, in order 
to facilitate its labours, a second agreement was 
signed at Algiers on the 20th of April, 1902, ''with a 
view to securing permanent peace, safety, and 
commercial progress." The first article said: "The 
Moorish Government engage, by all possible means, 
throughout the extent of their territory from the 
mouth of the Oued Kiss to Figuig, to consolidate the 
authority of their Maghzen such as it has been exer- 



THE MEDITERRANEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 117 

cised over the Moroccan tribes since the Treaty of 
1845. The French Government, by reason of their 
frontier situation, will lend their aid to this task 
in any and every case of need. The French Govern- 
ment will establish their authority and a condition 
of peace throughout the Sahara regions, and the 
neighbouring Moroccan Government will help in this 
by every means in their power." It was further 
stipulated that a triple line of markets, — French, 
mixed, and Moroccan, — with a corresponding col- 
lection of dues, should be created between Morocco 
and Algeria. The French Government pledged 
themselves to pay the Maghzen each year a sum 
equivalent to the Customs duties accruing from the 
merchandise entering Algeria from Morocco between 
Figuig and the Teniet es Sassi. A supplementary 
agreement, dated the 7th of May, 1902, rendered 
more precise certain of the clauses in the previous 
arrangement. And the policy, as thus defined, 
was forthwith put into execution. 

In carrying out this work, France gave proofs of 
her generosity and friendliness, placing instructors 
at the Sultan's disposal for his troops at Figuig, 
Oudjda, and Adjeroud (July, 1902), enabling him to 
negotiate a loan (October, 1902), not holding him 
responsible for the sanguinary outbreaks at Taghit 
(August, 1903), and at El Moungar (September, 
1903), nor yet for the attack made at Zenaga by the 
people of Figuig against Mr. Jonnart, the Governor- 
General of Algeria (June, 1903). In spite of certain 
fluctuations due to Algerian influences and to 



118 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

General O'Connor's imprudent language, the coopera- 
tion continued. As Mr. Delcasse wrote: ''The an- 
archy with which the Moorish Empire had to con- 
tend did not allow us to visit upon its monarch the 
responsibility for acts from which we had to suf- 
fer." We therefore permitted free entry, into the 
Algerian territory, of the money, weapons, ammuni- 
tion, and even troops which the Maghzen needed in 
order to cope with the Roghi (June, 1903). We 
further placed at his service a member of our mili- 
tary mission. Captain Larras, for the organizing of 
the expedition against Oudjda (July, 1903). We 
gave him two pieces of artillery with their material 
and men (August, 1903). Captain Martin, another 
French officer, was commissioned to instruct the Mo- 
roccan troops on the frontier (September, 1903). 
The Algerian Lieutenant Ben Sedira, with his cannon 
''carrying dread everywhere," assured the success of 
the mahalla directed against Taza (October-Novem- 
ber, 1903). Thus, the Maghzen was able to appre- 
ciate at the same time the necessity and efficacy of 
our assistance. And under the excellent superin- 
tendence of General Lyautey, who, in the autumn of 
1903, was appointed to the command of the subdi- 
vision of Ain-Sefra, there was a commencement of 
peace on the frontier, which a few months before had 
been in such a serious state of disturbance.^ 

Although this pacification was important, it was 
not, however, adequate, considering the double inter- 
est that inspired our Moroccan policy. It was not 
1 See the YeUow Book (1901-1905). 



THE MEDITERRANEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 119 

only on our borders but through the whole of the 
Moorish territory that, both commercially and politi- 
cally, we needed the restoration of order. Our pol- 
icy of reform and cooperation was intended to be 
applied over the entire length and breadth of the 
Empire, In order to prevent the establishment of 
any influence hostile to ours, it was necessary for us 
to make our action felt at Fez. On the 8th of April, 
1904, the Franco-English agreement secured us the 
renunciation of Great Britain, up to then our most 
redoubtable adversary. We had been guaranteed a 
similar renunciation of Italy several years before. 
Spain's adhesion was to be secured six months later. 
By a grievous error, Mr. Delcasse lost a great deal of 
time before he bethought himself of drawing the 
necessary conclusions from this new situation. Not 
before the 16th of May did Mr. Saint-Rene Taillan- 
dier, our Minister at Tangier, furnish Ben Sliman 
with explanations concerning the Franco-English 
Treaty; and, only in January, 1905, when nine 
months had been lost, did he go to see the Sultan at 
Fez. However, in spite of this grave mistake, some 
useful measures were taken. On the 27th of May, 
1904, Captain Fournier, a Frenchman, was intrusted 
by the Sultan with the organization of the police at 
Tangier. On the 12th of June, an association of 
French Banks granted the Sultan a loan of sixty-two 
and a half millions, guaranteed by the Customs 
duties, the lenders having the option of checking 
the receipts in the eight ports open to commerce, 
and furthermore a previous deduction and prefer- 



120 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

ence rights on future loans. The creation of a State 
Bank through our agency was also planned. In 
May, 1904, at the Maghzen's request, we lent our 
diplomatic assistance for the purpose of delivering, 
from the hands of the brigand Raisuli, Mr. Perdic- 
caris, an American, and Mr. Varley, an Englishman, 
who had been captured and detained by him. Not- 
withstanding the reservations formulated by Ben 
Sliman as to the Franco-English agreement, espe- 
cially respecting its '^difficult points," and those of 
its terms that ''might offer ambiguities and lead to 
something contrary to what was aimed at" we were, 
therefore, justified in believing that the programme 
of reforms elaborated — too slowly — by the Min- 
ister of Foreign Affairs and the Tangier Legation, 
would be considered at Fez as the logical develop- 
ment of the amicable policy which Ben Sliman him- 
self, in July, 1904, had defined when saying: ''His 
Majesty knows that the most powerful motive of 
your insistence is the community of interests pos- 
sessed by the Governments of the two neighbouring 
countries and also the community of harm that they 
are exposed to suffer." 

There was nothing extraordinary about the pro- 
gramme of reforms. It was based on three guiding 
principles: Morocco's integrity, the Sultan's sov- 
ereignty, commercial liberty. It continued the 
work that had been begun, — police, trade, civili- 
zation. There was no design of conquest, or of pro- 
tectorate, or of monopoly. Conquest would have 
cost too dear. A protectorate would have served no 



THE MEDITERRANEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 121 

purpose in face of the exclusiveness of the tribes. 
Monopolization would have been contrary to inter- 
national treaties. To create police forces with Mo- 
roccan natives and Algerian instructors in all the 
principal towns; to restore finances by means of a 
more honest collection of taxes, a genuine checking 
of expenses, and the repression of smuggling ; to in- 
crease the carrying trade by public works wisely 
planned and the construction of ports, bridges, and 
roads — all this by contract law ; to multiply hospi- 
tals, schools, educational and charitable institutions, 
— such was the tenor of the programme, which, if 
realized with the unique means of action conferred 
on us by Algeria, and with the clear-sighted sym- 
pathy of Europe, herself destined to benefit by it, 
would, within a short time, have been able to change 
the face of the Moorish Empire. As Mr. Delcasse 
wrote: ''Far from diminishing the Sultan's author- 
ity, we were peculiarly anxious to enhance his pres- 
tige." And with reason, the Foreign Minister added : 
"It will be in his name that the agents we may have 
to place at his disposal will exercise their functions, 
carefully applying themselves, in accordance with 
our wishes, to ingratiate themselves with the popu- 
lation, not to offend their feelings, but to respect 
their beliefs, their customs, and their organization. 
In return, we expect the Makhzen, while appreciat- 
ing our efforts, to do his best sincerely to second 
them. And, thus, an era of peace and prosperity 
will soon dawn upon Morocco." 

A few weeks later, all this appearance of promise 



122 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

had vanished. At the instigation of Germany, the^ 
Maghzen and the Sultan separated themselves 
bruskly from the policy of cooperation. The Mo- 
roccan problem passed from the African into the 
European domain. The solution, which had been 
rendered possible through the development of our 
alliances and friendships, was handed over to a 
diplomatic melee — a veritable conflict of alliances, 
the consequences of which were to weigh heavily on 
the world, while the causes leading up to them must 
be sought in the history of the past twenty years. 



CHAPTER IV 

FEANCE AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 

I. Formation of the Triple Alliance. — Crisis of 1875 and the 
Russian intervention. — Bismarck and the " coalition night- 
mare." — Congress of Berlin. — Austro-German Alliance. 

— Italy's accession. — Isolation of France. 

II. Hegemony of the Triple Alliance. — Kalnoky and Crispi. 

— Bismarck and Russia. — Triple "counter-assurance" of 
Skiernevice. — Double "counter-assurance" of 1887. — 
Bismarck and England. — Bismarck and French colonial 
policy. — Bismarck's threats. — Military laws. — Speeches 
of the 8th of January, 1888, and the consequences. 

III. Triple Alliance and the Franco-Russian Alliance. — Ger- 
man anxiety. — German attempt to capture the Dual Alli- 
ance. — Advances of William II. — Policy of William II. — 
Cooperation of the two systems. — Favourable situation of 
Germany. — Mr. von Buelow's mistake. 

IV. Triple Alliance and the Western understandings. — Ap- 
prehensions of William II. — Economic crisis in Germany. 

— Germany and Italy. — Italy and Austria. — Speeches 
of William II. — Policy of reserve. — Russian defeats. — 
Conflict of the Alliances. 



France has not developed her alliances and friend- 
ships with nothing in the way of opposition to face 
her. When our diplomacy began to incline towards 
Russia, about the year 1889, the Triple Alliance, initi- 
ated in 1879 by the bond between Austria and 
Germany, and completed by Italy's joining the com- 
bination, in 1882, dominated Europe without any- 

123 



124 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

thing to counterbalance it. Fifteen years later, this 
same Triple Alliance subsisted over against the har- 
monious edifice of agreements, the completion of 
which once more enabled us to make our diplomacy 
actively felt. A study, therefore, of the relations 
between France and the Triple Alliance is necessary 
for the right comprehension of our conduct and our 
interests. 

On the 10th of May, 1875, the Czar, Alexander II, 
arrived in Berlin. For several weeks, Europe had 
been living in the dread of a crisis. A sensational 
article published by Mr. de Blowitz in the Times on 
the 6th of the same month, and giving a summary 
of what had recently appeared in the German press, 
predicted that a war was on the point of breaking 
out. What the German writers said was in sub- 
stance this: ''To finish once for all with France is 
not merely opportune. It is a duty Germany owes 
to herself and to humanity. Europe will never be 
tranquil as long as a struggle is possible ; and there 
will be this possibility of a struggle as long as the 
blunder made by the Treaty of Frankfort remains 
unrepaired. For it leaves France in a position to 
survive and recommence the duel. Germany is 
troubled by the consciousness of having only half- 
crushed her enemy and of being able to defend 
herself only by sleeping with one eye open." This 
accurate and striking recapitulation of articles that 
could be read every day in the Trans- Rhenish press, 
aroused, according to Lord Derby's expression, ''uni- 
versal indignation." Sympathy for France, van- 



FRANCE AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 125 

quished but dignified in her defeat; and, what was 
more, the fear of a definitive rupture of the balance 
of power in Europe, facihtated the task of the Due 
de Decazes, who was resolved on '^exciting" the 
Powers. 

To General Le Flo, the French Ambassador, the 
Czar had made a promise that he would intervene; 
and between the Czar and the British Government 
there was an entire agreement on the subject. In 
vain Bismarck had the following statement inserted 
in the North German Gazette: ''The language of the 
European press is all the more unintelligible, as ab- 
solutely nothing has occurred which is of a nature 
to trouble the relations existing between the French 
and the German Government." In vain, he de- 
nounced the "hypocritical league composed of ultra- 
montane-revenge politicians and Exchange bears." 
No one believed him. On the 12th of Ma}^, Alex- 
ander II said to Viscount de Gontaut-Biron, the 
French Ambassador, in an interview he had with 
him while at Berlin: ''Peace is necessary to the 
world. We each have enough to do at home. Rely 
on me, and make yourself easy. Tell Marshal Mac- 
Mahon how much I esteem him and how sincerely I 
wish that his Government may be strengthened. 
I hope that our relations will become more and 
more cordial. We have interests in common. We 
must remain friends." On the 14th of May, Gort- 
chakoff addressed a telegraphic circular to the vari- 
ous Russian Ambassadors, announcing that "the 
maintenance of peace was assured." Bismarck, in 



126 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

his anger, overwhelmed the Russian Chancellor with 
his sarcasms: ''Why not/' said he, ''coin five-franc 
pieces with this motto: 'Gortchakoff protect 
France.' Or else, why not organize at the German 
Embassy in Paris a theatre where, with the same 
device, he might appear before French society in 
the role of a guardian angel, in a white robe, with 
wings, amidst a display of Greek fire." Whatever 
may have been his real intentions, Bismarck was 
none the less caught in his own trap. Russia and 
England spoiled his game. If he did not desire war, 
he had allowed or caused the contrary to be believed. 
In either case, the issue was the same : a discomfi- 
ture. "Whether it had been his wish or not to en- 
lighten himself as to the sentiment of the Powers, 
he knew now what he had to expect. The Franco- 
Russian rapprochement had appeared as a combina- 
tion eventually realizable, in the course of this press 
campaign so brutally entered upon, so ingeniously 
magnified, and so happily closed." ^ 

Thence was born the Triple Alliance. From the 
moment of this alarm, which he himself had been 
responsible for, Bismarck was obsessed, as Count 
Schouvaloff put it, with the "coalition nightmare." 
He saw only one way of warding off the fancied dan- 
ger; namely, to take the initiative, and on the Ger- 
man victories establish a league so strong and so 
wide-reaching that France would be for a long time 
condemned to isolation. The Alliance of the Three 
Emperors proposed in 1872, which indeed was to 

1 Hanotaux' History of Contemporary France, Volume III. 



FRANCE AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 127 

have been rather an understanding than an alliance, 
appeared to be impracticable on account of Eastern 
difficulties. At Germany's instigation, Austria was 
nourishing hopes of revenge in the East. Russia 
lived only for her policy in the Balkans. Between 
Vienna and Saint Petersburg there was bound to be 
conflict. A choice had to be made. Bismarck did 
not hesitate ; and, in spite of the Emperor William, 
he chose the good-will of Vienna. Already, in 1878, 
he had refused to give any pledges to the Czar 
against the hypothesis of an Austro-Russian war.^ 
His pretension to play the role of the ''honest inter- 
mediary" expressed nothing more than his deter- 
mination to remain neutral. At the Congress of 
Berlin, his attitude was explicable only by the choice 
he had made of Vienna in preference to Russia 
through his hatred of Gortchakoff. Three months 
later, the Russian Chancellor quitted Germany, say- 
ing that the Congress had been ''the darkest episode 
in his career." Alexander II declared that "Bis- 
marck had forgotten his promises in 1870." The 
Russian newspapers raged against the German pol- 
icy. Troops were massed on the frontier of Poland. 
Uneasy at the Russian movements in the East,^ 
Francis- Joseph asked for protection. On the 7th 
of October, 1879, the Austro-German Treaty was 
signed, in spite of the Emperor William's reluctance. 
Austria's abrogation of Article 5 in the Treaty of 
Prague, and Bismarck's assurances of political help 
to Count Andrassy, with regard to the occupation of 
* See Bismarck's Thoughts and Souvenirs, Volume II. 



128 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

Novi-Bazar, were the first indications of the rap- 
prochement. Within less than a year, an alliance 
was substituted for it. The Treaty, which was pub- 
lished by the two signataries in 1888, was drawn up 
as follows : — 

Considering that their Majesties, the Emperor of Austria and 
King of Hungary and the Emperor of Germany and King of 
Prussia must esteem it to be their unavoidable duty as sover- 
eigns to watch under all circumstances over the safety of their 
Empires and the tranquillity of their peoples ; 

Considering that the two Monarchs will be able, by a solid 
alliance of the two Empires, in the kind of that which previously 
existed, more easily to accomplish this duty, as also more effica- 
ciously ; 

Considering, in fine, that an intimate agreement between 
Austro-Hungary and Germany can threaten no one, but is 
rather calculated to consolidate European peace as created by 
the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlm ; 

Their Majesties, the Emperor of Austria and King of Hun- 
gary and the Emperor of Germany and King of Prussia, prom- 
ising each other solemnly never to give any aggressive tendency 
whatsoever to their purely defensive^ agreement, have resolved 
to conclude a reciprocal alliance of peace and protection ; 

In this aim, their Majesties have appointed as their plenipo- 
tentiaries : 

For his Majesty the Emperor of Austria and King of Hun- 
gary, his real Privy Councillor, the Minister of the Imperial 
House, as also for Foreign Affairs, Lieutenant Julius, Count 
Andrassy, etc, ; 

For his Majesty the Emperor of Germany, his Ambassador 
and plenipotentiary extraordinary, Lieutenant-General Prince 
Henry VII of Reuss, etc. ; 

Who have both entered into relations with each other to-day 
in Vienna, and, after showing each other their powers duly 
recognized as good and sufficient, have settled what follows : — 

Article I. — If, contrarily to what may be hoped and con- 
trarily to the sincere wishes of the two high contracting parties, 
one of the two Empires were to be attacked by Russia, the two 



FRANCE AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 129 

high contracting parties are bound to lend each other reciprocal 
aid with the whole of their imperial military power, and, sub- 
sequently, to conclude no peace except conjointly and in agree- 
ment. 

Article II. — If one of the two high contracting parties 
were to be attacked by another Power, the other high contract- 
ing party binds itself, by the present act, not only not to up- 
hold the aggressor against its high Ally, but at the least, to 
observe a benevolent neutrality with regard to the contracting 
party aforesaid. 

If, however, in the case previously mentioned, the Power 
attacking were to be upheld by Russia, whether by way of ac- 
tive cooperation or by military measures that should threaten 
the Power attacked, then the obligation of reciprocal assistance 
with entire military forces — obligation stipulated in Article 
I of this Treaty — would immediately become executory, 
and the military operations of the two high contracting parties 
would also, in such circumstances, be conducted jointly until 
the conclusion of peace. 

Article III. — This Treaty, in conformity with its pacific 
character and to avoid all false interpretation, will be held 
secret by all the high contracting parties. 

It may only be communicated to a Third Power with the 
knowledge of the two parties and after a special agreement be- 
tween them. 

Considering the intentions expressed by the Emperor Alex- 
ander at the Alexandrowo interview, the two contracting par- 
ties nourish the hope that Russia's preparations will not, in 
reality, become threatening to them; for this reason, there is 
at present no motive for communication. 

But, if, against all expectation, this hope should be ren- 
dered vain, the two contracting parties would recognize that it 
was a duty of loyalty to inform the Emperor Alexander, at least 
confidentially, that they must deem any attack directed against 
one of them as being directed against both. 

To testify which, the plenipotentiaries have signed this 
Treaty with their own hand and have affixed their seals thereto. 

Made at Vienna, on the 7th of October, 1879. 
Signed : Andrassy. 

Prince Henry VII of Reuss. 



130 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

This defensive Alliance was especially aimed at 
Russia, and, subsidiarily, against France. Mili- 
tarily, it constituted a guarantee against one or the 
other of these two Powers. Politically, it consoli- 
dated the triumph of 1871. But in order to hold 
Europe in check and to impose on her, in peace, 
the German supremacy, as also to avoid surprises 
such as that of 1875, it was not altogether adequate. 
A wider foundation was needed for the hegemony 
which Bismarck claimed to exercise from Berlin 
over the rest of the world. With a view to supply 
this breadth of base, an invitation was given to Italy 
in 1882. Mention has already been made of the 
grievances that irritated her against France. She 
was only too willing. Bismarck had merely to 
beckon to her. In the autumn of 1873, Victor 
Emmanuel had paid a visit first to Vienna, then to 
Berlin; and, from that date, journalists and other 
political writers, such as Colonel Marselli, had 
preached the German Alliance. In 1875, the Em- 
peror of Austria went to Venice, and the Emperor 
of Germany to Milan. And the triumphal reception 
accorded, at once to William I and to Marshal von 
Moltke, was rightly judged to foreshadow a political 
understanding. The Tunis affair did the rest. In 
October, 1881, King Humbert, accompanied by de 
Depretis and Mancini, made a journey to Vienna; 
and, at the end of December, his Ambassadors 
informed the Governments of Germany and Austro- 
Hungary that he was ready to give his adhesion 
to the defensive pact of 1879, on the basis of a 



FRANCE AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 131 

reciprocal territorial guarantee. In February, 1882, 
negotiations were begun at Vienna between 
Count Kalnoky, the Prince of Reuss and Comte de 
Robilant. On the 20th of May, 1882, the Triple 
Alliance was concluded. Its text was not published. 
But the tenor may be guessed by that of the 
Austro-German Treaty, to which Italy merely 
acceded. The pact was concluded for five years 
and, failing a formal renewal, was to expire on the 
20th of May, 1887. As every one knows, the Triple 
Alliance has never, since then, ceased being in force. 
Quinquennial renewals took place in March, 1887, 
and June, 1891. At the latter date, it was stipulated 
that the Alliance should be prolonged for twelve 
years with the option of denunciation at the end of 
the first six years. The three contracting parties 
not having made use of such option, the third re- 
newal, for a period of twelve or six years, was signed 
at Berlin on the 28th of June, 1902. 

The conclusion of the Triple Alliance corresponded 
to the desire expressed by Bismarck when he wrote : 
''We had made victorious wars on two great Euro- 
pean Powers. It was essential that we should 
remove one of these two powerful adversaries that 
we had vanquished on the battle-field from the 
temptation to make alliances with others for the 
purpose of obtaining revenge. We could not address 
ourselves to France. Any one acquainted with the 
history and character of the Gallic nation had no 
difficulty in understanding why." ^ The Austrian 
^ Thoughts and Souvenirs, Volume II. 



132 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

Alliance, which he had always desired, gave him 
satisfaction. As for the Italians, of whom he said in 
1880, ^'The Italians are like those crows that feed 
on carrion and hover around battle-fields until 
something is left for them to eat," ^ he accepted 
them with a touch of disdain, as a sort of political 
instrument, and still more as affording by their 
connection with Austria and Germany an additional 
guarantee for Austria. Germany thus found her- 
self at the head of a coalition disposing of more than 
two million men on a war footing, and barring 
Central Europe from the North Sea to the Medi- 
terranean with a line of alliances of which she was 
the guiding hand. She was the dictator of peace — 
a peace which she both imposed and guaranteed. 
''The force of Germany was protected by a belt of 
two bulwarks : against France, there was the Italian 
alliance ; against Russia, that with Austria. Within 
this double dyke, where she was invulnerable, she 
remained free for making an attack. Defensive in 
its appearance, this grouping of forces allowed 
Germany to act on the world at will. This it is 
which, since that time, has been called the German 
hegemony." ^ 

In face of such a combination, France, by herself, 
was paralyzed. True, the Republic had not per- 
mitted her to sink "gradually or by sudden drops" * 
to the degree Bismarck hoped. Her army was in 

* Maurice Busch's Memoirs, Volume II. 

^ Charles Andler's Prince Bismarck. 

3 Bismarck's Thoughts and Souvenirs, Volume II. 



FRANCE AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 133 

process of reorganization. In Jules Ferry she pos- 
sessed a firm, clear-sighted statesman. She had 
just proved in Tunis that she was capable of willing 
and executing. However, diplomatically, she was, 
none the less, reduced to impotence. Russia was 
not ready for an action in common. Great Britain, 
who had been favourable at the Congress of Berlin, 
was already veering round. She was displeased 
with France on account of the latter's hesitating 
attitude during the negotiations respecting the 
frontiers of Greece. She experienced both surprise 
and irritation on discovering what advantage had 
been taken in Tunis of Lord Salisbury's encouraging 
language. She foresaw also that her own action 
in Egypt would, for a long time to come, place her 
in opposition to the Cabinet of Paris. And, as a 
matter of fact, from the month of July, 1883, Anglo- 
French relations assumed that character of unfriendly 
coolness which they were destined to keep for the 
next twenty years. Spain, as previously shown, 
inclined towards the Triple Alliance.^ And through 
the medium of Italy, Bismarck was able to influence 
London. Nothing, therefore, thwarted German pre- 
ponderance. In order to maintain and strengthen 
it, there was no need to make war. A state of peace 
sufficed. And to secure such peace, not even the 
adhesion of the nation vanquished in 1871 was 
necessary. 

*See above, Chapter IIL 



134 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

II 

For the purpose of maintaining this situation, 
Bismarck could unreservedly rely on his Allies. 
Until his fall in 1890, he used them at his will, with 
perfect security. By the very reason of her hostility 
let loose against France, Italy was a puppet in the 
hands of Berlin. Having to procure forgiveness 
for his own "red'^ past, Crispi displayed great zeal. 
As soon as he came into power, he hastened to 
Friedrichsruhe in order to receive his instructions. 
And a military convention was the outcome of this 
journey. Under Kalnoky, Austria was no less 
docile. The ''dog of the Empire," as Beust ^ 
called him, was forever on the road between Varzin 
and Friedrichsruhe. There were interviews in 
abundance, in 1884, in 1885, in 1886, in 1888. 
The Emperor William, completely reconciled to the 
Austrian Alliance, had no need to stimulate Francis 
Joseph's fidelity in their long chats at Gastein or 
Ischl. In March, 1887, the Triplice was renewed 
on the same terms as those made five years earlier, 
without Comte de Robilant's obtaining anything 
else through his velleities of independence besides 
the Grand Cross of the Black Eagle. 

It was less easy to deal with Russia. But Bis- 
marck was not a man to be discouraged by diffi- 
culties. He, therefore, played his game — and 
played it with full success. The grievances of 1878 
had deeply affected the Czar, Alexander III, who, 

^ See Count von Beust's Memoirs. 



FRANCE AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 135 

moreover, had a dread of revolution ; and Germany- 
seemed to him to be the last rampart of the Mon- 
archy. Granted, all the ''Slavists," including Igna- 
tieff and Skobeleff, did not pardon the Germans, and 
continued to preserve their antipathy. Granted, 
there were commercial and fiscal difficulties with 
Germany, while the two countries' systematic 
armaments aroused on either side an amount of 
distrust and ill-humour. Yet, for all this, Bis- 
marck's will enabled him to find instruments, and 
he left nothing untried to ingratiate himself with 
Russia. No sooner was Prince Orloff appointed 
Ambassador at Berlin (February, 1884) than all 
the newspapers of the Chancellor extolled this 
'Hoken of rapprochement.' ' Six days afterwards, 
the Grand Duke Michael arrived for the celebration 
of the Emperor William's seventieth birthday, in 
his quality of Knight of Saint George. On the 16th 
of May following. Prince William went to Saint 
Petersburg to take part in the fetes given on the 
occasion of the coming of age of the Czarevitch; 
and, across the frontier, there was a fraternizing 
of German and Russian officers (June, 1884). In 
July, at Russia's request, Bismarck expelled from 
Berlin all persons residing in the German capital who 
were held to be suspects by the Czar's Government. 
Last of all, on the 14th of September, the Three 
Emperors, of Germany, Russia, and Austria, met at 
Skiernevice in a solemn interview. This interview 
did no more than reveal to the world at large an 
agreement that had been made six months previously. 



136 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

As a matter of fact, on the 21st of March, Bismarck, 
at length attaining his desire, had completed the 
Triple Alliance by the signing between two of its 
parties and the Russian Government of a secret 
understanding which stipulated for a benevolent 
neutrality in case one of the two should be attacked 
by another Power. The negotiations had not been 
altogether easy. ^^It was not with much enthusi- 
asm that Austria entered into engagements with a 
neighbour who was her most dreaded rival; and 
Russia, on her side, manifested some distrust towards 
these friends who had made their own alliance 
against herself." ^ After concluding the Triple 
Alliance against Russia, Bismarck had accomplished 
the stroke of genius which consisted in getting Russia 
to guarantee it. Under pretext of defending the 
''monarchic principle," Germany strengthened her 
hold on Europe. The isolation of France was 
absolute. An additional ring encircled those which 
had already been passed round her in 1879 and 1882. 

It will be understood without difficulty that 
Bismarck was anxious to preserve this masterpiece ; 
and, indeed, whatever could be done to make it 
secure, he did. In 1885, he welcomed Mr. de Giers, 
his Russian colleague, to Friedrichsruhe. In 1886, 
he met him at Franzenbad, and, with a view to 
conferring more importance on the meeting, five 
Russian diplomatists — Mr. de Staal, Ambassador 
at London; the Baron de Mohrenheim, Ambassador 
at Paris; Prince Cantacuzene, Charge d'Affaires at 

* See Paul Matter's Bismarck and his Times, Volume III. 



FRANCE AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 137 

Vienna; Mr. de Toll, Minister at Copenhagen; and 
Mr. de Struwe, Minister at Washington — were all 
present at it. In November, 1887, the Czar, 
Alexander III, arrived at Berlin. At this moment 
(March 21, 1887) the Counter-Assurance of the 
Three Emperors had been for three months without 
force, it having expired, and Russia not having been 
willing to renew it on account of her fears over the 
Eastern question. On the 18th of November, while 
the Czar was staying at Berlin, Bismarck extorted 
a fresh treaty from him, similar to the previous one, 
except that, instead of binding three Powers, the 
engagement was between Germany and Russia 
only. It was a repetition of Skiernevice, with two 
signataries. The Counter-Assurance was resus- 
citated with an equal value for Germany. Sure of 
the future, Bismarck was convinced that for long 
to come he had averted the danger of a Franco- 
Russian coalition. 

At the same time, he contrived, by his supple 
diplomacy, to keep England in his game. To tell 
the truth, it was not so hard as "recapturing" 
Russia. England had quitted the Congress of 
Berlin in a satisfied frame of mind. Egypt had 
caused her to fall out with France. She was content 
to remain in her "splendid isolation," and was 
without prejudices against Germany. Not that 
she had been pleased to see her acquire the Marshall 
Isles in 1878, Luderitzland, New Guinea, Togo, and 
the Cameroons in 1884, and install herself in Eastern 
Africa in 1886. But she did not yet believe in the 



138 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

German peril which, ten years later, was to cause 
her such anxiety. At certain times, there was 
some tension between London and Berlin, for in- 
stance, when Germany and France prevented Great 
Britain from ratifying the Treaty with Portugal 
which would in advance have made her supreme in 
the Congo (1884). Now and again, also, the North 
German Gazette had disputes with the Times (1884). 
But not much attention was paid to this. In 
1885, Bismarck declared he > was confident of the 
future. '^With England," he said, ''we are on good 
terms. That England, with her persuasion she 
rules the seas, should feel some surprise on suddenly 
seeing her cousin land-rats, as she calls us, begin 
to navigate, is not astonishing. . . . But we have 
old relations of friendship with England; and the 
two countries are anxious to preserve them." 
(January 10.) 

In the month of February following. Lord Gran- 
ville protested against the idea of any coolness 
having arisen between Downing Street and Wilhelm- 
strasse. In his turn, Bismarck disclaimed ''having 
ever blamed the English policy in Egypt." (March 
3.) On the 4th, Count Herbert von Bismarck, who 
was privy to his father's intentions, paid a visit 
of courtesy to London. And, on the 22d, the Prince 
of Wales, in person, went to Berlin to testify to the 
cordiality of the two countries' relations. In 1886, 
three Anglo-German colonial agreements were signed 
successively, the first relative to the Pacific (April 
6), the second, to the possessions in the Gulf of 



FRANCE AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 139 

Guinea (August 2), the third; to Zanzibar and 
East Africa (November 1). Moreover, through 
Italy, Bismarck did not despair of sooner or later 
entering into closer relations with London. He 
was aware of his Ally's exchanges of views with 
Great Britain. He knew that if the Italians had 
gone to Massowah, it was with the consent of the 
English Cabinet. And, in fine, he was not ignorant 
that Austria also, in a large measure, could rely on 
British support. He was quite confident, therefore, 
and, as he followed on a map of the world the 
progress of our expansion outside Europe, he prom- 
ised himself the j oy of witnessing, — suave mari 
magno, — 'Hhe shock of the English and French 
locomotives" ; a fresh opportunity for his acting the 
part of a kind and ''honest" broker. 

On the French side, he found entire security in 
the prodigious ardour which made us, in all parts 
of the world, rush after colonies, whatever they 
might be. Jules Ferry had said in 1882: ''France 
must have colonial power. Every portion of her 
colonial domain, even its least fragments, must be 
held sacred by us. . . . It is not the future of 
to-morrow that is concerned, but that of fifty and 
a hundred years hence, that of the mother-country 
herself." This eloquent appeal had been heard, 
and even listened to with too great readiness, so 
that the action of France had been scattered, and 
carried to spots in which we had no interests. The 
Tunisian protectorate in 1882, the annexation of 
the towns of Mzab, six hundred kilometres from 



140 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

Algiers (1882) ; the Senegal and Niger expeditions 
against Ahmadou and Samory (1883) ; the conquest 
of Dahomey (1883-1892) ; the settlement in the 
Congo (1884); the Madagascar war (1882-1885); 
the settlement at Djibouti (1882-1885) ; the con- 
quest of Tonkin and Annam (1885-1888) ; all these 
proved our vitality, and rendered us inoffensive in 
Europe. To this French expansion Bismarck was 
favourable. '^We have every reason to rejoice at 
it," he said after Tunis. And, in his generosity, 
he wished us to have Morocco, respecting which, 
in 1880, he had instructed his delegates at the Con- 
ference of Madrid "to regulate their attitude by 
that of their French colleague." In September, 
1884, he placed himself in agreement with our 
Ambassador at Berlin, the Baron de Courcel, on the 
question of opposing England. And in agreement 
with him also, he summoned the Congo Conference. 
On the 24th of December, 1885, he signed a delimi- 
tation treaty respecting the French and German 
colonies in West Africa. In October, 1886, Mr. 
Herbette's appointment, in the place of Mr. de Cour- 
cel, furnished the Chancellor's newspapers with an 
occasion to say that Mr. de Freycinet was coming 
round to Jules Ferry's policy. In reality, Bismarck 
had no anxiety that was caused by France ; and, for 
this reason, he proclaimed in the Reichstag "that 
the two Governments had full confidence in the 
sincerity and loyalty of their mutual relations." 

This did not, however, hinder him from some- 
times brandishing his big sabre with a view to 



FRANCE AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 141 

depriving the French neighbour of any inclination 
to budge, and more especially for the purpose of 
inculcating in the German tax-payers and their 
Parliamentary representatives a taste for military 
expenses. He had not waited for that till Boulang- 
ism arose, and had never ceased mingling threats 
with his advances. In 1883, the North German Ga- 
zette, speaking of the risks of war, wrote with refer- 
ence to France: ''One may paint the devil so often 
on the wall that at last one sees him appear." On 
the 4th of September in the same year, the same 
semi-official paper declared: ''Germany will main- 
tain the Treaty of Frankfort as long as she is left 
with a man." And gracefully the paper added: 
"And now let there be no more said about it." Ten 
days after at Skiernevice, Bismarck warned the 
Three Emperors of the revolutionary peril, that is 
to say, of the French peril. On the 28th of Novem- 
ber, 1885, he condescended to address to the French 
Government an assurance of his confidence; but, 
at the same time, complained bitterly of the French 
press and people. On the 26th of March, 1886, he 
seized the occasion of the Decazeville strikes to 
express the opinion that, after all, the French Army, 
which was then occupied in restraining the work- 
men on strike, might well one day become again, 
as in 1792, the army of social subversion. On the 
outbreak of Boulangism, his tone naturally rose. 
On the 31st of January, 1887, there was an article 
in the Post, entitled "Under the Knife," which vio- 
lently denounced French provocations. In April, 



142 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

there was the Schnaebele incident; in September, 
the Brignon affair/ The North German Gazette, be- 
tween times, lauded ''German patience" in terms 
that hinted this patience was at an end. And, on 
the 19th of May, a circular, courteously conceived, 
it is true, made public the fact that Germany would 
not take part in the Universal Exhibition of 1889. 

Why all this fuss and bluster? No doubt, to 
secure the voting of the War Credits. The Seven 
Years' Period, adopted in 1880, expired on the 31st 
of March, 1888. At the opening of the session of 
1886-1887, the Royal Speech had announced the ne- 
cessity of increasing the country's military strength. 
''In the Army," it said, "is the only sure guaran- 
tee for the lasting protection of the blessings of 
peace; and, although the Empire's policy contin- 
ues to be pacific, Germany is not able, in presence 
of the development of military institutions in States 
bordering on our own, to abstain longer from in- 
creasing her military force and, in particular, its 
present peace footing." The new Seven Years' 
Period, in fact, comprised an augmentation of 61,000 
men and increased credits of 47 million marks. 
On the 11th of January, 1887, Bismarck made a 
strong personal appeal.^ 

The question," he said, "of our future relations with France 
is one that I am not so sure about . . . Between ourselves and 
France the work of maintaining peace is difficult, since the two 
countries have long been divided by a dispute that is historical, 
to wit, the fixing of the frontier line, which has been doubtful 

^ Incidents on the French-German border. 
* See Paul Matter's book already cited. 



FRANCE AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 143 

and contested from the time when France acquired her complete 
unity and Royal Power. This dispute is not ended; and we 
must expect to see it continued on the French side. At present 
it is we who are in possession of the coveted portion, if I may so 
speak of Alsace. We consequently have no motive ourselves 
for fighting about it. But no one can pretend that France does 
not dream of reconquering it, no one of those who have any 
real knowledge of what is published in the French press. They 
who desire a war with us seek only in the meantime for the pos- 
sibility of entering upon it with the greatest forces possible. 
Their task is to keep alive the sacred fire of revenge. ... I 
have confidence in the pacific intentions of the French Govern- 
ment, and of the French people ; but I cannot on this account 
lull myself with such assurance as to be able to say : We have 
no fear of France attacking us ! I am convinced that an attack 
by France is to be feared. Whether it may happen in ten days 
or in ten years is something I cannot venture to settle. . . . 
His Majesty cannot disavow the work to which he has devoted 
the last thirty years of his life — the creation of the German 
Army, the creation of the German Empire. ... If to the Con- 
federate Government's soUcitude for the defensive strength of 
Germany you do not give satisfaction by a prompt and com- 
plete adoption of our project, we shall then prefer to continue 
the discussion with more chance of success by resuming it in 
another Reichstag than the one I see before me. 

Being beaten, Bismarck read the decree dissolv- 
ing the national Parliament; and at once let loose 
the official press, the Post in particular. The elec- 
tions of the 21st of February, 1887, gave him his 
majority. But the military effort was not yet 
achieved, whence the occurrence of fresh frontier 
incidents, which continued until the eve of the 
January discussions in 1888. In December, there 
was a new project for increasing the numbers of the 
Landwehr and Landsturm, which, following on the 
inauguration of the fresh Seven Years' Period, 



144 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

caused considerable anxiety in the Russian press. 
Deeming his situation impregnable, since he had 
just concluded his second Treaty of Counter- Assur- 
ance with Russia (November, 1887) and France 
was in the midst of her civil discord, Bismarck now 
resolved to strike a decisive blow. On the 3d of 
February, 1888, he gave order for the text of the 
Austro-German Treaty to be published. Any one 
who reads it through again will be able to judge 
what an effect was produced by its becoming known 
at Saint Petersburg. On the 8th of the same month, 
he made a speech in the Reichstag, using language 
of unprecedented harshness, aimed not only against 
France, but still more against Russia : — 

The fears that have arisen in the course of the present year 
have been caused by Russia more even than by France, chiefly 
through an exchange of provocations, threats, insults, and recip- 
rocal instigations which have occurred during the past summer 
in the Russian and French press. 

He added, however, that the pacific assurances 
which he had received from the Czar in 1887, had 
more weight with him than newspaper articles. 
As to the movements of Russian troops on the 
frontier since 1879, they had tended to create the 
impression of an approaching aggression, at some 
unexpected moment, against one of the neighbouring 
countries. He declared, nevertheless, that he did 
not believe in the existence of such an intention : — 

I am convinced that even if some French explosion or other 
were to involve us in a war with France, it would not immedi- 
ately bring us into immediate hostilities with Russia, at any 
rate not necessarily. But, on the other hand, should we be 



FRANCE AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 145 

engaged in a war with Russia, war with France would be certain. 
No French Government would be strong enough to hinder it. 

Bismarck went on to speak of the military ex- 
penses France had made, of ''her hatred against all 
her neighbours," and said: — 

Our geographic situation imposes greater efforts upon us. 
We have to protect ourselves on three sides. . . . More than 
any other nation, we are exposed to the dangers of a coalition. 
God has given us on our flank the French, who are the most 
warlike and turbulent nation that exists, and he has permitted 
the development in Russia of warlike propensities which, until 
lately, did not manifest themselves to the same extent. 

He then retraced the history of Russo-German 
relations, insisting more peculiarly on his own role 
at the Congress of Berlin, where, with fine cynicism, 
he claimed to have behaved as if he had been "a 
fourth Russian plenipotentiary." He declared that 
throughout the Congress, no Russian wish had been 
expressed, to his knowledge, without his immedi- 
ately satisfying it. At the same time, he over- 
whelmed Gortchakoff with his retrospective irony: 
"If I had not then been long in possession of the 
highest Russian Order, I should have well earned 
it." In fine, he accused Russia of having excited 
him against Austria. Thence had been born the 
Triple Alliance. And he concluded: — 

The threats of the psess are nothing else than sheer folly. 
Can any one believe that, by dint of ink and words, it is possi- 
ble to intimidate a Power of Germany's pride and power ? By 
means of courtesy and kind methods we may be easily — too 
easily perhaps — influenced, but by means of threats, never. 
We Germans fear God and nothing else in the world. It is fear 
of God which has caused us to love and cultivate peace. If any 



146 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

one should break it, he will soon be convinced that the com- 
bative patriotism which, in 1813, called to arms the entire peo- 
ple of Prussia, — who were then weak and vanquished, — is to-day 
the common property of the whole German nation ; and he will 
find them animated by one soul, with the strong belief existing 
in each soldier's heart that God is with us ! 

This Quos Ego, which was, as it were, Bismarck's 
political will and testament, ripened the Franco- 
Russian Alliance ten years sooner than might have 
otherwise been the case. Never had the pax Ger- 
manica uttered a prouder language. Never had the 
Chancellor made Europe feel, in a harsher way, that 
she had a master and would have to keep him. 
Would she have kept him, if, two years later, Will- 
iam II, in his feverish haste to reign alone, had not 
dismissed this master and freed Europe at the same 
time that he freed himself? We leave the question 
to be answered by amateurs of conjecture. As for 
Bismarck, such an hypothesis never entered into his 
head. A few months later, he made the statement 
that "he was sure he would remain Chancellor till 
he died." The ordering of the future was one of his 
favourite cards. Yet it was this card that deceived 
him. After struggling in secret for eighteen months 
with the new Sovereign, Bismarck retired on the 
8th of March, 1890. Would his successors be able 
to play his game and prolong his success? 

Ill 

The conclusion of the Franco-Russian Alliance 
occurred a few months after the accession of William 



FRANCE AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 147 

II and Bismarck's retirement. As early as 1888, 
the victim of 1888 had come into unmistakably 
closer relations with the victim of 1871. True, on 
the 30th of June, 1888, the Gazette of the Cross per- 
sisted in announcing that Bismarck had definitely 
turned Russia from the French Alliance, and that, 
in order to confirm the Russo-German understand- 
ing, William II, as soon as he was crowned, would 
commence his visits to the various foreign courts by 
going to see the Czar. The interview took place ; 
but its effect was not to bring Germany any nearer 
to Alexander III. On the 10th of May, 1890, after 
his dismissal of the month of March, Bismarck be- 
gan his polemical revelations against his Sovereign 
and his successor; and, in a published interview, 
declared that "the existence of France was necessary 
to Russia." On the 14th of the same month, when 
defending a military project in the Reichstag, Moltke 
contrived to couple Paris and Saint Petersburg in 
his speech. He said: ''The pacific assurances given 
to us by our neighbours in the East and in the West- 
— assurances which do not prevent them from con- 
tinuing their armaments — are certainly precious 
to us. But it is for us to find our security in our- 
selves." A few months later, himself intervening 
in the debates, William II exclaimed: ''The times 
in which we live are serious ; and, perhaps in coming 
years, we shall have trouble." When it is recollected 
that, only ten weeks afterwards, the welcome ac- 
corded by the Russian people to Admiral Gervais' 
squadron at Cronstadt, manifested to the world at 



148 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

large, as the Czar put it, "the deep bonds of sym- 
pathy uniting France and Russia," these words of 
the German Emperor assume their full significance. 
From that moment, the Franco-Russian Alliance 
was made, if not signed; and the coalition which 
Bismarck, until his death, boasted of having dreaded 
and hindered as long as he was in power, — the 
coalition which, in several speeches, Caprivi was 
subsequently to declare inevitable and, indeed, inof- 
fensive, — was thenceforth assured. 

At first, this political event appeared to German 
policy as a discomfiture. When bringing in two 
new military bills on the 23d of November, 1893, 
Caprivi, in spite of his habitual optimism, did not 
dissimulate the change in the situation. '^France," 
he said in substance, "has numerous and well- 
organized army corps, fortresses, and intrenched 
camps. And we should no longer find in Russia the 
same forbearance as in the commencement of the 
War of 1870. . . . The Emperor of Russia is a pow- 
erful partisan of peace. But the sentiments of the 
Russian people are against us. The Russian mo- 
bilization, moreover, proves that Saint Petersburg 
believes the next war will be in the West. . . . There 
can be no doubt that a rapprochement has come about 
between France and Russia. Its origins date far 
back. But, to-day, everything, Cronstadt included, 
leads us to suppose that an alliance is meditated. 
We do not mean to attack. But we do mean to be 
able to hold our own on both sides." This, it may 
be said, was an oratorical artifice, calculated to ob- 



FRANCE AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 149 

tain the voting of the mihtary credits; an artifice 
perhaps, but yet testifying to sincere anxiety and 
real disappointment. Thanks to the Russian Alli- 
ance, France escaped from the forced inaction in 
which she had remained for twenty years. Count 
Schouvaloff's expression: ''You are suffering from 
a Coalition nightmare," took on an appearance 
of prophecy in the light of events. The "Western 
neighbour" passed from the state of passive peace 
to one of voluntary peace. Germany, forsooth, did 
not lack means to defend the territorial statu quo; 
but the political statu quo was modified; and the 
European balance of power, reestablished to the 
profit of Bismarck's two victims, took from the Ger- 
man Empire the dictatorship which it had held so 
long. In 1879, Bismarck wrote to the King of Ba- 
varia: "The danger of war complications (with 
Russia) is, in my opinion, not imminent. It would 
only become serious if France were ready to march 
in agreement with Russia. Up to the present, such 
is not the case." After 1891, "such was the case"; 
and it is easy to understand that the change repre- 
sented a material and moral diminution for Ger- 
many. 

A policy of sentiment and impressionism would 
not have accepted this fait nouveau without anger. 
German policy, being positive and realistic, sought 
to get out of it what was possible. Without much 
trouble, she recognized that the conclusion of the 
Dual Alliance did not constitute an immediate 
threat. Granted, the inheritors of Boulangism and 



150 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

their naive supporters attributed to the Franco- 
Russian Alliance a revenge of counter-value and 
approaching reparation. And they relied on it for 
the reconquest of Alsace and Lorraine. But, in the 
Chancelleries, and even among the well-informed 
public, it was understood that this Alliance was 
purely defensive and that, if, in case of aggression, 
it afforded France a guarantee, it did not in any de- 
gree or under any form encourage her to undertake 
an offensive policy. What did the Cronstadt toasts 
say? That the new Alliance was an element of 
peace. What did the Russian papers say? That 
Europe's tranquillity gained additional security by 
the union of the two peoples. But peace meant the 
statu quo; and the statu quo was the Treaty of 
Frankfort. Germany, therefore, could put up with 
the Dual Alliance, on condition it did not escape from 
her control and turn against her. Within a few 
months, her decision was made. She would resign 
herself to the Franco- Russian Alliance, first because 
no useful end would have been served by her not 
resigning herself, and secondly because the Alliance 
might become, in her hands, a fresh means of action. 
Consequently, there was an end to bitter speeches, 
an end to hints of possible or likely war which had 
so recently been heard. Instead, were exhibited 
constant amiability towards France, a visible desire 
to act in concert with her, in concert with Russia; 
to draw, when occasion offered, the two Allies into 
cooperation with Berlin outside Europe, a coopera- 
tion having the double advantage of diverting France 



FRANCE AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 151 

more and more from Continental matters, and of 
involving her more deeply in the Colonial policy 
which, in 1881, had caused her to fall out with Italy, 
and had always, especially since the Egyptian ques- ' 
tion, brought her into conflict with England. 

To this policy of relaxation and advances, William 
II contributed in person. When he ascended the 
throne, just after the Boulangist agitation and the 
Schnaebele incident, he brought with him, rightly 
or wrongly, a reputation for rashness, and for being 
ready to embark on any wild enterprise. Already, 
before the death of his grandfather, William I, he 
had protested that this reputation was undeserved. 
At the commencement of 1888, he declared: '^I am 
quite aware that, among people in general and es- 
pecially abroad, I am accused of frivolous desires of 
warlike fame. God preserve me from such cruel 
folly. I indignantly spurn these unworthy impu- 
tations." None the less, the reputation has re- 
mained, and has served as a foil to all his pacific 
affirmations. First, there was the Workmen's Con- 
ference at Berlin in 1890, and the fascination he 
exercised upon Jules Simon — things which marked 
the dawn of a fresh point of view in the French press 
with regard to the German Emperor. Jules Simon, 
who wrote a great deal, could not say enough in 
eulogy of the Imperial host, who entertained him 
royally. He repeated the favourable opinion held 
by William II respecting our Army, its progress, its 
fitness. And our amour-propre was flattered by this. 
Then, there was a series of courtesies which, coming 



X 



152 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

one after another, fell, like so many germs of peace, 
upon the ground that had been so well prepared. 
If there was some anniversary of 1870 to be com- 
memorated, the Emperor did not fail to render 
homage to "ihe chivalrous enemy" (December 14, 
1891); to "the brave French soldiers fighting with 
the courage of despair for their laurels, their 
past, their Emperor" (December 2, 1895). When 
Marshal MacMahon died, he instructed Count Miin- 
ster, on the same day, to convey to the Duchess 
of Magenta the respectful expression of his sympa- 
thy" (October 18, 1893). When President Car- 
not was assassinated at Lyons, he once more con- 
trived to say just the right thing; and, first among 
foreign monarchs, expressed his sympathy with the 
widow of the President who, "worthy of his great 
name, had died on the field of honour." On this 
occasion, and in spite of some resistance manifested 
by German opinion, he gave orders for the liberation 
of two French naval officers who had been arrested 
for espionage. Afterwards, there were similar pro- 
ceedings on the death of General Canrobert (Janu- 
ary 29, 1895) ; of Jules Simon (June 8, 1896) ; on 
the morrow of the fire at the Bazar de la Charite 
(May 4, 1897) ; and of the loss of the Bourgogne 
(July, 1898) ; and again, still more recently, at the 
funeral of Felix Faure, where, by his choice, he was 
represented by one of the German princes nearest to 
France by his family relations. Prince Anthony 
Radzivill (February, 1899). On the 6th of July of 
the same year, being in Norwegian waters, he visited 



FRANCE AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 153 

the French training-ship, Iphigenia, and telegraphed 
to Mr. Loubet to express his gratification, " both as 
a sailor and as a comrade" at the amiable reception 
accorded him. In 1900, he personally superin- 
tended the organization of the German section of 
the Exhibition, with a view to increasing its brill- 
iance and success. In 1901, General Bonnal hav- 
ing been invited by him to the German military 
manoeuvres, he received this officer at Berlin and j 
loaded him with attentions. And, not so long agO; 
the catastrophe of Martinique Island furnished him 
with another opportunity to send us one of those 
sympathetic telegrams in which he excels, and to 
foster a friendly atmosphere which, while somewhat/ 
artificial, perhaps, is none the less useful by reason 
of the greater facility of relations that results from 
it. The extreme shrewdness of Prince Mtinster, the 
amenity of Prince Radolin, the smiling skill of the 
Marquis de No allies, for whom the Emperor felt an 
especial friendship, aided in the improvement. On 
our part, we did not cease to contribute what lay in 
our power, with the reserve imposed on our dignity 
by souvenirs ever present, but with correctness and 
perfect grace. And, on each occasion that called for 
it, notably at the time of the Kiel fetes and of the 
inundations in Silesia, the Government of the Re- 
public were not backward in replying with courtesy 
to the courteous advances made to them by the 
German Emperor. 

Politically, these advances bore their fruit; and 
Germany derived profit from them. Being sure, or 



154 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

at least believing he was sure, of the friendship of 
England, with whom he had signed successive Colo- 
nial agreements, William II managed to find or cre- 
ate opportunities of exhibiting his relations with the 
Dual Alliance. Already, in 1891, Mr. de Giers, 
Russia's Minister of Foreign Affairs, after a journey 
to Paris, had ostentatiously visited the three Capi- 
tals of the Triplice, Rome, Vienna, and Berlin. 
Four years later, the war between China and Japan 
brought about the threefold action of Russia, France,! 
and Germany, which snatched from Japan the fruit' 
of her victory (1895). In the same year, the inaug- 
uration of the Kiel Canal, which was honoured by 
the simultaneous presence of a French and a Russian 
squadron, was the outward and visible sign of a rap- 
prochement that Saint Petersburg would seem to have 
counselled in Paris. On the 31st of May and the 10th 
of June, Mr. Hanotaux, being challenged in Parlia- 
ment, defended his policy and secured its approval. 
To Mr. Millerand, who said to him: '' France will 
never be false to the fidelity she has vowed to the 
provinces that have been taken from her," the Min- 
ister replied : — 

We have done no more than other Powers in manifesting 
a behaviour of international politeness corresponding to an act 
of international policy that was addressed to all the Powers. . . . 

In open peace, the relations of the various nations must be 
regulated by a sentiment, at once worthy and simple, of inter- 
national politeness." 

And further : — 

Our sailors will go to Kiel, representing, not a resigned and 
discouraged France, but a France free and strong, sure enough 



FRANCE AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 155 

of herself to remain calm, proud enough and rich enough in 
glory to fear no comparison, to disown no souvenir. 

In what will this France be diminished in her prestige, her 
authority, her interests, because of her vessels' presence at an 
international ceremony where they will meet, among a hundred 
others, the vessels of a nation that is her friend, and that has 
replied in the same conditions as ourselves to the same invita- 
tion? 

Now, by a curious coincidence, the sitting of Par- 
liament in which the French Minister held this ex- 
tremely poHte language with regard to Germany, 
was just the one in which, in accord with the Prime 
Minister, he proclaimed officially, for the first time, 
the existence of the Franco-Russian Alliance. The 
feeling of the rapprochement was thereby rendered 
more sensible. In 1896, there was another symp- 
tom: Germany announced her intention to partici- 
pate in our Universal Exhibition of 1900; and, a 
few weeks later, William II made a speech in hon- 
our of the European solidarity. In 1897, Count 
Mouraview, then Russian Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs, came to Paris ; but, with a certain manifesta- 
tion of intention, he stopped at Berlin on his way ^ 
back to Russia. On the 23d of July in the same.^ 
year, a Franco-German agreement was signed rela- 
tive to the Togo delimitation. And, at that mo- 
ment, overtures were made to us from Berlin with a 
view to an understanding between the two countries, 
— overtures the particulars of which were unknown, 
but the reality of which was undeniable. More and 
more it would seem that circumstances were leading 
us towards a rapprochement with Germany on the 



156 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

basis of the Continental statu quo and of Colonial 
action in harmony. The Fashoda alarm, and the 
threatening prospect of a naval war for which we 
were not ready, disturbed public opinion greatly, 
which again turned to the advantage of Berlin, 
since French Nationalists both past and future, 
Mr. Jules Lemaitre among them, advocated an 
understanding with our neighbours on the East 
against Great Britain. True, when once the Eng- 
lish peril was averted, the Dreyfus Affair awoke the 
old historic resentment. But the correct attitude 
of the German Imperial Government removed all 
risks of clashing and conflict. On several occasions, 
the German Ministers were able to congratulate 
themselves that this "Affaire which raised so much 
dust, had not troubled the correctness of France and 
Germany's relations with each other." And when 
the crisis was over, it was once more the Colonial 
understanding with France, which appeared to be 
Germany's object, when Count von Buelow, speak- 
ing in the Reichstag in December, 1899, and defin- 
ing the world-policy of Greater Germany, added : 
''With France we have always, so far, easily and 
willingly come to an arrangement in matters con- 
cerning Colonial interests." The events that oc- 
curred in China in 1900, the appointment of General 
von Waldersee, as Commander-in-Chief of the Inter- 
national troops, the confraternity of arms instituted 
between the adversaries of Sedan, confraternity 
which William II celebrated in the ensuing year by 
receiving General Bonnal at Berlin — everything 



FRANCE AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 157 

seemed to favour German plans. Again (March 15, 
1901) the Chancellor insisted on the fact that, be- 
tween France and Germany, there was no longer any 
real conflict of interests, whether in the Far East or 
in the many parts of the world. More and more, 
Germany availed herself of a diplomatic combina- 
tion which increased the security of her State-pos- 
session, and allowed her, both in Europe and out of 
Europe, to use either her own Allies, or ours, or our- 
selves. 

The Triple Alliance, moreover, continued in force, 
as in the past. Austria remained constantly faith- 
ful to it, and, absorbed by her domestic struggles, 
in no way modified her foreign policy. Italy was no 
less docile. She had feted Chancellor von Caprivi 
in November, 1890, WiUiam II in 1892 and in 
1897. King Humbert had gone to Potsdam in 1892 
and 1897 ; and the Prince of Naples, to the Lorraine 
manoeuvres in 1893. Her defeats in Ethiopia and 
her economic difficulties, besides, dissuaded Italy 
from the fits of Gallophobia that she had indulged in 
during the early period of the Triple Alliance. In 
June, 1991, this Treaty had been renewed for twelve 
years, with the option of denouncing it in 1898. But^ 
none of the three Allies had made use of the option. 
Consequently, the Bismarckian system subsisted, 
without any appearance of umbrage or prejudice 
being caused by the Franco-Russian Alliance. Tur- 
key and Roumania had been drawn further and 
further into the German wake. The Empire's pros- 
perity was brilliant. Its military strength was un- 



158 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

diminished. The Triplice was no longer alone ; but 
it was not eclipsed. Never had the international 
situation appeared to be more favourable to her 
than it then was. William II exercised a personal 
ascendency over Nicholas II which was maintained 
by frequent interviews and regular correspondence. 
Russia's Asiatic policy inclined her to accept in 
Europe the German lead, which she had already 
obeyed in China, by doing at Port Arthur what Ger- 
many had done at Kiao-Tcheou. The Austro-Rus- 
sian agreement of 1897, relative to Turkish affairs 
and intended to preserve the statu quo, prevented 
risks arising from Eastern complications ; and, if the 
Bismarckian Counter-Assurance of 1884 and 1887 
no longer existed, this had happened through the 
operation of facts, not of engagements. Strength- 
ened by her naval programme of 1900, Germany 
saw opened to her, by the firman granting her the 
Bagdad Railway, which had been obtained from the 
Sultan in January, 1902, the fairest economic and 
political prospects in Nearer Asia. Her purchase of 
the Spanish colonies in the Pacific had also served 
her world-policy (1899). She had made her ap- 
pearance at Pekin, in 1900, under the auspices of 
Marshal Waldersee, as Europe's dictator. Nothing 
hindered her from wielding a discreet and profitable 
influence over the Latin nations at the time when 
they manifested a tendency to come nearer together. 
The abolition of the dictature paragraph applying to 
Lorraine had produced a good impression in Paris. 
Negotiations had been opened respecting the Bagdad 



FRANCE AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 159 

Railway, which, with a little more moderation, Ger- 
many might have brought to a successful conclusion. 
It depended on Berlin, by coupling such negotiations 
with African affairs, to preside at the elaboration of 
the various Mediterranean understandings, instead 
of leaving the honour and benefit of them to others. 

It seemed even that, to the political domination ) 
established by Bismarck, the Germany of William II | 
had added an economic supremacy. Allusion has 
already been made to the prodigious progress of her 
commerce and industry. As ideas always run in the 
same mould, the Germany of trade had the like con- 
ception of success as the Germany of government. 
Under colour of serving the people's needs and Ger- 
man prestige, the German speculators attempted to 
impose their combinations on the world without re- 
specting or even recognizing the rights and prefer- 
ences of others. These economic conquerors on 
land and sea contrived to bring the nation's force 
and influence into the service of their unbounded 
appetites. Germany had become an ''Industrial 
State." After supplying herself with the most sci- 
entific machinery and requisites that had ever been 
introduced into the economic struggle — canals, rail- 
ways, harbours, technical schools, manufactories, and 
banks, — she abandoned Bismarck's system of pro- 
tection. In 1895, she broke down the barriers which, 
not so long before, were a hindrance to her expan- 
sion, and started out to conquer fresh markets. She 
began with the countries of the Continent. But soon 
Europe no longer sufficed to her progress. Asia 



160 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

Minor, India, Siam, Japan, China, Africa, the United 
States, South America, were invaded by her products ; 
her commercial travellers, with imperial, dominating 
manners, never failing to utilize the strength of the 
Empire on behalf of their merchandise. Thus un- 
derstood, the Weltpolitik was the mercantile continu- 
ation of the Bismarckian policy. 

In spite of the perils attaching to such a system, 
circumstances at the commencement of the twenti- 
eth century enabled Germany to consolidate it. She 
had it in her power to draw along her borders, for 
her own advantage, the "Continental line" which 
seemed at certain moments to be the Emperor Will- 
iam's supreme aim. For three years, England had 
been paralyzed by the Transvaal war. The rest of 
Europe was in a hesitating frame of mind, easy to be 
gained over and to be guided. There was a fine game 
to be played, a game not difficult to be won by Mr. 
von Buelow, who, since 1897, had been the guiding 
hand of the Empire's diplomacy. ''There is but one 
favourable moment in affairs," said Bismarck, in 
1878; ''the thing is to know when to seize it. Mr. 
Von Buelow did not seize it. Led away, now by the- 
"grand Continental designs" of the Emperor, now by 
the attraction of immediate profits at the expense of 
one and another, he was unable to choose ; and, 
through his contradictions, inspired distrust in all. 
A few months later, peace was signed in the Trans- 
vaal (June, 1902) ; and this, following on the Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance (January, 1902), restored to 
England a liberty of action which new men, the King 



FRANCE AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 161 

and Lord Lansdowne, were ready to make good use 
of. The opportunity which Germany had allowed 
to escape vanished ; and fresh combinations arose in 
the midst of astonished Europe. 

IV 

As a matter of fact, at this time, acting on the 
idea — a true one, indeed — that the Russian Alli- 
ance, which neither could have nor should have been 
for us an instrument of revenge, yet, at least, could 
and should leave us free in our movements, for the 
settlement of our own affairs and the pursuit of our 
interests, French policy, first in the direction of Italy, 
next in the direction of England, and, last of all, in 
the direction of Spain, began a triple campaign of 
rapprochement. After playing, in Crispi's time, the 
offensive role of the Triple Alliance against us, Italy 
effected her reconciliation with us, first commer- 
cially and then politically (1898-1902). Not many 
months after, an explanation of the same kind led 
us to liquidate with Great Britain a whole past of 
colonial rivalry and ancestral resentment. And this 
liquidation, more striking and more important than 
that of the quarrel between France and Italy, was 
recorded, on the 8th of April, 1904, in a public treaty. 
Finally, six months later, Spain, in her turn, gave 
adhesion to this agreement. The local consequence 
of these negotiations was to give us a free hand in 
Morocco. That, however, was a small thing com- 
pared with the general scope of the liquidation, 



162 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

which extended the field opened to our activity by 
the Franco- Russian Alliance, guaranteed us our ma- 
terial and moral autonomy in Western Europe, and 
made us a centre of attraction. 

This was something new and disquieting to Ger- 
many, who, while it was still time, had not known 
how to assume the direction of the movement. The 
fresh Continental grouping, added to the Dual Alli- 
ance, was, in fact, calculated to substitute for the 
German hegemony an equilibrium independent of 
her influence. Being deeply imbued with Bis- 
marck's principles, William II had no illusions on 
the subject. The very system was in danger, which 
it was his mission to safeguard. If any one will read 
over the seven hundred and some odd speeches pro- 
nounced, since his accession, by the voluble orator 
who presides over the destinies of the German Em- 
pire, a fixed idea will be found in them, by the side 
of accidental opinions and ephemeral theories. This 
idea is that Germany must retain the position she 
acquired through her victorious war against France 
— position accruing at once from the territorial con- 
quests realized at our expense and from the passivity 
to which our diplomacy was reduced. At the very 
commencement of his reign, William II said plainly 
what he conceived his task to be, and that he would 
allow no breach to be made in the Imperial work: 
'^ There are people," he exclaimed, ^'who do not fear 
to assert that my father would have been willing to 
give up what he, with my grandfather, had won by 
the sword. We knew the Emperor Frederick too 



FRANCE AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 163 

well to permit, even for an instant, such an outrage 
on his memory. Like ourself, he was convinced 
that nothing must be abandoned of the conquests of 
the heroic epoch. We would sooner sacrifice our 
eighteen Army Corps and our forty-two millions of 
inhabitants than let one stone fall of the edifice 
raised by William I." The tenor of this speech, 
which was made on the 16th of August, 1888, found 
its echo in a series of similar manifestations during a 
period of seventeen years. And it was always the 
same thought that recurred: ''To preserve the glo- 
rious conquests with which God has rewarded Ger- 
many's struggles for independence and unity is the\ 
most sacred of duties." For this work of preserva- 
tion two conditions were required, — those indeed 
which Bismarck had always known how to realize. 
First, it was necessary that the German Empire — 
in security with regard to one of its two vanquished 
rivals, to wit, Austro-Hungary — should be in a 
position to repel an aggression of the other, to wit, 
France, if, perchance, the aggression occurred. Next, 
it was necessary that any risk of it should be averted 
by the incapacity of France to practise and even to 
conceive a policy of action. Thus and thus only 
would the hegemony of Germany be maintained. 
Thus and thus only would the ''coalition night- 
mare" be removed from her. In 1903 and 1904, 
William II was again seized by this nightmare. 
Europe was escaping from his control, and he felt it. 
Seeing her organize herself without him, and per- 
haps against him, he was troubled and alarmed. 



164 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

Moreover, at this moment, Germany was but ill- 
prepared to look coolly at a disagreeable situation, 
finding, as she did, within herself and near her, things 
that might well make her nervous. The very prog- 
ress which was her pride and which aroused anger 
and was prejudicial to interests abroad, was, by its 
rapidity and far-reaching character, a source of diffi- 
culties at home. In 1901, an economic crisis com- 
menced to rage, which took more than two years to 
exhaust itself. ''Between 1890 and 1895, seven 
hundred and eleven Joint-stock Companies were 
founded, with a nominal capital of 755 million francs. 
And between 1895 and 1900, fifteen hundred and 
fifty-one were founded, with a capital of 2 billions 
800 millions. If to these figures be added the 600 
millions represented by the various augmentations 
of capital belonging to older Companies and the two 
billions of bonds issued by them, it may be said that 
since 1895 the sums invested in German industry 
have attained the enormous figure of six billions." ^ 
Now the German Empire does not possess anything 
like the capital of England or France. Money fell 
short. The banks, becoming more and more dar- 
ing, continued to go right on. And the returns were 
not sufficient to cover the overdraft. Failures, bank- 
ruptcies, and scandals occurred; notably there was 
the disaster of the Leipziger Bank,^ which in 1904 
was hardly liquidated. Agriculture was as much in 
debt as Industry. People began to ask themselves 

* See Francis Delaisy's book, German Force. 
' See Victor Berard's William II and France. 



FRANCE AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 165 

whether it was not possible that the economic giant's 
feet were made of clay. Certain persons even 
thought that war was still the most profitable na- 
tional career. Even the more moderate lacked the 
calmness needed in order properly to appreciate the 
European events by which the Continent was escap- 
ing from German preponderance. 

Did it not seem, indeed, that the Triple Alliance 
itself was languishing ? True, it subsisted still ; and 
nothing was falser than to believe that its real exist- 
ence had ever been threatened. Yet, certain dis- 
quieting symptoms were noticeable. Italy showed 
a somewhat indiscreet joy over the balance of power 
that she had managed to reestablish to her advan- 
tage among the nations of Central Europe. She con- 
gratulated herself on having added to the prestige 
which for the last twenty years had accrued to her 
from the Triplice, the political influence which, to 
use Mr. von Buelow's expression, results from the 
''play of counterweight." However anxious she 
was to preserve her alliances, she was no longer, as 
at the beginning, condemned to them by her isola- 
tion. Slight modifications of attitude rendered the 
change perceptible. Germany no longer exercised 
over Rome the invincible prestige of yore. Visits 
were still paid, in which speeches were still pro- 
nounced in honour of reciprocal engagements. But 
the Italian speeches were colder than the German. 
And the reception accorded by Italy to William II, 
when he went there in 1904, seemed less hearty than 
the one given simultaneously to Mr. Loubet. On 



166 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

the other hand, it was impossible not to recognize 
that clouds were arising between Vienna and Rome. 
The irredentist incidents of Innsbruck, Trent, and 
Trieste, together with armaments that were sym- 
metric and manifestations that were hostile, had on 
various occasions, in spite of the two Governments, 
brought out popular antipathies. Last of all, Italy's 
Balkan ambitions, the well-known theory of ^'the 
Adriatic equilibrium," which practically amounted 
to claiming for the Italians alone the supremacy of 
these seas, could not fail to give the Austrian Gov- 
ernment serious food for thought. With the lauda- 
ble desire of coming to an understanding, Rome and 
Vienna had elaborated agreements in view of the 
statu quo — promesse di non fare, as Signor Ugo 
Ojetti one day said. But such expedients were pre- 
carious. And the awakening of the Balkan prob- 
lem might, whether Germany willed it or not, put 
her Italian Allies and her Austrian Allies at logger- 
heads. 

The Emperor William's uneasiness was not long 
in showing itself. On the 8th of April, 1904, the 
Franco-English arrangement was signed. On the 
28th of the same month, he spoke at Carlsruhe, and 
this is what he said: ''Let us think of the great 
epoch when the German unity was created, of the 
battles of Woerth, Weissembourg, and Sedan. Pres- 
ent events invite us to forget our domestic discords. 
Let us be united in preparation for the occasion 
when we may be compelled to intervene in the policy 
of the world." On the 1st of May, when inaugu- 



FRANCE AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 167 

rating a bridge at Mainz, he spoke again and still 
more clearly: ''This work, which is intended to de- 
velop the pacific relations of our country, may have 
to be used for purposes that are more serious.'' Fi- 
nally, on the 14th of May, the same tone might be 
remarked at Saarbriick. And, after congratulating 
himself on the fact that the town in which he was 
speaking had ceased, thanks to the German victo- 
ries, being a frontier town, he unnecessarily boasted, 
in the course of his peregrinations, of having visited 
Metz, ''the bulwark of Germany," which "sought no 
quarrel with any one, but was ready to defend itself 
against all the world." It is true that, for another 
ten months, no act followed these words. The Chan- 
cellor of the Empire, who had made the Franco- 
Italian tour de valse a subject for his jesting, who, 
in 1902, had declared that the "Franco-Italian agree- 
ments respecting certain Mediterranean questions 
were not directed against the Triple Alliance, and 
did not, in fine, encroach on its scope, who, three 
months later, had added: "We have no gable front 
on the Mediterranean; we are pleased to see that 
France and Italy, who each have great, important 
interests there, have come to an understanding on 
the question," — the Chancellor himself appeared 
also to be as little disturbed by the Franco-English 
agreement as he had been by that between France 
and Italy. On the 12th of April, 1904, he said, when 
commenting on the Treaty of the 8th of April: "We 
have nothing to object to in it from the point of view 
of German interests." On the 14th, he advocated a 



168 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

''policy of calm reflection, and even of reserve," as- 
serting his determination "not to embark the coun- 
try on any adventurous scheme" — the reference 
being to Morocco. From that moment, however, 
the Emperor and Mr. von Buelow — the Emperor's 
alter ego — were conscious that the hour was ap- 
proaching for them to enter, at least on the diplo- 
matic if not on the military course which should 
decide about the future. They felt that an era of 
equilibrium was succeeding in Europe to the period 
of Germany's hegemony. About Morocco they 
cared but little. It was merely a pretext. Their 
preoccupation was ''Germany's situation in the 
world," and by this they meant German preponder- 
ance based on the isolation of France. The pre- 
ponderance, as they thought, w^as in peril. If they 
waited, it was because they hoped thereby to obtain 
circumstances more favourable. Since the month 
of February, 1904, Russia had been monopolized by 
the war in Manchuria. How would this war turn 
out? Before acting, they must know. 

In the month of September, General Kouropatkin 
suffered a first disaster at Liao-Yang. In the month 
of February, 1905, that of Mukden was worse. The 
moment had arrived ; the moment to defend, against 
European claims, "the edifice raised by the Emper- 
or's grandfather," the moment to destroy coalitions 
that were forming, the moment to put in check the 
vanquished of the past or the aggressors of the fu- 
ture. On the 31st of March, 1905, William II, by 
disembarking at Tangier, proclaimed his hostility 



FRANCE AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 169 

towards France. In reality, it was one system of 
Alliances which opposed itself to another. It was 
the Triple Alliance which was trying its strength 
against the Dual, the latter backed up by the Entente 
Cordiale. The diplomatic shock, which had been 
preparing since 1875, was about to take place. His- 
tory would pursue its way with relentless logic. 



CHAPTER V 

CONFLICT OF THE ALLIANCES 

I. German Offensive. — Mr. von Kuhlmann's statements. — 
Cause and pretext. — William II at Tangier. — Mistakes 
of Mr. Delcass^. — Prince Henckel of Donnersmarck. — 
Scare in France. — Mr, Delcass^'s resignation. 
II. German success. — Mr. Rouvier and the Conference. — 
Acceptance of the Conference by France. — French-German 
agreements. — Moroccan concessions of Germany. — Suc- 
cess of the great German design. 
III. German discomfiture. — Situation just before Algeciras. 

— Germany's error. — Fluctuations of German policy. — 
Ends and means. — "European reprobation." — Failure of 
the German attempt to restore the Bismarckian hegem- 
ony. — Russian Alliance and the Western understandings. 

— Ti'iple Alliance. — Opinion in Germany. — Resignation 
of Prince von Buelow to the inevitable. 



It is impossible to justify, and difficult even to 
understand, Germany's Moroccan policy during the 
crisis of 1905-1906, if its manifestations only are 
considered. If, on the contrary, it is regarded as a 
functional part of her European policy, everything 
becomes clear; and it is seen to be an attempt to 
prove the value of the several international combi- 
nations made between 1902 and 1904, an effort to 
demolish these combinations by menace, if not by 

170 



CONFLICT OF THE ALLIANCES 171 

violence, a Bismarckian operation carried out by- 
men who had neither enough of Bismarck's prestige 
nor enough of his genius to succeed. 

On the 11th of February, 1905, while Mr. Saint- 
Rene Taillandier, our Minister in Morocco, was 
engaged in explaining to the Sultan the plan of re- 
forms that he had drawn up, Mr. von Kuhlmann, 
Germany's Charge d'Affaires at Tangier, said to 
Comte de Cherisey, his French colleague: — 

After the Franco-English agreement, we supposed the 
French Government would wait, to put us into possession of 
the facts concerning this new situation, until the Franco-Span- 
ish understanding was effected, which was foreshadowed in the 
arrangement of the 8th of April. But, to-day, everything be- 
ing definitely concluded, and the requisite Parliamentary ratifi- 
cations having been obtained, we find that we have been 
systematically kept ignorant of what was going on. 

We have therefore regulated our attitude in accordance. 

Do not imagine that I have laid down my line of conduct 
on my own initiative. In presence of the contradictory inter- 
pretations of our newspapers, I thought it my duty to ask my 
Government for formal instructions. Count von Buelow there- 
upon informed me that the Imperial Government had no 
knowledge of the different agreements that had been made with 
reference to Morocco, and did not recognize that he was in any 
way bound as regards the question.* 

These statements were calculated to surprise us. 
As a matter of fact, it was false that Germany had 
been kept in "systematic ignorance." On the 23d 
of March, 1904, before the Franco-English agree- 
ment was signed, Mr. Delcasse informed Prince 
von Radolin of its tenor. The Ambassador re- 
plied that he found the arrangement ''very natural 

1 See Yellow Book, 1901-1905. 



172 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

and perfectly justified." On the 25th of March, fol- 
lowing on these verbal explanations, the North Ger- 
man Gazette wrote : — 

As far as can be at present judged, German interests cannot 
be affected by the various exchanges of views concerning Mo- 
rocco. 

By reason of the reiterated assurance officially given on the 
French side that France has no conquest, no occupation in view, 
but is pursuing rather the opening of the Sultan's dominions in 
North West Africa to European civilization, there is ground for 
believing that Germany's commercial interests in Morocco have 
nothing to be afraid of. 

With regard to this problem, therefore, there is no need, as 
far as the Germans are concerned, to take umbrage at the Franco- 
English understanding which is at present in force.* 

A fortnight later, the text of the Agreement 
was published in London. On the 12th of April, 
Count von Buelow, Chancellor of the Empire, said 
in the Reichstag : — 

We know of nothing that should lead us to think that this 
agreement is directed against any Power whatsoever. What it 
seems to indicate is an attempt to settle a series of disputes be- 
tween France and England by means of an amicable under- 
standing. 

From the point of view of German interests, we have no ob- 
jection to make against it. As a matter of fact, we cannot be 
desirous of a tension between France and England which would 
be a danger for the peace of the world, whereas we are sincerely 
anxious that peace should be maintained. 

To speak more especially of Morocco, which constitutes the 
essential part of this agreement, we are interested in this coun- 
try, as indeed in the rest of the Mediterranean, chiefly from an 
economic point of view. 

Our interests there are, first and foremost, commercial. So 

1 See Yellow Book, 1901-1905. 



CONFLICT OF THE ALLIANCES 173 

we have important reasons for wishing tranquillity and order 
to reign in Morocco. 

We owe it to ourselves to protect our commercial interests 
in Morocco, and we shall protect them. Nor is there anything 
to make us fear that they can be overlooked or injured by one 
Power or another.* 

On the 14th of April, returning to the subject, the 
Chancellor expressed himself as follows : — 

Count Reventlow pretends that the Anglo-French agreement, 
and especially the fundamental part of it referring to Morocco, 
called forth in Germany sentiments of dismay and discourage- 
ment. 

He deems that we ought not to have suffered other Powers 
to acquire in Morocco a greater influence than ourselves. 

That can only signify this : namely, that we ourselves ought 
to claim a part of Morocco. I should like to ask Count Revent- 
low one question, which is very simple. 

Count Reventlow will certainly agree with me that, if a great 
Empire, like that of Germany, formulates such a claim, she 
must pursue the realization of the claim, cost what it may. 

What now would Count Reventlow advise me to do, if a claim 
of this kind were to be resisted ? 

I do not say it is certain that such a claim would meet with 
resistance ; I do not say this is likely ; I say only that, in ques- 
tions of such gravity, no eventuality should be lost sight of. 

Would Count Reventlow advise me to unsheath the sword? 

Count Reventlow does not reply, and I understand his si- 
lence. (Laughter.) 

I think, Gentlemen, it would be inconsiderate on my part, — 
and I am pleased to note that the leaders of all parties, except 
Count Reventlow, have expressed a similar opinion, — to decide 
unnecessarily on embarking the country in such an adventurous 
enterprise. 

I think, too. Gentlemen, that, were I so to act. Count Revent- 
low, in whom the critical faculty seems to me to be strongly 
developed, would reproach me with my exaggerated ardour for 
action as keenly as he has blamed my so-called fear of action. 

» See Yellow Book, 1901-1905. 



174 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

On the 20th of April, Mr. Bihourd, French Am- 
bassador at Berlin, saw Baron von Richthofen, then 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and said to him : — 

" I much appreciated the Chancellor's language, 
when he acknowledged in the Reichstag that the 
Franco-English understanding was not directed 
against any Power and in no wise threatened Ger- 
man commercial interests." 

In reply, Mr. von Richthofen expressed no ob- 
jection, made no reservation. 

On the 7th of October, after the signature of the 
Franco-Spanish agreement, Mr. Bihourd informed 
Baron von Richthofen of the fact. 

"Are you able," the Baron said to him, "to fore- 
cast the scope of the agreement with regard to Ger- 
many's commercial interests, which are what I have 
especially to think of?" 

"The Franco-English declaration of the 8th of 
April last," replied Mr. Bihourd, "offers every guar- 
antee on this point, nor can Spain's adhesion modify 
anything in the promises then made." 

Finally, on the 13th of October, the French Am- 
bassador communicated to Mr. von Richthofen the 
text of the Franco-Spanish declaration. Once more 
the Minister spoke to him of the exclusively eco- 
nomic interest that Germany took in Moroccan af- 
fairs. The Ambassador immediately answered, — 
renewing his assurances in Mr. Delcasse's name, — 
that "the Franco-English declaration of the 8th of 
April expressly guaranteed commercial liberty and 
that the Franco-Spanish declaration could not, in 



CONFLICT OF THE ALLIANCES 175 

his opinion, affect the securities already offered to 
international commerce." 

Consequently, Mr. von Kuhlmann's assertion was 
entirely unwarranted. It constituted a "baW — 
founded on a pretext — in view of diplomatic action 
dictated by reasons of a general and not a local na- 
ture. The reasons were likewise general, not local, 
which guided the development of this action. On 
the 15th of February, Mr. von Muhlberg, Under- 
Secretary for State Affairs, when questioned by Mr. 
Bihourd about Mr. von Kuhlmann's statements, re- 
plied that he had no cognizance of them. A fort- 
night later, the Russian Army suffered its decisive 
defeat at Mukden, a defeat which was destined to 
render the Saint Petersburg Cabinet powerless for 
some time to come. Straightway, Germany's real 
policy revealed itself. On the 21st of February, the 
German Consul at Fez reported to headquarters that 
Mr. Saint- Rene Taillandier, in order to back up his 
plan of reforms, had claimed that he held a ^'man- 
date from Europe." This assertion was false. On 
the 7th of March, the same official denounced the 
'' aggressive Colonial tendencies of France." On the 
12th of March, it was announced that William II 
would call at Tangier in the course of his cruise in 
the Mediterranean. On the 16th of March, Mr. von 
Buelow, speaking ambiguously in the Reichstag, 
said : — 

Herr von Reventlow touches on the question whether 
fresh agreements between third parties can affect our relations 
with Morocco. 



176 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

Herr von Reventlow seems to find that our policy is too 
inactive on this point, and that we are allowing ourselves to be 
guilty of negligence. 

I quite understand the attention paid here to the events 
now taking place in Morocco and to their significance. 

I consider it to be the duty of the German Government to 
see that, in the future, our economic interests in this country 
are not injured. 

The moment is inopportune to make more particular state- 
ments. 

I defer these till later. 

On the 29th of March, the Chancellor said : — 

The Emperor some time ago told the King of Spain that Ger- 
many seeks in Morocco no territorial advantage. 

After a declaration so categoric, it is absurd to try to explain 
the Emperor's visit to Tangier by intentions directed against 
the integrity or independence of Morocco. 

From this visit of the Emperor to Tangier, nothing can be 
deduced, as to its motive, that is of a nature to render any one 
uneasy who himself has no aggressive intentions there. 

Herr Bebel has hinted that our pohcy with regard to Mo- 
rocco has changed in the last year. 

I must remind him that the language and attitude of diplo- 
matists and politicians are regulated by circumstances. 

The moment that I judge to be favourable for setting forth 
German interests, I choose according to my own estimation. 

With this understood, nothing has changed in the tendencies 
of German policy on the point in question. 

Whoever seeks anything new will not find it in German 
policy. 

But if any attempt should be made to modify the interna- 
tional situation of Morocco or to establish any check on the 
open door in the country's economic development, we must see 
more than ever that our economic interests are not endangered. 

We should first put ourselves into relations with the Sultan 
on the subject. 

The threat, therefore, was rendered more precise. 
On the 31st of March, it was repeated with circum- 



CONFLICT OF THE ALLIANCES 177 

stance. Disembarking at Tangier, William II 
spoke to the representative of Abd el Aziz as fol- 
lows : — 

To-day, I pay my visit to the Sultan in his character of in- 
dependent sovereign. 

I hope that, under the Sultan's sovereignty, a free Morocco 
will remain open to the pacific competition of all nations, without 
monopoly and without annexation, on a footing of absolute equal- 
ity. 

My visit to Tangier is intended to make known the fact 
that I am resolved to do all that is in my power properly to safe- 
guard the interests of Germany, since I consider the Sultan as 
being an absolutely free sovereign. 

It is with him that I mean to come to an understanding 
respecting the best way of safeguarding such interests. 

As regards the reforms which the Sultan is intending to 
make, it seems to me that any action in this direction should be 
taken with great precaution, respect being had for the religious 
sentiments of the population in order that there may be no 
disturbance of public tranquillity. 

By a circular addressed to the various German 
Ambassadors on the 12th of April, the Chancellor 
appealed to Europe. The die was cast. The sub- 
stance of his communication was a reiteration of the 
imaginary grievances already invoked by Mr. von 
Kuhlmann, together with proposals for remedying 
what was amiss. Relying on her rights and the 
agreements she had made, France had endeavoured 
to act alone. Mr. von Buelow demanded that anl 
International Conference should be summoned, com-' 
posed of the signataries of the 1880 Convention of 
Madrid.^ This Convention, it was manifest, had 

» See White Book for 1906. 



178 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

nothing to do with the subject now raised, — and 
German jurisconsults themselves acknowledged this, 
— since it had merely settled the altogether special 
question of the protection to be granted to Moroc- 
cans by the several Foreign Legations. But, by 
forcing France to accept it, Europe was to be shown 
that, in spite of the agreements recently concluded, 
there was nothing changed in the world, and that 
Germany had only to oppose a certain policy for it 
to be altered in accordance with her wishes. On 
the 27th of May, the Moroccan ''Notables," being 
assembled to hear what Mr. Saint- Rene Taillandier 
had to say, took up on their own account the Ger- 
man idea of a Conference. On the 30th, the Sultan 
made the proposal his own, and Abd el Aziz thus 
became the instrument of the European scheme 
which recent Western agreements had tempted Ger- 
many to try to carry out, which the Russian defeats 
had allowed her to initiate. 

Considered by itself, the game was a magnificent 
one for the French Government to play. Thirty- 
four years had passed since the signing of the n 
Treaty of Frankfort. After being vanquished, dis-| 
membered, threatened afresh in 1875, isolated until 
1891, our country had, through the Russian Alliance, ' 
been restored to the possibility of diplomatic action. 
In spite of errors, she had pursued her way towards 
the attainment of an increasingly stable equilibrium, 
towards an autonomy more safely guarded on the ^ 
outside. She had successively drawn nearer to Italy P 
England, and Spain; and had utilized these rajp- 



CONFLICT OF THE ALLIANCES 179 

prochements for the service of her most essential in- 1 
terests — her Mediterranean interests. The weight 
had grown lighter with which triumphant Germany 
pressed upon her; and it was in the plenitude ofl 
her good right that she had acquired such guarantees, j 
After his installation at the Foreign Office in 1898,' 
Mr. Delcasse had done more than any other Minister! 
preceding him towards obtaining this result. For- 
tified by his patriotism, by Mr. Waldeck- Rousseau's 
confidence (1899-1902), by Mr. Combes' indiffer- 
ence respecting questions of foreign policy (1902-j 
1905), he had methodically applied the plan that he 
had laid down for himself, probably without under- 
estimating the risks attending it. 

Unfortunately, when these risks revealed them-f 
selves, Mr. Delcasse had as yet done nothing to ward! 
them off. Absorbed by his contemplation of the | 
goal, with his eyes raised aloft, he no longer saw the 
snares that lay in his path. After the signing 
of the Franco-English agreement, he allowed ten 
months to go by without taking any action in Mo- 
rocco, just as if he had been in sovereign disposal of 
a serene future. He had waited to act until the 
rout of the Russians at Liao-Yang, with those at 
Mukden and Tsusima, which were worse, deprived 
us of our best trump card, of our sole Alliance, of 
our only support on the Continent. Nor had he 
taken any measures to provide for the consequences I 
of such conduct. Being split up into two parties by 
the Dreyfus Affair, and subsequently by the religious \ 
quarrel, France had lost her inclination for action 



180 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

abroad. Disheartened by the system of delation 
that prevailed, our Army and Navy had no leaders, 
no organization, no ammunition, no provisions ade- 
quate to the role they should have been ready at 
any minute to play. For some idea to be gained of 
their weakness at this time, it suffices to mention 
that the extraordinary credits, hastily spent in order 
to remedy the worst deficiencies, amounted, in 1905, 
to 225 millions; and this, '^to execute in a few 
months what should have been spread over years, 
this, to fill up enormous shortage in the stock of 
ammunition, to place our four great fortresses in a 
proper state of defence, to complete the weapons 
and equipment of our armies, to construct the rail- 
ways that were absolutely indispensable for oper- 
ating the concentration set down in our plans of 
mobilization." ^ For months past and years past, the 
nation's "expenditure" had been cheese-pared to the 
profit of "Social" laws. For months past and years 
past, the Government had been living in a deceitful 
security, hiding from the country the consequences 
accruing from the policy — in itself excellent enough 
— which they were being compelled to carry out. 
And when the Minister of Foreign Affairs was anx- 
iously asked for information respecting our military 
preparedness, he replied : — 

"You are asking me too much. I do my own duty 
and presume that my colleagues do theirs." 

It is not with "suppositions" that nations are led 
to victory. When Bismarck founded Germany, he 
1 See Pierre Baudin's book, The Alarm. 



CONFLICT OF THE ALLIANCES 181 

first consulted Moltke. Mr. Delcasse had questioned 
neither General Andre, nor yet Mr. Camille Pelletan, 
whose bad administration, however, he had no right 
to ignore. Being the dupe of a strange illusion, he 
believed that a diplomatic operation was self-suf- 
ficing. He forgot that the basis of a diplomatic oper- 
ation is formed out of the military cash-in-hand of a 
nation, that, when one Power intends to uphold her 
rights and her designs, she prevails only by the con- 
sideration in which her strength is held, that, in 
order to be able to resist pressure in a state of peace, 
what is needed is the capacity for repelling an ag- 
gression through war. Being aware that German 
opposition would be made, sooner or later, not to his 
Moroccan but to his general policy, he, however, did 
not perceive that a France half-disarmed both mate- 
rially and morally was fatally condemned to yield. 
He willed the end without willing the means. It 
was a ruinous aberration of mind in a good French- 
man who, by dint of regarding that which was de- 
sirable, had lost all notion of the real, and the senti- 
ment of what was possible. 

It was not long before the consequence of this mis- 
take overwhelmed us. On the 31st of March and the 
7th of April, Mr. Delcasse made two useless speeches, 
one in the Senate and one in the Chamber, in which 
he feigned not to understand the meaning of the dis- 
cussion. On the 13th of April, he had a personal 
interview with Prince von Radolin, and on the 18th 
he caused a communication to be made to Mr. von 
Muhlberg, for the purpose of ''removing the mis- 



182 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

understanding." But neither in Paris nor in Berlin 
did he receive a reply. On the 19th of April, a pain- 
ful, alarming, humiliating discussion occurred in the 
Chamber of Deputies. The Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs was not in his usual form. Mr. Rouvier, the 
Prime Minister, raised a corner of the veil when he 
exclaimed : — 

What is it that we are reproached with? 

With not informing Germany of the Franco-English agree- 
ment on the morrow of its being signed. 

Rather should it be said "with not informing other nations" ; 
since no notification was made of the agreement which the Cham- 
ber had approved. 

Had not the Chancellor's speech the value of an acquiescence ? 

Did not the Chancellor declare himself satisfied on condi- 
tion Germany's commercial interests were not threatened ? 

What has taken place since then ? j. 

Certain military happenings have weakened our Ally.! 

Perhaps, then, the neighbours with whom we wish to live in 
harmony thought that, by raising a debate, they might open a 
question which we were justified in deeming closed by reason 
even of the language held on the other side of the Vosges, and 
might thus obtain some commercial advantages. 

This was the truth ; but it was rather late in the 
day to utter it. After resigning for a first time, and 
then withdrawing his resignation on the 20th of 
April, Mr. Delcasse resumed the direction of his De- 
partment, but with diminished authority. It was 
just at this moment that Germany and Morocco de- 
manded the assembling of a Conference, Mr. Del- 
casse attempted to reply by a refusal ; as, however, 
he had neither previously arranged for the conditions 
of his refusal nor yet prepared them, his thesis was 



CONFLICT OF THE ALLIANCES 183 

untenable. One needs trump cards in order to be 
able to resist a ''bluff." And we had none. Every- 
day, German pressure became increasingly insolent. 
Prince Henckel of Donnersmarck, whose colossal 
fortune assured him at the Court of Berlin a situa- 
tion which he had not merited by his career, came 
to Paris as a bearer of comminatory language. After 
going over certain petty grievances, he came straight 
to the point, and said : — 

We have, moreover, to complain of more serious grievances 
and grave lack of customary courtesy. You have endeavoured 
to detach from us the Power that was our ally and this on the 
advice of another Power with whom you have established a cor- 
dial understanding. You certainly have the right to choose 
your friends and your allies as you like ; but we owe it to our- 
selves to protect ourselves against the consequences that may 
be involved for Germany by the agreements that you contract. 

If your arrangements with England aimed only at the main- 
tenance of peace in Europe, we should have sincerely applauded 
them. Unfortunately, the appreciations of newspapers that are 
supposed to reflect Government opinion, certain conversations -sc^ 
having all the importance of official declarations, the speech^ 
made by King Edward VII in Paris, have convinced us that 
the chief object of the Entente Cordiale was to secure the 
isolation of Germany, preceding and preparing an aggression in 
the near future. Last of all, by disposing, without warning us 
or consulting us, of the Empire of Morocco, you have wounded 
the German Emperor and the German people to the quick. 

Is this policy that of France, or must we consider it as being 
merely personal to Monsieur Delcasse ? 

If you are of opinion that your Minister of Foreign Affairs 
has engaged your country in too adventurous a course, acknowl- 
edge it by dispensing with his services, and especially by giving 
a new direction to your foreign policy. 

We are not concerned with Monsieur Delcasse's person ; but 
his policy is a threat to Germany; and you may rest assured 
that we shall not -wait for it to be realized. The Emperor does 



184 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

not desire war. His chief care is to favour the development and 
expansion of German commerce. The German navy, which he 
means shall be large and powerful, is only a means for carrying 
out his exclusively pacific designs. 

On this ground, the Emperor naturally finds himself in rivalry 
with England, who, by tradition, is bent on destroying the fleets 
of her neighbours, or rather on preventing their creation. It is 
for you to decide whether you prefer to serve England's inter- 
ests, after taking into account the perils to which you expose 
yourselves by a verbal understanding which you are thinking of 
transforming into a written alliance. 

The Emperor respects your Army, the high value of which he 
is far from underestimating. He is, however, warned, and it is 
better you yourselves should be so too, of the causes that may 
weaken it and of the germs of dissolution that have been sown 
throughout it. 

In a war against Germany, you may possibly be victorious, since 
in her most tragic crises France has always found extraordinary 
resources in herself ; but, if you are vanquished, — and my first 
hypothesis deprives my second of aU offensive character, — if 
you are vanquished, as you probably will be, it is in Paris that 
peace will have to be signed. 

Are you hoping that, faithful throughout to the friendship 
uniting you, England will make common cause with you, and 
attempt — on the German coast — a diversion from which you 
might derive advantage ? That is possible. Let us assume the 
most favourable case for you. She bombards our ports, she 
destroys our fleets, she ruins our Colonies. With your billions, 
we shall repair the damage of all kinds that she may have caused 
us. She may deem herself impregnable at home; but, if we 
occupy your territory, she will be powerless to drive us away. 

And now let us examine what I will call the other picture. 

France does not tlireaten Germany. According to the desire 
of my friend Gambetta, she still thinks of Alsace and Lorraine ; 
but she never talks about them. Other questions of more im- 
mediate importance solicit her attention; since the world is 
wide enough for a great nation hke yours to be able to find the 
wherewith to satisfy her present ambitions, while adjourning 
hopes that are for the moment irrealizable. 

Your country would assuredly have the finest and most glori- 



CONFLICT OF THE ALLIANCES 185 

ous r61e that a civilized nation can desire. Placed as an umpire 
between friendly England and Germany, then, not hostile, she 
might, by arbitrating in their eventual quarrel, spare the world 
the horror of a general conflagration. 

Believe the word of a German who has always had great 
sympathies with you. Give up the Minister whose only aspira- 
tion is to trouble the peace of Europe; and adopt with regard 
to Germany a loyal and open policy, the only one which is worthy 
of a great nation like yours, if you wish to preserve the peace of 
the world.* 

A few days later, the inevitable occurred. Con- 
scious of our military weakness and Russia's power-i 
lessness, Mr. Rouvier decided to yield. In opposi-| 
tion to Mr. Delcasse, who declined negotiations in' 
view of a Conference, he advocated the acceptance 
of preliminary pourparlers. Being supported by the 
majority of the Cabinet, he did not refuse the resig- 
nation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs when it 
was handed in to him the second time. And by a 
regrettable error, the disgrace of this retreat under 
the enemy's fire was not even masked by a collective 
resignation of the Ministry, which might have been 
reconstituted on the morrow. Germany demolished 
the Minister who had vaunted of holding his own 
against her — without, indeed, his doing anything to 
render himself capable of such action. She gained 
the first bout. France was obliged, notwithstand- 
ing her alliances and friendships, to gainsay and 
humble herself. And to enforce this success William 
II bestow^ed on Count von Buelow the title of Prince. 
^ Conversation published by the Gaulois (June, 1905). 



186 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

II 

After this grave set-back, Mr. Rouvier found him- 
self in a disadvantageous situation to negotiate. As 
a matter of fact, the two agreements which he con- 
cluded with Germany, on the 10th of July and the 
10th of September, conceded Germany's claims. 

If the Prime Minister hoped that, in the course of 
fresh pourparlers, the German Chancellor's exigencies 
would be lessened by Mr. Delcasse's retirement, he 
was soon obliged to undeceive himself. Since the 
immediate occasion of their dispute was not the 
fundamental cause of these exigencies, — no more 
in the second phase than it had been in the first, — 
any one would have been foolish to imagine that Mr. 
Rouvier's arguments on the subject of Morocco, how- 
ever reasonable they might be, would have a deter- 
mining influence at Wilhelmstrasse. In vain the 
Prime Minister remarked that projects were attrib- 
uted to us which had not entered into our 
thoughts; that we had solicited the Sultan for no 
concession that could diminish his authority or 
hamper the freedom of trade within the boundaries 
of his Empire ; that we had neither done nor dreamt 
of doing the same in Morocco as we had done in 
Tunis. In vain he added that a Conference would 
be ''rather a complication than a solution"; that, if 
it assembled without a previous understanding being 
arrived at, it would turn out to be prejudicial; that, 
if it assembled after an understanding had been 
reached, it would be entirely useless. Prince von 



CONFLICT OF THE ALLIANCES 187 

Radolin, acting on the Chancellor's orders, contin- 
ued obstinately to demand that the Conference 
should be summoned, adding (on the 10th of June, 
1905): "We insist on the Conference. If it is not „ 
held, then the statu quo will remain in force. And I 
you must know that we will back up Morocco with; 
our entire strength." ^ 

If the matter, thus put, had referred to Africa, and 
Africa only; if Germany had merely desired to ob- 
tain especial advantages in the Moorish Empire or 
elsewhere, such an attitude would have been inex- 
plicable. On the other hand, it is understandable, 
if the Assembling of the Conference is regarded as a 
proof that the German Government was attempting , 
to impose her hegemony on the world ; if there is a 
consensus of opinion to the effect that the Moroccan ! 
dispute was the ''occasion" only and that the object/ 
to be attained was something higher — and else-' 
where. In this month of June, 1905, the Germans 
knew that Mr. Rouvier was willing to do more than 
pay the price of their good-will in Morocco. The 
financial help of France for their railways in Asia 
Minor might have been had by simply asking. They 
might even have obtained more, — perhaps the quot- 
ing of their public and private securities on the Paris 
Bourse. These advantages, although great, did not 
suffice to alter their attitude, since they were antici- 
pating larger profit from the satisfaction being ac- 

1 See Yellow Book (1901-1905). The Yellow Book does not 
say "with our entire strength." But I am informed by Mr. Rou- 
vier that this was the Ambassador's expression. 



188 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

corded them that would publicly demonstrate the 
continued existence of their preponderance. 

Indeed, one has only to glance at the two agree- 
ments in virtue of which, during July and Septem- 
ber, Mr. Rouvier prepared with Germany the meet- 
ing of the Conference. From the Moroccan point of 
view, these agreements were not disadvantageous to 
France, and procured her stronger guarantees than 
those we had first hoped for. By the terms of the 
former one, Germany declared that ''she pursued no 
object at the Conference that might compromise the 
legitimate interests of France in Morocco or that was 
contrary to the rights of France accruing from her 
treaties or arrangements." She placed herself in 
accordance with us respecting the principles them- 
selves which had never ceased to inspire our policy, 
— ''the sovereignty and independence of the Sultan; 
the integrity of his Empire ; economic liberty with- 
out any inequality ; the utility of police and financial 
reforms, the introduction of which would be regu- 
lated for a short period through an international 
agreement." Last of all^ she acknowledged "the 
situation enjoyed by France in Morocco by reason 
of Algeria's contiguity to the Moorish Empire along 
a vast extent of frontier, and of the particular rela- 
tions that arise between two bordering countries, 
there being also special reasons why France should 
desire the reign of order throughout the Sultan's 
dominions." The second agreement, which was the 
consequence of the first, laid equal stress on our privi- 
leges. It provided for "the organization of a police 



CONFLICT OF THE ALLIANCES 189 

system by way of international arrangement"; but.- 
"outside of the frontier region," there being an un-/ 
derstanding to the effect that, in this region, poHce' 
questions should continue to be settled directly., 
and exclusively between France and the Sultan, and 
should remain outside of the Conference programme." 
There was a similar understanding with regard to 
the repression of the smuggling of arms over the 
area of the same region. The upshot of all this was 
that Germany did not dispute our "peculiar inter- 
ests." She admitted that we had in Morocco an 
exceptional situation. She placed in our hands cer- 
tain means of action, the value of which was incon- 
testable, since, owing to them, we were able to obtain 
at Algeciras the recognition of our rights and the 
guarantee of our Moroccan interests. 

But, if these various points were gained, if Germany 
made us concessions which, though accorded reluc- 
tantly, were none the less precious, it was because,' 
by obtaining our adhesion to the Conference princi- 
ple, she had secured that which she most desired. In 
the German press her conduct was characterized even 
as a policy of amour-propre and show-off. We will 
be more equitable towards the Chancellor. If he in- 
sisted so strongly on the Conference being held, it 
was because alone the assembling of it would per- 
emptorily establish that French understandings were 
not self-sufficing when Germany was pleased to in- 
terfere ; it was because this meeting, before which 
would be heard the appeal of the policy that Ger- 
many had prevented us from carrying out at Fez, 



190 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

would be a monument raised to German puissance, 
a warning for the future, a threat against whoever 
should bethink himself to aspire to political inde- 
pendence. On the 11th of April, the Chancellor 
wrote to Count Wolff Metternich, the German 
Ambassador in London : — 

We are acting with a view to our interests, which apparently 
there seems to be an intention to dispose of without our assent. 
The importance of these interests is a secondary thing here. . . . 
If we, however, abandon them by our silence, we shall thus en- 
courage the world, seeing us act so, to commit similar breaches 
of courtesy, to our prejudice in other questions perhaps more 
considerable.* 

On the 4th of October, Prince von Buelow, re- 
ceiving the author of this book at Baden-Baden, 
said to him : — 

In the incidents which have arisen during the past six months 
or so, there are two distinct things to consider. 

Morocco is the first ; general policy is the second. 

In Morocco we have important commercial interests : we in- 
tended and we still intend to safeguard them. 

In a more general way, we were obhged to reply to a policy 
which threatened to isolate us and which, in consequence of 
this avowed aim, assumed a distinctly hostile character with 
regard to us. 

The Moroccan affair was the most recent and most clearly 
manifested example of such policy. It furnished us with an 
opportunity to make a necessary retort.^ 

What should be thought of this pretended ''iso- 
lation," the Chancellor had previously stated on 
the 14th of April 1904, when he said: — 

» See White Book (1906). 

2 See Le Temps of the 5th of October, 1905. 



CONFLICT OF THE ALLIANCES 191 

The member, Mr. Bebel, has also spoken of an isolation of 
Germany. He seems to fear that we are drifting into complete 
solitude. 

I answer him that we find ourselves at present in solid bonds 
of alliance with two great Powers, in amicable relations with the 
five others, that our relations with France are calm and pacific, 
and, as far as depends on us, will remain so. 

I believe, moreover, that we shall not have much isolation to 
fear, as long as we continue to keep our swords well-whetted. 

Germany is too powerful not to be capable of alliances. 

There are many combinations possible for us; and, even if 
we had to remain alone, this would not be very terrible either. 

Consequently, there is no need for anxiety. 

Nothing had happened since this date, with regard 
to the distribution of alliances, that could justify 
the altogether different language which the Chan- 
cellor used to me in October. Germany had still 
her 'Hwo solid Alliances"; and was the only Power 
in Europe enjoying this situation. The isolation 
spoken of by Prince von Buelow was therefore 
imaginary. The truth was that the effect of the 
change he dreaded, the effect of the change which 
had induced him to employ the Moroccan question 
in order to make a "necessary return-thrust," the 
effect of the change which had caused him to pass 
from the policy of reserve to a policy of action and 
which he characterized as "isolation" by a con- 
versational euphemism, this effect had been, not to 
reduce Germany to solitude, but to restore the 
balance of power in Europe. It had achieved, not 
the encircling of Germany, but the affranchisement 
of France. Throughout the dispute, the stake at 
issue for Germany was not the preserving of alii- 



192 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

ances, which there was no likelihood of her losing, 
but the safeguard of the diplomatic hegemony- 
secured by Bismarck as the outcome of the Congress' 
of Berlin. The stake was an important one, and, 
far more than Morocco, warranted the efforts made 
to win it. 

At the end of 1905, Germany had grounds for 
believing that she was nearing the desired goal. In 
the conflict of Alliances that had just been fought 
out, her triumph had been complete. She had 
merely had to intervene at Fez for the policy to 
crumble that had been established by the Franco- 
English agreement of 1904. She had merely had 
to threaten for France to sacrifice a Minister of 
Foreign Affairs whom the Parliament had during 
seven years supported by its confidence. Nothing 
had been able to stand against her interference. 
The paralysis of the Franco-Russian Alliance was 
not astonishing, considering the difficulties both 
exterior and interior in which our Allies were in- 
volved. But at its outset the Entente Cordiale 
had shown itself no better, since it had not spared 
France either discomfiture or humiliation. Indeed, 
the military aid that England could have offered, 
would have done but little to make up for our own 
weakness. The Franco-Italian and Franco-Spanish 
agreements had not even been invoked against the 
German pretensions. The Chancellor deemed him- 
self sure of the morrow and spoke somewhat ironically 
of English policy in its relations with ours. 

In the conversation with me mentioned above, 



CONFLICT OF THE ALLIANCES 193 

the. text of which was corrected by him before its 
publication, he said : — 

Your country has a useful role to play in tranquillizing minds 
instead of exciting them. 

In such a case as the present, the suave mart magno is not 
applicable. International solidarity is too deep for any one to 
be able to flatter himself on being the tertius gaudens — if I 
may again use a Latin expression — in a quarrel, whatever its 
nature may be. 

If, between Germans and Englishmen, there are prejudices 
which will vanish sooner or later, France can help in removing 
them. 

Allow me to add that she has set an example which proves 
that it is always possible to become reconciled with England. 

The Prince then went on to express his conviction 
that the Conference would draw us nearer rather 
than separate us. And he added in conclusion : — 

One condition, however, is essential for the rapprochement, 
namely, that the French public should quite understand that the 
policy tending to isolate Germany is a thing of the past, and that 
the course of conduct lately pursued is to-day definitely aban- 
doned. 

In spite of the courteous language that was subse- 
quently employed in speaking of the Franco-English 
and Franco-Italian rapprochements, Germany, not 
without some curtness, expressed the wish that 
nothing more should be said about the policy which 
these rapprochements had emphasized. The meet- 
ing of the Conference appeared to sanction the 
deference of France to this request. The debates 
of this same Conference were about to prove to the 
Chancellor that the "eviV was deeper seated than 
he had imagined; and that Europe, after once shak- 



194 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

ing off Germany's diplomatic yoke, did not intend 
to submit to it again. 

Ill 

The Conference of 1906 was a disappointment to 
Germany. The fact was that, owing to the ease 
with which she had triumphed in the preceding 
year, she had neglected to take into consideration 
the durable realities underlying ephemeral appear- 
ances. 

When, on the 15th of January, 1906, the delegates 
of the Powers met at Algeciras, the situation in 
Europe was no longer what it had been six months 
earlier. First of all, in France, a material and moral 
change had occurred. A reflecting uneasiness had 
succeeded the scare. Military measures had been 
taken, and this was known. Ninety-four million 
francs had been spent on ammunition, thirty mill- 
ions on equipment, twenty-six millions on railways. 
The press, which in the beginning had been divided 
and hesitating, had now recovered itself, and had 
rallied the minds of the public to the idea of resistance 
being necessary, after so many concessions. On 
the other hand, in August, 1905, Russia had signed 
peace with Japan. And, in spite of the disorganiza- 
tion inevitably caused by an unsuccessful war, she 
had resumed her place in Europe. England, who, 
if France had been willing, would have made war 
in 1905, had seen in Germany's success a fresh 
motive for acting in conjunction with us for the 



CONFLICT OF THE ALLIANCES 195 

purpose of establishing the European balance of 
power. On the 1st of September, 1905, in view of 
the Conference, Spain had strengthened the ties '^ 
that bound our two countries together. Last of all, 
and above all, the circumstances of an International 
Conference were less favourable than a tete-h-tUe 
to the game of menace and '^ bluff" practised by 
Germany in the previous year. If a rupture were 
aimed at, it would be less easy to realize amidst the 
cumbersome machinery of an international gather- 
ing; and, by reason of the time lost, would appear 
less specious. If intimidation and moral pressure 
were the object, Europe's presence at the debates 
would allow us to find support and to create majori- 
ties. It was not so difficult for us to remain cool. 
Our risks were not so great. 

This was not suspected at Berlin. There they 
relied on the docile aid of the two Powers of the 
TripUce. William II reserved to himself the task 
of personally influencing the Czar so as to get him 
to adopt a neutral attitude. From England and 
Spain an adhesion was reckoned on, which France 
alone would, have paid for. What was simpler 
than to say to them: ''You have treated with 
France about Morocco. You, English, have with- 
drawn in her favour ; you, Spaniards, have pledged 
yourselves to her. Now, recover your liberty. You, 
English, have secured in Egypt the advantages 
promised you by the Franco-English agreement. 
You, Spaniards, have been obliged to give up, in 
favour of France, a considerable portion of the 



196 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

profits you were hoping for in Morocco. Come, let 
us talk, and talk about Morocco. Let us draw up a 
scheme by which you will each get your share, and 
we, ours. As to the solution, you will find us accom- 
modating, since we have no fixed intention, or rather 
we have only one, namely, to oust France, and to 
publish her discomfiture to the world." This, 
you may say, is hypothesis. No ! not if the history 
itself of the Conference demonstrates that such 
was the policy of Germany; if it makes plain that, 
while ready to accept all sorts of combinations which 
France refused, she pursued one design only: to 
wit, that of breaking down the diplomatic system 
which Prince von Buelow, three months previously, 
had said was a thing of the past, a thing that must 
be abandoned forever. 

The initial stage of the negotiations ^ lasted from 
the 15th of January to the 19th of February and was 
taken up with private conversations. On the 25th 
of January, Mr. von Radowitz, the premier German 
plenipotentiary, entered into pourparlers with his 
French colleague, Mr. Revoil, yet without formulat- 
ing any precise proposals concerning essential ques- 
tions, such, for instance, as the police organization, 
which France asked might be placed under her 
control. At the same time, in order to entice Spain 
away from us, Germany offered her the police of all 
the ports, renewing the ofTer at Algeciras after 
making it at Madrid. Through a semi-official 
agency, the South German Imperial Correspondence, 

^ See our book on the Algeciras Conference, 2d edition (1907). 



CONFLICT OF THE ALLIANCES 197 

Italy received a similar offer. Finally, on the 3d 
of February, Count von Tattenbach, who was 
the second German plenipotentiary, suggested to 
England's representative the idea of separating 
from France. In the same week, four solutions, 
each differing from the others and from those that 
had been previously put forward, were proposed 
by Germany's representatives in interviews with 
the governmental delegates or communications to 
the Governments themselves of Spain, the United 
States, Russia, and Italy. There was thus a clear 
manifestation of attempts to dissociate these Powers 
from France, the sole, visible, and avowed aim being 
to isolate her, no respect being paid to the question 
at issue. On the 9th of February, one of the Wolff 
agency's telegrams announced that Germany had 
rejected the French proposals. This rejection, which 
was irregular in its form, occurred after the repre- 
sentatives of Russia, Italy, and the United States' 
had informed Mr. von Radowitz that these pro- 
posals had their approbation. On the 19th of Febru- 
ary, the Germans again rejected what was proposed 
both concerning the police and the question of 
finances; and, simultaneously, strong pressure was 
brought to bear on the Duke of Almodovar, Spain's 
plenipotentiary, with a view to securing his detach- 
ment from our side. Meanwhile, in Saint Peters- 
burg, the German Ambassador, Mr. von Schoen, 
was trying to shake Count Lamsdorff in his 
fidelity to our cause. And in Rome, Count von 
Monts was advising Italy to ''resume her liberty of 



198 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

action." At Madrid, Mr. von Stumm declared that, 
in case Spain behaved badly, the Emperor William 
would not be able to return the visit which he had 
received from the latter in 1905. In Algeciras every 
one believed that there would be a rupture. Every 
one found the French proposals reasonable. Every 
one was astonished at Germany's resistance. The 
astonishment was natural enough, if only the Moroc- 
can question was regarded. But, on the other 
hand, no one had any need to wonder, who placed 
himself so as to see that the Chancellor's sole aim 
was to affirm Germany's supremacy in Europe 
through this thwarting of the French projects. 

During the second period (February 20-March 
14), the Conference held sittings for the discus- 
sion, first of the Bank question, next that of the 
Police. At the conclusion of the debates on the 
former subjects, German intransigence still con- 
tinued to show itself, notwithstanding French 
concessions. In the meantime (February 21), 
Prince von Buelow, availing himself of Baron 
de Courcel's presence in Berlin, proposed a com- 
promise to the eminent Ambassador which, since it 
went counter to the principles we had invoked from 
the beginning, would have certainly caused us to 
fall out with England and with Spain. On the 1st 
of March, William II replied to a communication 
of the Russian Prime Minister, Count Witte, by 
recommending the same compromise to him. To 
two telegrams of Mr. Roosevelt advocating the 
creation of a Franco-Spanish police checked by re- 



CONFLICT OF THE ALLIANCES 199 

ports of the Italian Legation at Tangier, the Emperor 
replied by a double refusal. The 'isolating" action 
therefore was being continued. The French Govern- 
ment was of opinion that they could not, without 
danger, allow it to develop further. On the 3d of 
March, seeing that no decisions were being reached 
with reference to the Bank, Mr. Revoil asked that 
the Police question should be brought up for dis- 
cussion. Mr. von Radowitz opposing this, a vote 
was taken, with the result that ten delegates sup- 
ported the French side, and three, the German. 
Although the point to be settled was merely one 
of procedure, it was seen that Europe had cast the 
die and won. Tired of Germany's injunctions, she 
had expressed her sentiments. The ''Guardian'' 
of European interests, as the Berlin papers called 
her, was deserted by all her wards except one ; and, 
when the Conference had to decide as to the best 
way of entering upon reforms, she was backed up 
only by Austria and by the compromising help of 
Morocco, the latter being desirous of thwarting, by 
every means possible, the Conference's labours 
tending to reform. 

This warning was understood at Berlin, since 
now, for the first time, either in Paris through the 
medium of the Prince of Monaco, or at Algeciras 
through the voice of Count von Tattenbach, the 
Chancellor's Government showed themselves dis- 
posed to be more conciliatory. It is in fact easy 
to see that, by demonstrating through its debates 
and votes the isolation of Germany, the Conference 



200 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

was upsetting the whole design which the Emperor 
had so striven to reahze in his pohcy. Unfor- 
tunately, just at this moment, the French Chamber 
placed the Rouvier Cabinet in a minority, an act 
of folly which once more raised Germany's hopesj 
On the 10th and 11th of March, Mr. von Radowitz 
refused to keep the promises of concessions that he 
had made during the morning of the 10th. On the 
12th, the various German Ambassadors received 
a circular telegram from their Government, asserting 
that the majority of the delegates at Algeciras were 
hostile to France ; that with a last effort she would 
be compelled to capitulate. On the same day. Prince 
von Buelow, through the medium of a German 
financier who was at Saint Petersburg, telegraphed to 
Count Witte: ''Thanks to our concessions every- 
thing was going on favourably at the Conference 
when, suddenly, Mr. Revoil created fresh diffi- 
culties, to the surprise of all the other plenipotentia- 
ries, who deem his pretensions unwarranted, and 
who, with even the English, incline in our favour. 
We hope that Mr. Witte will make his influential 
voice heard, if he desires to avoid a final rupture." 
Last of all, on the 13th, 15th, and 17th of March, 
in three personal telegrams, addressed to Mr. Roose- 
velt through the German Ambassador at Washington, 
William II appropriated the affirmation and declared 
that all the Powers, except the United States, had 
abandoned France, so that he urged the President to 
prevail upon us to consent. 

Never had Germany's hold on the world been 



CONFLICT OF THE ALLIANCES 201 

asserted with such audacity. If France had yielded, 
and if her Allies and friends had not supported her, 
Germany would have won the game, not merely the 
Moroccan game, which forsooth was a small part of 
the Chancellor's great design, but that of the wider 
world, the Bismarckian game in favour of her 
hegemony against European equilibrium. Happily, 
France did not give up ; and no one abandoned her. 
On th§ 14th of March, Mr. Leon Bourgeois, who 
succeeded Mr. Rouvier at the Foreign office, declared 
to the Ambassadors that he had maintained the 
instructions to Mr. Revoil in their entirety. Be- 
tween the 13th and 14th, the British Government 
notified the Powers by a circular telegram that they 
supported France on all points and without either 
restriction or reserve. On the 18th, Mr. Roosevelt 
characterized the German proposals as being inac- 
ceptable. On the 19th, by a circular similar to the 
English one, the Russian Government informed the 
different Chancelleries that they unhesitatingly sup- 
ported the French requests. In less than a week, 
we had recovered the advantage. Since our isola- 
tion had been asserted, we replied by a demonstra- 
tion of the help on which we could count. The 
German manoeuvre had failed. Europe had not 
yielded. In such conditions, the Algeciras debates, 
had no further interest for Germany. She had now 
but one desire, to finish them off as quickly as 
possible, whatever the solution might be. On the 
20th of March, Mr. von Tschirschky, Secretary of 
State, said to Mr. Bihourd : — 



202 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

"I see no further difficulties, since we accept 
what you desire." 

On the 28th, an agreement was established on all 
the principal points. Brutality of procedure, bad 
mental analysis, inaccurate estimation of the forces 
in presence — Germany's discomfiture exhibited all 
these. Obsessed with the idea of triumphing alone 
and gloriously, of leaving the Conference in her 
character af sovereign of the world, Germany had 
rejected with disdainful superciliousness the four 
offers of arbitration which had been made to her 
during the Conference, to wit, the Italian, Russian,! 
American, and Austrian. To these four Powers, 
who, with but small difference of detail, were equally 
desirous of arriving at an honourable compromise, 
she rendered their task so difficult that, after being 
at first well-disposed intermediaries, they had be- 
come, with their varying means, the auxiliaries of| 
our policy. The attempt made to entice England 
away had produced the contrary effect and joined 
London and Paris in closer bonds. Russia, who at . 
the beginning had flattered herself she would be 
able to bring about an understanding, had subse- 
quently been obliged, in presence of German exi- 
gence, to content herself with fulfilling her duty as^ 
our ally, and had fulfilled it loyally. Spain had re- 
mained faithful to us, seeing what little sincerity 
there was in advances that were continually accom- 
panied by threats. Italy would have been only too 
glad to be spared the necessity of taking sides openly.'^ 
Germany, however, forced her to do so ; and, as she : 



CONFLICT OF THE ALLIANCES 203 

had given us positive pledges, whilst, on the other 
hand, through Germany's will, the Triple Alliance 
had always ignored the Mediterranean, she was 
bound to grant us her vote. The United States 
had supported us for the simple reason that our 
proposals appeared to them to be moderate. As 
for Austria, although devoted to Germany, she 
could not go against plain evidence, and had exer- 
cised a conciliatory action, which now and againi 
inclined distinctly in favour of France. In short, 
throughout the three months, none of our supports 
had weakened; and some had even become more 
solid. It may also be said that fresh ones had 
been created through '^reprobation of Germany," I 
as Count Lamsdorff, on one occasion, put the 
matter. 

The results of the Conference were important, 
gauged by the interest Germany had had in sum- 
moning it. The aim of German policy, manifest- 
ing, as it undoubtedly did, indifference with regard 
to Morocco, was to use the African conflict as an 
occasion for reprisals in Europe ; to prove to France 
that the Anglo-French Entente was inefficacious; 
at the same time, to fortify the Triple Alliance byi ^ 
detaching Italy and Spain from the Western powers ; 
in a word, to restore the situation which Bismarck 
had bequeathed to William II. And the undertak- , 
ing was an utter failure. Not only had the two 
countries, reconciled by the agreement of the 8th 
of April, 1904, remained refractory to every effort 
made to disunite them, but, in the trial, their En- 



204 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

tente had changed its character ; and, after being 
originally signed for the purpose of liquidating the 
past, it had become a principle of action. This 
action had influenced Madrid and Rome. The 
visible solidarity of French and English policy had 
likewise made its impression on the Italian and 
Spanish nations. It had attracted them to the 
extent of transforming the primitive tour de valse 
into a durable connection. The Franco-English 
binomial had acquired weight. It had changed 
from the static to the dynamic condition. Even 
the Franco-Russian Alliance was strengthened by 
the crisis through which it had passed. On the 
morrow of the Russian defeats, German threats 
had shown to adversaries, as well as to friends, 
of the Dual Alliance, the need there was for its ex- 
istence. Last of all, for the first time at Algeciras 
the representatives of Russia and England, brought 
into contact by their cooperation in a work of gen- 
eral behoof, had exchanged amicable and reason- 
able views respecting the situation of both coun- 
tries. The combinations in which France had her 
place marked had lost nothing by this '' experiment 
of resistance." In accepting Europe's intervention 
between the Sultan of Morocco and herself, our 
country had done nothing more than record the 
inevitable consequence of her set-back in 1905. 
For the rest, her essential interests in the Moorish 
Empire were safeguarded by the privilege of exe- 
cution she shared with Spain, in putting into force 
the police and finance reforms she had proposed. 



CONFLICT OF THE ALLIANCES 205 

In Europe, she maintained her rank; and her 
diplomatic resources were increased rather than 
diminished. 

Germany's discomfiture was proved by the fact 
that what she had tried to demoHsh remained still 
in existence. The odds, therefore, turned against 
her. After winning the first two games, she lost 
the final one that should have given her complete 
victory. She was not any more isolated after Al- 
geciras than she had been before, since she kept her 
two allies. But, if the term 'isolation" is taken 
in the sense given to it by Prince von Buelow in 
1905, to wit, a grouping of Powers outside of Ger- 
many's dictation, such isolation continued. Her 
own allies had made her understand that, while 
correctly fulfilling their obligations towards her, 
they were not wiUing to merely follow in her wake. 
Italy did not give up her Mediterranean agreements. 
To the theory of an autocratic Triple Alliance, she 
had opposed the doctrine of a constitutional Triplice 
in which each of the contracting parties propor- 
tioned their contributions to their profits. Austria, 
who was fulsomely congratulated by William II, 
had acted less as a ''second" than as a mediatrix; 
she had contrived to show that she had her own 
policy, a thing many had doubted; and that she 
did not mean to accept peremptory orders from Ber- 
lin. So far, therefore, from having widened her 
field of action, Germany had, on the contrary, nar- 
rowed it. Instead of augmenting her authority, 
she had diminished it. Nothing of what was ma- 



206 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

terial had been lost; but she had not obtained the 
moral success on which she had relied. 

This judgment was that which, in general, was 
expressed by the German press. ''Neither van- 
quisher nor vanquished," said the Cologne Gazette. 
The pronouncement would have been true, if, at 
Algeciras, Germany had not been seeking victory. 
"Neither Bismarck's genius nor Talleyrand's subt- 
lety could have obtained more," was the opinion 
of the Berliner Tagehlatt, which, however, added; 
''But Bismarck would never have gone to Alge- 
ciras." The Tcegliche Rundschau spoke of Germany's 
isolation; and the Tageszeitung summed up by say- 
ing: "After commencing with a flourish of trum- 
pets, our Moroccan policy finishes by a surrender;" 
while the Hamburger Nachrichten exclaimed: "In 
reality, France has obtained everything at the Con- 
ference; her concessions are purely those of form. 
On essential points, we have done nothing but 
yield." A few months later, the Hannoversche 
Courrier added, "Our diplomacy has been blind." 
And at the end of 1906, the Frankfort Gazette summed 
up the general impression by saying in substance: 
"The Moroccan adventure has warded off none of 
the risks against which it was pretended measures 
were to be taken. . . . Germany's position has 
been aggravated instead of being improved. Ger- 
man diplomacy has made itself disagreeable to every- 
body. . . . The telegram to President Kruger ; 
the propaganda against the Yellow Race or against 
America; Pan-Islamic intrigues in Africa, — mistakes 



CONFLICT OF THE ALLIANCES 207 

and nothing but mistakes. . . . And what has it 
all resulted in? We have left the Boers to stew in 
their own juice. The Japanese have beaten the 
Eussians. The Sultan of Morocco has to submit 
to Franco-Spanish police. Was it worth while 
raising such a hubbub?" 

The official manifestations themselves were quite 
as little disposed to exult as the newspapers. On 
the 14th of November, 1906, Mr. Bassermann, one 
of the National Liberals in the Reichstag, said: — 

We have entered upon an era of travels, speeches, telegrams, 
and amiable advances lavished on all sides. 

To-day, the Triplice has no practical utility. 

The Italian press and people incline more and more towards 
France. 

Austria has been too much eulogized for playing the role of a 
"brilliant second," which she herself disclaimed. 

The Franco-Russian Alliance remains intact; and the atti- 
tude of France towards us is not so good as it was. 

The interview at Cronberg between the English and German 
sovereigns does not prevent England from pursuing her ancient 
policy, which tends to isolate us. 

We are living in a period of alliances between other nations. 

The Anglo-Russian understanding is fraught with grave con- 
sequences for us, and Bismarck already had the coalition night- 
mare. 

Our policy lacks calmness and consistency; and one sees 
clumsy hands upset plans that had been well laid. 

Abroad, all this is noticed with attention and distrust. We 
do not see that there is any imminent danger of war ; but there 
is the danger that comes from a sudden relaxation of strain. 

The Chancellor himself had altered his tone. 
Speaking during the same sitting, after Mr. Basser- 
mann, he used language characterized by its ex- 
treme moderation, indifference, and resignation: — 



208 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

I may remark here more especially that we have no thoughts 
of slipping in between France and Russia, or between France 
and England. 

Nor have we any idea of producing a rupture of the friend- 
ship between any of the Western Powers. Such is not the ob- 
ject of our efforts whether secret or avowed. 

The Franco-Russian Alliance, since its conclusion, has not 
been a danger to peace ; on the contrary, it has acted as a weight 
contributing to the regular movement of the world's clock. 

We hope that the same thing may be said of the Anglo- 
French Entente Cordiale. 

The good relations between Germany and Russia have in no 
wise tended to break the Franco-Russian Alliance. 

Nor can the good relations between Germany and England 
be in contradiction with the Entente Cordiale either, if its ob- 
ject is pacific. 

He thus appeared to recognize the fresh condi- 
tions of equilibrium which, both before and during 
the Conference, the German semi-official press had 
not ceased denouncing as an attack on Germany's 
rights. The dream he had conceived, that of re- 
storing, through Morocco, the threatened Bis- 
marckian edifice, had not stood against the reality 
of things. In the ardour of the struggle, there was 
a good deal of indignation aroused, on this side the 
Vosges, by the manner in which Germany behaved. 
Without approving all that was said, one may re- 
call, at this distance from the past, Bismarck's say- 
ing that 'indignation is not a political state of mind." 
And as one understands better, one is less inclined 
to grow angry. The prodigious display of effort, 
activity, and intrigue which distinguished German 
policy during those three months could not be ex- 
plained — and would be blamable and ridiculous — 



CONFLICT OF THE ALLIANCES 209 

if Morocco had been the only stake that was being 
played for, if the only questions had been those of 
deciding about a few gendarmes and meagre Cus- 
toms duties. Let it rather be supposed that this 
effort and activity and intrigue were meant to build 
up, on the threshold of the twentieth century, the 
most extraordinary structure of political power" 
that had ever been raised since the time of Napo- 
leon I; to save Bismarck's work from the assaults 
of age; to secure Germany in the domination of 
Europe that had belonged to her from 1871 to 1891,j 
— and even to 1902 ; to oppose these new combina- 
tions by an alliance that had gloriously won its 
laurels in a series of trials, and with it to overcome 
them. Then one may admit that the sometimes 
exaggerated ardour of German policy was not un- 
justifiable. 

Its only crime, in the eyes of history, will be that 
of having been useless. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE NEW ASIATIC AND EUROPEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 

I. Asia and the German policy. — Sino-Japanese war. — 
Combined action of Germany, France, and Russia. — The 
"break-up of China." — Crisis of 1900. — Russo-Japanese 
War. — German profit. — Three risks of France. 
II. Asia and the French policy. — Russo-Japanese reconcilia- 
tion, and the agreements of 1907. — Franco-Japanese rec- 
onciliation. — Anglo-Russian reconciliation. — Persia, Af- 
ghanistan, Thibet, the Persian Gulf. — France and the Anglo- 
Russian Agreement. — French profit accruing from it. 
III. European developments. — Evolution of the Anglo-Rus- 
sian understanding. — Germany's attitude. — Interview 
at Revel. — Anglo-Russian understanding in Macedonia. 
— End of the Austro-Russian understanding. — Anglo- 
Spanish and Franco-Spanish agreements. — Tendency to 
an equilibrium. 



During the last ten years, Asiatic policy has ex- 
ercised on European policy an influence at once con- 
stant and considerable. Every Power that has 
occupied the political stage in Europe possesses 
territory in Asia. All the various diplomatic group- 
ings, formed by reason of Asiatic interests, have 
produced their counter-effect in Europe. Such 
being the case, alliances and understandings refer- 
ring to Asia can only be rightly comprehended 
when viewed in connection with general policy. 

210 



ASIATIC AND EUROPEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 211 

The real fait nouveau of this period is Japan's 
entrance into the circle of the great Powers. Al- 
ready, for a long time, the world had followed with 
sympathetic and astonished curiosity the efforts 
made by the Empire of the Rising Sun to super- 
impose, on its ancient and admirable civilization, 
the acquisitions of the West, which seemed to its 
patriotism the assurance of strength and an instru- 
ment of future greatness. For the first time, in 
1894, Japan, being conscious of her power, put it to 
the test. Between herself and China, the Corean 
question had always been the subject of disputes, 
which, at length, grew embittered. On the 1st of 
August, 1894, the Mikado's Government transported 
the quarrel to the field of battle; and, on the 17th 
jof April, 1895, the Treaty of Shimonasaki recorded 
'their easy victory.^ China, once for all, recognized 
Corea's entire, complete independence, renouncing 
all tribute from her and all ceremony indicative of 
vassalage. She gave Japan the perpetual right of 
possession over the peninsula of Leao-Tong, with 
Port Arthur, the island of Formosa, and the Pes- 
cadoras. Besides, she pledged herself to pay a war 
indemnity of 200 millions of taels in eight instal- 
ments, the delay fixed being seven years at the out- 
side, with a 5% interest on all payments in arrears; 
to appoint plenipotentiaries for the purpose of con- 
cluding with Japanese plenipotentiaries treaties of 
commerce and navigation, and arrangements rela- 
tive to land communications and trade. She granted 

^ See Edouard Driault's book, The Question of the Far East. 



212 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

Japan, in advance, the treatment of the most fa- 
voured nation. She opened to Japanese trade the 
ports of Chachi, Chung-King, Souchow, and Hang- 
Chow. She accorded Uberty of navigation on the 
Yang-tse-kiang, beyond I-chang as far as Chung- 
King, and on the river Wusung as far as Hang-Chow. 
Moreover, Wei-hai-Wei was to be occupied by a 
Japanese garrison until the first two instalments of 
the indemnity had been paid. 

Japan's joy of triumph did not last long. On the 
20th of April, 1895, three days after the Treaty of 
Shimonasaki had been signed, a group of Powers, 
which seemed at this moment agreed to act together 
in Europe and out of Europe, to wit, Germany, 
Russia, and France, laid their embargo on Japan's 
victories, and, out of the peace of the 17th, made a 
second treaty of San Stefano. In friendly yet im- 
perative language, the three Powers declared that 
"a, Japanese possession of the peninsula of Leao- 
Tong would be a menace against the Capital of China 
and would render Corea's independence merely 
nominal." On the 5th of May, Japan yielded. She 
announced that she accepted the advice of the Pow- 
ers, not wishing to raise other difficulties. She 
therefore contented herself with keeping the Pesca- 
doras and Formosa, and renounced her right to Leao- 
Tong and Port Arthur. In return, she obtained an 
indemnity of 30 millions of taels. The Treaty of 
Pekin, of the 21st of July, 1895, set seal to this sacri- 
fice, which was a painful one for Japanese pride to 
make. Indeed, the sacrifice was not definitive, des- 



ASIATIC AND EUROPEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 213 

tined, as it was, to be redeemed by another treaty 
which the Mikado's plenipotentiaries were to sign ten 
years later at Portsmouth in the United States. 

The European intervention, which had just been 
manifested so bluntly, would have been justifiable, 
if it had been inspired by the principles that it ap- 
pealed to/ The Powers were quite warranted in 
insisting on the respect of Chinese independence, 
which — then as to-day — appeared to be the best 
pledge of peace in Asia. But throughout this inter- 
ference, there was much less principle operating 
than covetousness, which, in Saint Petersburg and 
still more in Berlin, awaited only a more favourable 
opportunity to satisfy itself. Since the time of Bis- 
marck, Germany has always sought to tempt Russia 
Asiawards, with a view to '' getting rid of her influ- 
ence" in Europe. The Chancellor used to say: 
''Russia has nothing to do in the West. All that 
she can get there is nihilism and other maladies. 
Her mission is in Asia. There she represents civ- 
ilization." In 1880, at the time of the Kouldja in- 
cident, this policy had been applied. Just then, a 
diplomatist drew attention to ''the incomprehen- 
sible intimacy" of Russia's Minister, Mr. Koyander, 
and Mr. von Brandt, who was Germany's, and to 
their joint efforts to egg things on, the former act- 
ing from national ambition, and with an imprudent 
and heedless desire of procuring his country fresh 
conquests, the latter, on the contrary, reasonably 
calculating that it was advantageous for Germany 

^ See Rene Pinon's book, The Struggle for the Pacific. 



214 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

that Russia should be involved in adventures which 
he knew were perilous and which, if entered upon, 
would absorb her vital forces for long to come, and 
thus remove from Europe and the Vistula, men and 
generals whose proximity might hamper Germany 
at a moment when she wanted her hands free.^ Fif- 
teen years had gone by since then. And in their 
adoption of the Weltpolitik, the German Govern- 
ment had acquired also a taste for a Colonial Em- 
pire. To make in China a conquest of this kind and 
to drag in Russia behind them was killing two birds 
with one stone, a coup of the kind relished by Im- 
perial diplomacy. From 1895, Germany had been 
working with this end in view. 

Although having obtained excellent results dur- 
ing the whole of the nineteenth century by a policy 
of pacific penetration, Russia was not able to resist 
the lure of immediate profits that was held out to 
her. Being in the honeymoon period of the Alli- 
ance, France was hardly in a position to restrain 
her other half by a show of authority. So Germany 
had the game all to herself. On the 1st of Novem- 
ber, 1897, the murder of two German missionaries 
at Chang-Tong furnished William II with the desired 
opportunity for making China feel his '4ron-sheathed 
fist." After an expedition theatrically organized 
at Kiel under the command of Prince Henry of 
Prussia, China was obliged, on the 6th of March, 
1898, to lease to Germany for ninety-nine years 

^ See Andre Cheradame's book, The World and the Russo-Jap- 
anese War. 



ASIATIC AND EUROPEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 215 

the Bay of Kiao-Chow and a zone of fifty kilometres 
round it — an admirable footing on Chinese soil 
adapted to go with various other German vantage 
points in the Pacific, which latter were increased in 
the same year by the purchase of Spain's colonies 
in these seas. Three weeks later, on the 27th of 
March, without any pretext, and simply "with a 
view to protecting the Russian fleet and giving it 
a strong base on the western coast of China," 
Russia contrived to obtain, under the same condi- 
tions, the cession of Port Arthur, Talienwan, and a 
contiguous zone, as the terminus of the Trans- 
Manchurian Railway, for which, in August, 1896, 
Count Cassini had obtained the Tsong-li-Yamen's 
permission to be cut through Chinese territory. 
On the 11th of April, 1898, France exacted, in her 
turn, a lease of the bay of Kwang-Chow-Wan. 
Great Britain installed herself at Wei-hai-Wei. 
Even Italy, in 1899, tried, but in vain, to claim the 
Bay of San-Mun. It was the break-up of China of 
which Lord Charles Beresford had spoken some 
months earlier. 

This quarry was the starting-point of the events 
which have since marked the history of Asia; and 
the situation thus created determined the trend of 
Far Eastern policy during the ensuing eight years. 
Though stripped of her conquests, Japan would, 
perhaps, have resigned herself to see them remain 
Chinese. What decided her to seek revenge was 
the substitution of the Russian for the Japanese 
flag at Port Arthur. With her integrity safeguarded 



216 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

in 1895, China might have gone on in her lethargic 
existence. She was roused and awakened by the 
foreign invasion of her land. The Reform move- 
ment of Kang-yu-Wei, which failed in 1900, was 
followed by that of the xenophobe Boxers. In the 
month of June, 1900, the European Legations in 
Pekin were attacked by the mob, with the inter- 
mittent complicity of the regular soldiers and of 
the Chinese Government. Baron von Ketteler, 
Germany's Minister, was assassinated whilst pro- 
ceeding on horseback to the Tsong-li-Yamen. On 
the 13th of August, an international army, which 
was constituted at Tien-tsin, delivered the Legations, 
the command of it being handed over, a few days 
later, to Field-Marshal Count von Waldersee. Ger- 
many thus continued to play the premier role, or 
at least the most ostentatious one, in Far Eastern 
affairs. Assuming a high tone after the murder of 
his Minister, William II peremptorily insisted on a 
severe chastisement. He proposed his ''military 
protection" to the Emperor of China and refused to 
evacuate Pekin. By an arrangement with England 
(October 16, 1900), he seemed to reserve for his 
own field of action the entire north of China, his 
navigation companies, in the meantime, bidding 
fair to destroy all competition in the South. At the 
same moment, a Russian Army was systematically 
occupying Manchuria. The European monopoliza- 
tion policy therefore still persisted, amidst a medley 
of contradictions due to divergences among the 
Powers ; and it was becoming more and more alarm- 



ASIATIC AND EUROPEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 217 

ing to China, who had to suffer by it, and to England 
and Japan, who, on different grounds, were forced 
to remain spectators of it only. 

For many years, the progress of Russian influence 
in China had caused serious anxiety to the British 
Government, both commercially and politically. 
In 1900, their Consuls wrote: ''The frontier routes 
take every year to Russian markets tea, either in 
blocks or in leaves, the total value of which must 
figure out in tens and hundreds of millions; and 
important cargoes also arrive at Odessa by sea. 
Although statistics are not forthcoming, there are a 
thousand indications which show from day to day 
the extent to which Russia has got hold of Northern 
China's trade. Even in the valley of Yang-tse- 
kiang, a rich colony of Russian merchants and 
commission agents has replaced the English agents 
who formerly made all Russia's purchases at Han- 
Kow, the great tea-market." ^ On the 16th of 
April, 1899, the London Cabinet, being already 
preoccupied by the prospect of war in South Africa, 
signed a treaty with Russia from which good results 
were hoped, for the protection of British interests. 
Russia pledged herself to ask for no railway con- 
cessions in the basin of the Yang-tse-kiang, whether 
for herself or for any of her subjects. England 
made a similar promise with regard to the Chinese 
provinces north of the Great Wall. The two signa- 
taries, moreover, expressed their intention to commit 
no act prejudicial to China's sovereign rights or to 
^ See Victor Berard's book, The Revolt of Asia. 



218 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

existing treaties. These stipulations, however, did 
not suffice to restrain the Russian infiltration. 
England then concluded (October 16, 1900) an 
agreement with Germany, — still with a view to 
''the preservation of her interests and her rights 
under the regime of existing treaties." But when 
an attempt was made by the London Cabinet to 
use this agreement for the purpose of protesting 
against the continued occupation of Manchuria, 
Berlin replied that, whilst the province in question 
belonged to the Chinese Empire, it did not, for all 
this, make part of the real "China," which latter 
country alone was the object of the treaty signed 
in October. Realizing how powerless she was to 
defend her interests in Asia as long as the Trans- 
vaal war occupied her military forces. Great Britain 
sought to get an Ally who might act in her place and 
stead. Japan offered, and she took Japan. 

In silence and reflection, the statesmen of Tokio 
had been meditating many things during the past 
seven years; and, though they never spoke of their 
discomfiture of 1895, this was always in their mind. 
Throughout the crisis of 1900, forgetting their just 
grievances, they had loyally taken sides with Europe, 
had defended the cause of civilization, and had ren- 
dered eminent service to the international army, yet 
without losing the authority which they had acquired 
over the Chinese not only by their victories, but by 
the European spoliations that had followed them. 
At times, the presence of Russian armies in Man- 
churia caused them grave uneasiness. The occupa- 



ASIATIC AND EUROPEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 219 

tion had lasted from 1900; and might any day be 
extended to Corea — the Corea so necessary to 
Japan economically, on account of the rice it pro- 
duced, so necessary strategically by reason of the 
Continental base which it afforded her and which 
she as an island needed. On the other hand, Japan 
wanted money in order to go on with her trans- 
formation and complete her equipment; and none 
could be found except in Europe. She aspired, 
above all, in her legitimate pride, to be admitted 
as an equal into the company of the Nations, to 
see her efforts, magnificent in their intensity and 
discipline, openly acknowledged by the world. 
True, there were various ways of realizing such a 
design. And it does not seem that Marquis Ito, 
the Japanese Envoy, when he left for Europe in 
October, 1901, was altogether decided as to the par- 
ticular solution he should adopt. He began his calls 
with Paris, staying a week in the French capital,- 
when Mr. Dele ass e would have been able, had he 
chosen, to conclude with him a piece of business 
advantageous to ourselves. He next went to Saint 
Petersburg, where they were no more clear-sighted 
than our statesmen had been here. Count Mourav- 
ieff, one of the most mediocre Ministers who have 
ever directed Russian policy, did not understand 
that despatch was necessary and that Japan would 
not wait. He allowed Marquis Ito to go away. 
In January, the latter arrived in London; and, on 
the 30th of the same month, the Alliance was signed 
and immediately published. 



220 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

''Moved by the sole desire of preserving the 
statu quo and general peace in the Far East, being 
especially interested in guaranteeing the indepen- 
dence of China and Corea/' the two Governments 
settled, for a period of five years, the following 
agreement : — 

Article 2. — If Great Britain or Japan, for the defence of 
their respective interests before mentioned, should be engaged 
in a war with another Power, the second contracting party shall 
maintain strict neutrality and do her utmost to prevent other 
Powers from entering upon hostilities against her Ally. 

Article 3. — If, in the case just mentioned, any other Power 
or Powers should enter upon hostilities against the said Ally, 
the other contracting party shall come to her aid and make war 
in common with her and conclude peace, with common accord. 

This Treaty, the sudden conclusion of which 
astounded every one, had immediate consequences 
both in Europe and Asia. In Asia, Japan secured 
for her policy, not a military support, — since the 
casus foederis was only to be brought into action in 
the contingency of a war with two Powers ; and such 
a contingency was hardly probable — but a moral 
authority which was bound to encourage her in 
assuming an energetic attitude. On her side, Eng- 
land secured, for the aggregate of her possessions 
and the defence of her interests, the help of a Power 
installed in the very heart of the disputed country, 
and well equipped and armed. To the policy prac- 
tised by Germany in 1897 and pursued also by 
Russia with increased vigour after 1900, the Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance gave a check, the efficacy of which 
was soon to make itself felt. In Europe, Russia 



ASIATIC AND EUROPEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 221 

received a set-back. And by the Franco-Russian 
declaration of the 19th of March, asserting the unity 
of views — a purely theoretic one — between Saint 
Petersburg and Paris as to questions in the Far 
East, France, without profit for Russia, took her 
part in this set-back.^ From this moment, Russian 
policy, and the Franco-Russian Alliance in conse- 
quence, showed a growing tendency to drift farther 
East. Germany began to find fresh prospects of 
security and European preponderance, which the 
next three years were destined to develop to her 
advantage. 

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance came into force on 
the 6th of February, 1902. On the 12th of April 
ensuing, Russia signed a treaty with China, fixing 
as successive dates for the evacuation of Manchuria 
the 8th of October, 1902, and the 8th of April and 
8th of October, 1903. When the time came for the 
second zone to be restored to China, Russia contrived 
to maintain her troops in it, on the ground that the 
region was in a disturbed condition, this being, in- 
deed, a fact. Three months later (August 13, 
1903) the creation of a Russian Vice-Royalty in the 
Far East, and Admiral Alexeieff's appointment 
to it, seemed to indicate that a policy of expansion 
was being planned. The intrigues of Russian busi- 
ness men in Corea rendered Japan more and more 
uneasy. During this same summer of 1903, Mr. 
Kurino, the Japanese Minister at Saint Petersburg, 
informed Count Lamsdorff of his desire to enter 

^ See Chapter I. 



222 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

into negotiations with reference to questions in the 
Far East. Russia comphed, but appeared in no 
hurry to discuss. On the 3d of October, it became 
only too evident that the Russian and Japanese 
proposals were not in harmony. The crux of the 
dispute lay in Russia's refusal to come to any terms 
with Japan on the subject of the Chinese province 
of Manchuria. Three months passed by; and, on 
the 13th of January, 1904, this difficulty with regard 
to Manchuria still blocked the way. As a matter 
of fact, Japan required Russia to promise that she 
would '' respect the integrity of China in Manchuria." 
Russia kept putting off her reply, and Japan lost 
patience. On the 5th of February, she broke off 
diplomatic relations; and on the 8th, her torpedo 
vessels attacked the Russian iron-clads, — Cesarevitch, 
Retvisan, and Pallada, — which were lying outside 
Port Arthur. 

The war which thus commenced is too well known 
to require that an account of it in detail be given 
here. On the 1st of May, the Japanese crossed the 
Yalu. On the 30th, they invested Port Arthur. 
On the 15th of June, General Stackelberg, who had 
been sent to relieve it, was defeated at Vafangu. 
On the 8th of August, the outer positions of Port 
Arthur all fell into the hands of the Japanese. On 
the 2d and 3d of September, Kuropatkin was de- 
feated at Leao-Yang. On the 1st of January, Port 
Arthur capitulated. Between the 23d of February 
and the 10th of March, the Russian Army was again 
beaten at Mukden. On the 27th of May, Rodjest- 



ASIATIC AND EUROPEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 223 

vensky's fleet was annihilated at Tsusima. On the 
8th of June, President Roosevelt induced the belliger- 
ents to negotiate. On the 5th of August, the Russian 
and Japanese plenipotentiaries met at Oyster Bay. 
And, on the 29th, peace was signed at Portsmouth. 

In a previous chapter was shown the immediate 
effect exercised by the Russian defeats not only on 
Europe at large, but more especially on France. 
Germany, being desirous of strengthening the he- 
gemony that she feared to lose, profited by these 
defeats to act with greater freedom. A month 
after the fall of Port Arthur, Mr. von Kuhlmann 
gave us a hint of his approaching inimical behaviour. 
Three weeks after Mukden, William II manifested 
a clearer hostility at Tangier. A fortnight after 
Tsusima, Mr. Delcasse's resignation was imposed 
upon us by a campaign of intimidation. Only after 
the opening of the peace negotiations did Germany 
make the concessions which rendered the signing ot 
the July and September agreements possible. With- 
out exaggerating the rigour of this synchronism, it 
may be said that each defeat of Russia was followed 
by a set-back for France, and that the detestable 
policy entered upon in 1897, at Germany's instiga- 
tion and from her example, had profited no one but 
this latter Power. In what position did the con- 
clusion of peace leave us? What reasons did we 
find in it for uneasiness or for security? 

If we had learned to our cost what an unsuccessful 
war waged in Asia by Russia meant, we were by no 
means sure, on the morrow of the Treaty of Ports- 



224 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

mouth, not to see the peril reappear within a brief 
delay. Both belligerents had been exhausted by 
the war; and both — the vanquishers perhaps even 
more than the vanquished — felt the urgent neces- 
sity of laying down their arms. But neither side 
was content with the terms of peace ; the Russians 
first, which is easy to understand. On the 10th 
of June, General Linevitch, who had become 
the Commander-in-Chief; Generals Kuropatkin and 
Kaulbars, Chiefs of Army Corps ; Sakharoff, Chief of 
the Staff ; Rennenkampf , Zarubaieff, Bilderling, Lvof , 
Samsonoff, Daniloff, and Korff had ''energetically 
and unanimously petitioned the Czar to continue 
the war." In the heart of many Russians the regret 
remained that this prayer had not been heard. 
Corea was handed over to Japan; Port Arthur was 
lost ; the railway had been given up ; half of 
Saghalien had been ceded ; a number of grants had 
been made, notably in the way of fishing rights; 
the Asiatic dream was deprived of its crown; and 
all this was painful to Russian pride. The Japanese 
'were more irritated still. Intoxicated by their 
victories, they were indignant at a peace which they 
deemed to be shameful. When, on the 7th of Sep- 
tember, the signing of the Treaty was known by 
telegrams which the authorities had been keeping 
back for two days, there was a formidable riot. 
The Ministerial offices were attacked, and one of 
them was set fire to. On the 9th, the Progressists 
held a meeting at which all the members were 
present; and a vote of censure on the Government 



ASIATIC AND EUROPEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 225 

was passed. How long would a peace last which 
was received thus on either side? 

In addition to the indirect peril threatening France 
from this situation, there was the more direct risk 
she ran of having compromised her relations with 
Japan through her friendly attitude towards Russia. \ 
During the war, on several occasions, the Japanese 
Government had reproached the French Govern- 
ment with failing to preserve neutrality out of 
courtesy towards Admiral Rodjestvensky. In the 
month of May, 1905, these reproaches assumed a 
character of sharp remonstrance. Basing herself 
on what had occurred at Cherbourg, Dakar, Algiers, 
Djibouti, Majunga, Nossi-Be, and in the bays of 
Kam-ranh and Port-Dayot, Japan, through the voice 
of Mr. Motono, her Minister in Paris, stated : — 

" 1°. That, without incriminating the French Gov- 
ernment's good faith, she was of opinion that the 
latter's orders had been insufficiently executed. 

'' 2°. That, since her observations had been acted 
upon, after the things complained of had occurred, 
it was regrettable no better surveillance had been* 
carried out before. 

" 3°. That, while not ignorant of the complexity of 
maritime neutrality questions and of the reasons 
France had for adhering to her own special regula- 
tions, she — Japan — considered that the aid given 
to the Russian fleet, through no proper surveillance 
being exercised, had greatly facilitated the accom- 
plishment of its mission and had enabled it to 
reach the China seas." 



226 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

Mr. Motono concluded : — 

"What Japan defends against France is her very 
existence. 

" What she invokes is the spirit of the duty of 
neutrahty against the quibbles of the letter. 

" What she affirms is that, on many distinct 
and successive occasions Rodjestvensky has utilized 
French waters, during his voyage on a war-expedi- 
tion, either for staying to re victual his ships or else 
for the purpose of awaiting in safety the arrival of 
his reenforcements." 

The French Government replied that in law they 
were completely covered by their neutrality regula- 
tions, drawn up, not on the occasion of the Russo- 
Japanese war, but at the beginning of that between 
Spain and the United States ; that they had taken, 
in spite of the letter of these regulations, all the meas- 
ures in their power to secure complete impartiality ; 
that, except at Algiers, and there only in very small 
quantities, there had never been any direct pur- 
chase of coal in French ports; that purchases made 
even from French private persons, through the me- 
dium of trading vessels accompanying the squadron, 
had been insignificant; that all the stock of coal 
used by these vessels had been bought in England 
and Germany, without Japan's having made any 
protest on the matter ; that it was impossible to ex- 
ercise permanent surveillance along the whole of 
the Indo-Chinese coasts ; that, moreover, the Japan- 
ese had done in the Dutch Indies and the Philip- 
pines the same things that they reproached the 



ASIATIC AND EUROPEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 227 

Russians with doing in French waters. This dis- 
cussion between the two Governments had no defi- 
nite conclusion ; but it left traces. A report, which 
was false, was published by some newspapers to the 
effect that the Japanese military Staff had elabo- 
rated a plan of invasion against Indo-China; and 
this produced a certain amount of sore feeling in 
France. Consequently, just after the end of the 
war, Franco-Japanese relations were less cordial ' 
than they had been before it. 

Finally, if the Anglo-Japanese Alliance can be 
considered as one of the causes of the war of 1904, ■ 
this cause subsisted more than ever on the morrow 
of the conclusion of peace. For the Alliance was 
renewed in London on the 12th of August, 1905,( 
while negotiations were in progress and before they 
had finished. The common principles to which the 
two Governments subscribed were : — 

1°. The consolidation and preservation of general 
peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and India. 

2°. The upholding of the common interests of all 
the Powers in China, while assuring the indepen- 
dence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the 
principle of equality for the commerce and industry 
of all nations, in China. 

3°. The maintenance of the territorial rights of 
the high contracting parties in the regions of East- 
ern Asia and India. 

Japan's political preponderance in Corea was rec- 
ognized by England. On the other hand, Japan 
recognized that Great Britain, by virtue of ''her es- 



228 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

pecial interests along all the Indian frontier, had the 
right to take, in the neighbourhood of this frontier, 
such measures as she judged necessary for the pro- 
tection of her possessions in India." The clause 
respecting military cooperation remained the same 
as in the first treaty, except that Article 7, relative 
to 'Hhe means by which help should be rendered 
available," allowed it to be understood that such 
military cooperation might be given in Europe as 
well as in Asia. The Alliance was concluded this 
time for ten years, and was consequently extended 
and strengthened. The article referring to the Ind- 
ian frontiers and their '' neighbourhood" lent itself 
to all sorts of interpretations, even to that of a plan 
of military action against Russia in Central Asia. 
The Alliance was generalized in its object and made 
more precise in its means. 

For France, it brought out the disquieting possi- 
bility of a conflict no longer between Russia and , 
Japan, but between Russia and England. The 
rivalry of the '^elephant" and the ''whale" was em- 
phasized by the very precautions taken in London 
to protect English possessions in Asia. In the course 
of the war, the Dogger Bank incident had shown how 
great the tension of minds was both in England and | 
Russia. The Saint Petersburg papers openly ac- ■ 
cused Great Britain not only of having excited Japan 
and let loose the war, but of fostering Russian revo- 
lution with her gold. The English had not concealed 
their sympathies for Japan, and had even given 
them a distinctly aggressive form against the ''heredi- 



ASIATIC AND EUROPEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 229 

tary enemy," saying as the Glohe did : ''We shall not 
deviate from this line of conduct through fear of giv- 
ing umbrage to Russia's friends on the Continent or 
through complaisance to the sentiments of Continen- 
tal Powers." It was Lord Curzon's earlier policy 
which had riiost efficaciously contributed to prepare 
the way for the first Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The 
second one had the same character, in spite of the 
letter in which, on the 6th of September, Lord Lans- 
downe had announced it to Sir Charles Hardinge, the 
British Ambassador at Saint Petersburg. Notwith- 
standing the euphemisms in which the English guar- 
antee was expressed when publicly spoken of, its 
consolidation of the Japanese victories caused the 
Russians an anxiety which was quite legitimate. The 
situation of France between Russia, her ally since 
1891, and England, her friend since 1904, was about' 
as difficult a one as could be conceived. The con- 
ciliation of our Alliance and our friendship might 
become impossible. And our entire policy risked 
being paralyzed in the attempt. 

Whilst, through the conflict of alliances, which, 
in the month of September, 1905, was developing in 
Paris and Berlin, Germany derived an immediate ad- 
vantage from her intervention, as proved by Mr. 
Delcasse's resignation and the forthcoming meeting 
of the Algeciras Conference, she was, therefore, bene- 
fited indirectly, but very appreciably also, by the 
events that had occurred in the Far East, although 
taking no part in them. The result for France was 
a false, precarious situation, perhaps even a danger- 



230 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

ous one. Between an enfeebled Alliance and a tri- 
umphant friendship, our country must expect any- 
thing. In the past ten years, the intrusion of Asiatic 
affairs into European policy had always been 
prejudicial to us; and when the crisis closed, Asia 
weighed upon us more than ever, burdening our fu- 
ture with heavy uncertainty, all to Germany's profit. 

II 

It is to the honour of France that she succeeded 
in less than two years in warding off the three dan- 
gers threatening her — a conflict between Russia and 
Japan, a conflict between France and Japan, and a 
conflict between England and Russia — by means 
of three reconciliations, Russo-Japanese, Franco- 
Japanese, and Anglo-Russian. 

The Russo-Japanese was the first one that needed 
securing; and, consequently, it was the first one 
essayed. Not to speak of the resentments already 
alluded to, the Treaty of Portsmouth had left mate- 
rial incertitudes subsisting. Arrangements it had 
provided for were still to be negotiated ; and certain 
things remained to be defined more clearly, while 
there were also measures to be taken for the Treaty's 
execution. Between the month of December, 1905, 
and the end of 1906, the report was spread several 
times that these supplementary negotiations, which 
had commenced immediately after the signing of 
the Treaty, were making no progress. On the 1st 
of January, 1907, Mr. Motono, the Japanese Am- 



ASIATIC AND EUROPEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 231 

bassador at Saint Petersburg, protested publicly 
against such rumours, in which the wish was father 
to the thought, being circulated both by Japanese 
and Russian newspapers. Thanks to the concilia- 
tory spirit shown by the Ambassador, as also by Mr. 
Isvolsky, the year 1907 witnessed the conclusion of 
the necessary agreements. On the 13th of June, the 
Convention relative to the exploitation of the East 
China and South Manchurian railways was signed at 
Saint Petersburg; and also the protocol relative to 
the station in common at Kwang-Chung-tse. 

On the 28th of July, 1907, an arrangement was 
made respecting the Fisheries question, which 
granted to Japanese subjects the right to fish, 
gather, and treat sea produce, seals and walruses 
excepted, in the seas of Japan, Okhotsk, and Behr- 
ing, excluding only rivers and bays. Portions of 
land were to' be offered on public lease to Japanese 
and Russian subjects, without distinction, for the 
preparation, etc., on shore of the fish that was caught. 
On the same day, a Treaty of Commerce and Navi- 
gation reciprocally recognized, on behalf of the sub- 
jects of both countries, rights and privileges which 
did not normally accrue from the most-favoured- 
nation clause. Finally, on the 30th of July, Mr. 
Isvolsky and Mr. Motono signed an agreement of 
more general scope. ''Being desirous," it was said, 
''of fortifying the pacific, amicable, and neighbourly 
relations which have been happily reestablished be- 
tween Russia and Japan and to do away with the 
possibility of future misunderstanding between the 



232 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

two Empires," the contracting parties made the 
following stipulations : — 

Article 1. — Each of the high contracting parties promises 
to respect the present territorial integrity of the other, as also 
all the rights accruing to either the one or the other of the high 
contracting parties from the treaties in force, agreements or con- 
ventions in application at present between the high contracting 
parties and China, the texts of which have been exchanged be- 
tween the contracting Powers, this in the measure in which such 
rights are not incompatible with the principle of equal treat- 
ment enunciated in the Treaty signed at Portsmouth, on the 5th 
of September, 1905, and in the special conventions concluded 
between Russia and Japan. 

Article 2. — The two high contracting parties recognize the 
independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China, 
as also the principle of equal treatment with regard to trade 
and industry for all the nations of the said Empire. They like- 
wise pledge themselves to uphold the statu quo and the respect 
of this principle by all the pacific means at their disposal. 

With praiseworthy clear-sightedness, Mr. Isvolsky 
thus drew the inevitable consequences from a war 
which had, indeed, cost Russia neither a kopeck of 
indemnity nor an inch of her territory, and from 
which, therefore, resulted no imperious duty of re- 
venge. The Asiatic policy, as it had been practised 
at Saint Petersburg since 1896, embraced more of a 
chimera than a reality. It is not in the seas of China 
that Russia has to seek for the free port promised 
her by Peter the Great ; not at four thousand kilo- 
metres from her Capital that a great Continental 
Power must place the centre of her action. The 
agreements of 1907, which recorded accomplished 
facts and substituted friendship for distrust, were 
consequently inspired by just views. Having played 



ASIATIC AND EUROPEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 233 

a discreet and friendly r61e in the conclusion of these 
agreements, France saw the Russian Alliance re- 
placed by them, on its proper basis, that is to say, in 
Europe. The more immediate peril existing for her 
in the Far East was removed by the sincere recon- 
ciliation of those who so lately had been adversaries. 
And the field was thus opened for the pursuit of 
other guarantees. 

If intellectual and moral ties have any value in 
the formation of international combinations, they 
should contribute something to the rapprochement 
of France and Japan. As was well said by the Jap- 
anese newspaper, the Kokumin, in the autumn of 
1906, France, among the nations of Europe, was one 
of the most eager to encourage the Mikado and his 
people in the evolution which has made Japan a 
great Power. It was to France that the Japanese 
officers came who were sent to acquire instruction in 
military organization. And it was a Frenchman, 
Mr. Bertin, who created the Japanese fleet. The 
Japanese Code was modelled on that of Napoleon. 
Even during the course of the war, and in spite of 
the incidents mentioned above, a Japanese states- 
man of mark, Baron Suyematsu, son-in-law of the 
Marquis Ito, said to me : — 

^'No one in Japan is surprised at your sympathies 
for your allies. But we do not forget either — and 
we hope that France does not forget — the ancient, 
cordial relations uniting us to you, the services you 
have rendered us, the friendships you have formed 
among us. However ferocious a war may be, it is 



234 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

only an incident in the history of the world. This 
one has created between France and Japan a situa- 
tion which is false and somewhat embarrassing. But 
let us recollect two things — first, that France has 
never been wronged by Japan, and secondly, that 
Japan has never been wronged by France; and let 
us in confidence wait for better days." 

These days arrived. On the 5th of May, 1907, the 
Havas Agency announced that a Franco-Japanese j 
understanding was about to be signed. The next 
day, Mr. Pichon said: — 

''The object of our negotiations with Japan, which 
indeed are not yet terminated, is the signing of a con- 
vention which is calculated to add fresh guarantees 
to those existing for the preservation of peace in the 
Far East. They are the logical continuation of the 
absolutely peaceful policy of France, a policy whose 
only aim is to prevent all complications in whatso- 
ever parts of the world, and more especially in those 
where we have particular interests." 

On the 7th of May, Baron Kurino, Japan's Am- 
bassador, characterized the approaching agreement 
as follows : — 

"Our wish has been to achieve a work of good 
sense and peace. The interests of France and Japan 
are not at all contradictory. And the agreement will 
set seal to their harmony. This arrangement com- 
prises, on the one hand, a guarantee for the inde- 
pendence and integrity of China, and, on the other, 
a security for the possessions of the two contracting 
Powers. It gives sanction to the territorial status 



ASIATIC AND EUROPEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 235 

accruing to Japan from the last war, and to France, 
from her situation in Indo-China. It constitutes a 
decisive proof of the moderation of our pohcy. The 
legend of the Yellow Peril and Japanese ambitions 
will, I hope, be definitely dissipated by the event 
now preparing. The old relations of friendship 
uniting Japan and France increase the value of this 
loyal arrangement, which the two countries have 
decided to conclude, by promising each other mutual 
support on the basis I have indicated to you." 

The agreement was signed on the 10th of June 
following. It was conceived as hereafter: — 

Declaration 

The two Governments of Japan and France, while reserving 
to themselves the liberty to enter into •pourparlers with a view 
to the conclusion of a commercial convention in regard to rela- 
tions between Japan and French Indo-China, agree on the ensu- 
ing stipulations : — 

The most-favoured-nation treatment shall be accorded to 
Japan's subjects and functionaries throughout French Indo- 
China in all that concerns their persons and the protection of 
their property; and this same treatment shall be applied to 
the subjects and proteges of French Indo-China throughout the 
Empire of Japan, and this, until the expiration of the Treaty 
of Commerce and Navigation signed between Japan and France 
on the 4th of August, 1896. 

Arrangement 

The Government of the French Republic and the Govern- 
ment of his Majesty, the Emperor of Japan, being animated by 
the desire to fortify the amicable relations existing between 
them and to remove for the future all cause of misunderstand- 
ing, have decided to conclude the following arrangement : — 

The Governments of France and Japan, while agreeing to 



236 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

respect the independence and integrity of China, as well as the 
principle of equal treatment in this country for the commerce 
and things touching the jurisdiction of all nations, and while 
having a special interest in securing order and a state of tran- 
quillity, notably throughout the frontier regions of the Chinese 
Empire that are contiguous to territories over which they have 
rights of sovereignty, promise to support each other mutually in 
assuring peace and safety in these regions, with a view to pre- 
serving the respective situation and territorial rights of the two 
contracting parties on the Asiatic continent. 

One has only to remember the anxiety experi- 
enced by France during the Russo-Japanese war, to 
appreciate rightly the diplomatic guarantee thus ob- 
tained from Japan for the integrity of her posses- 
sions. True, this guarantee depends only on the 
word of the Tokio Cabinet ; and, whenever it might 
please Japan to attack Cochin-China, Annam, or 
Tonkin, it would be difficult for us, at so great a dis- 
tance, to defend them. But to doubt of Japan's 
sincerity would be an insult. Her foreign policy 
has always been vigorous, and at times brutal. It 
has never been disloyal. It has kept the engage- 
ments to which it has given its seal. It has consist- 
ently announced in advance any decisions it intended 
to take. Moreover, everything dictates to Japan the 
advisability of maintaining amicable relations with 
France. The war having terminated without Rus- 
sia's paying an indemnity, the financial situation of 
the Mikado's Empire has been rendered somewhat 
difficult. Japan's debt, which, in 1903, was 559 
million yens, amounted, on the conclusion of peace 
at Portsmouth, to 1859 millions, this being an in- 



ASIATIC AND EUROPEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 237 

crease of 1300 millions. France, therefore, being 
an inexhaustible reservoir of capital, can be to Japan 
the most useful of friends. Two loans of twenty- 
three millions sterling have already been subscribed' 
by the French market. Provided the Japanese Gov- 
ernment grants equitable advantages to our industry 
in return, these operations are likely to be renewed. 
The agreement, taken in itself, is, consequently, a 
profitable one for both contracting parties. And it 
becomes more valuable still, when taken in conjunc- 
tion with the Anglo- Japanese Alliance, the Franco- 
English friendship, and the Russo-Japanese con- 
ventions. It makes, in fact, an integral part of a 
system of arrangements, the advantage of which for 
France is twofold. In Asia, it eliminates all imme- 
diate risk of war, since three out of the four Powers j 
that have the greatest interests there have come to 
an understanding for the maintenance of the statu 
quo. In Europe, it removes risks of complications 
arising from an Asiatic conflict. In order that such 
a conflict, already rendered improbable, might be- 
come impossible, there remained one necessary con- 
dition to be fulfilled, and the one was sufficient: to 
wit, the reconciliation of London and Saint Peters- 
burg. Within less than three months after the 
signing of the Franco-Japanese agreement, this last 
condition was realized in its turn. 

A few years ago, between August, 1900, and De- 
cember, 1901, an English statesman published in the 
Fortnightly Review, under the pseudonym Calchas, a 
series of articles on British policy. In opposition to 



238 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

current opinion, Calchas maintained that Great Brit- 
ain might and should come to an understanding with 
Russia. ''Why not a treaty with Russia V he asked 
in October, 1900. And he drew the conclusion that, 
whether on the Bosphorus, or in the Balkans, or in 
Asia Minor, or in the Far East, there was room for 
the two countries, room also for an agreement be- 
tween them. This press campaign, which attracted 
great attention at the time, may be considered as the 
origin of the oft-thwarted movement which, after 
seven years' waiting, resulted, in 1907, in the con- 
clusion of the Anglo-Russian convention. In order 
to get so far, many prejudices had to be overcome. 
Since the mutiny of the Sepoys and its thorough re- 
pression, the Russian invasion had appeared to Eng- > 
land to be the only peril with which India was 
threatened ; and the history of Mediterranean Asia 
or Oriental Asia had, during half a century, been 
nothing but the record of Anglo-Russian disputes.^ 
After the Crimean war, there was the struggle against 
Schamyl, the Caucasian Iman ; that against Yacoub, 
the Sultan of Cashgar; then, there were Tcherna- 
ieff's, Romanowsky's, and Kaufmann's campaigns, 
the Turkestan campaign in 1870, that of Khiva in 
1873, of Khokand in 1876, of Merv a few years later, 
and finally the Afghan war. Behind each of these 
native resistances, Russia thought she saw England. 
In 1885, just after the successes of General Komar- 
off, war appeared to be inevitable between the two 
Powers. However, it was avoided by the agree- 

1 See Rouire's book, Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Asia. 



ASIATIC AND EUROPEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 239 

merits of 1885, 1887, 1895, and 1899. Russian ex- 
pansion had slackened, and had to some extent 
turned aside. Still, it had not stopped. And soon, 
indeed, it was seen advancing over the plateaus of 
Mongolia and along the plains of Manchuria, filtering 
through into China and as far as Thibet, troubling 
once more the Hindu frontier, the defence of which 
dominates England's Asiatic policy, and adding the 
peril of the North to that of the Northwest. It was 
the time of the Transvaal war. On the 30th of Jan- 
uary, 1902, the Anglo- Japanese Alliance was signed. 
The policy advocated in the Fortnightly Review 
seemed more than ever impossible. Anglo-Russian 
antagonism was at this moment aggravated by the 
rivalry raging between Russia and Japan ; and a col- 
lision seemed to be imminent. 

The very greatness of the peril acted as a brake. 
In spite of the occurrence of certain awkward inci- 
dents, — the Dogger Bank cannonade, for instance, 
— Great Britain and Russia remained at peace. 
For one thing, there was to be considered the impor-'^ 
tance of Anglo-Russian trade, which had grown' 
continually since 1882. The English had increased 
their sales in the Empire of the Czars from eight to 
fourteen millions sterling, and their purchases from 
fifteen to twenty-five millions. Their consuls pointed 
out that Russia was an admirable field opened to 
their commercial progress, which everywhere else 
was hampered by Germany. Moreover, although 
Japan's Ally, England had no intention of handing 
the Far East over to her, Russia might be a useful 



240 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

counterweight against a friend that was too strong, 
while also offering an outlet for English industry. 
Last of all, the settlement of the Franco-English 
quarrel, on the 8th of April, 1904, gave a pertinent 
example to those partisans of a reconciliation who, 
though deeming it desirable, did not think it possible. 
In 1905, the Russian press, when examining into the 
causes of the Manchurian defeat, opined in favour 
of an agreement. The Novoie Vremia, in the Sep- 
tember of this year, manifested a conciliatory atti- 
tude, which the Times at once took occasion to 
praise. In 1906, during the long weeks spent at 
Algeciras, the Russian Plenipotentiary, Count Cassini, 
had frequent chats with his English colleague. Sir 
Arthur Nicholson, and with Sir Donald Mackenzie 
Wallace, the king's personal friend, who subse- 
quently paid a visit to Saint Petersburg. On being 
called to the Foreign Office in the May of the same 
year, Mr. Isvolsky, whose diplomatic skill was incon- 
testable, showed his firm determination to place 
questions concerning the Far East in their proper 
relation to other Russian interests, without allowing 
them to encroach unduly, and his equally firm desire 
to establish a better understanding between Russia 
and England, on the basis of an equitable agreement. 
This desire was reciprocated by King Edward and 
his Government. 

On the 23d of October, 1905, two months after 
the peace of Portsmouth, the Times correspondent 
at Saint Petersburg telegraphed to his paper : — 



ASIATIC AND EUROPEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 241 

Saint Petersburg, October 23d. ... I have reason to be- 
lieve that the audience just granted by the Czar to Sir Charles 
Hardinge referred to the understanding which is being prepared 
between England and Russia. The arrangements to be made, 
in view of pourparlers concerning this question, require Sir 
Charles Hardinge's presence in London. I learn, on the other 
hand, that the Count Benckendorff, Russia's Ambassador in 
London, will proceed to Saint Petersburg for a similar purpose. 
The negotiations being intrusted to two Ambassadors who have 
already proved their ardent desire to see an improvement in the 
two countries' respective relations, the result of these negotia- 
tions can hardly be doubtful. 

Faint denials greeted this information, which was 
perhaps premature. On the 22d of May, the Temps 
correspondent at Berhn telegraphed that every one 
in Germany was expecting the speedy conclusion of 
an Anglo-Russian agreement. Questioned on the 
24th, in the House of Commons, Sir Edward Grey 
said : — 

I cannot make any statements as to the alleged agreement 
which has been published in the press, since this agreement does 
not exist. But I may add that there is an increasing tendency 
on the part of England and Russia to give an amicable consid- 
eration to questions which concern them both, whenever such 
questions arise. 

This tendency has lately led the two Governments to coop- 
erate on more than one occasion. 

It is a tendency which we shall be happy to encourage, it is a 
tendency which, if continued, will naturally bring about the 
progressive settlement of questions interesting each of the two 
countries, and the strengthening of the friendly relations exist- 
ing between them. 

In the month of July, the intended visit of an 
English squadron to Cronstadt was put off on account 
of the domestic difficulties with which Russia had 



242 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

to cope at the time. However, in March, 1790, the 
Russian sailors had a cordial reception in England. 
And, on this occasion, a semi-official note, communi- 
cated to the papers, said : — 

The information published on the Continent, according to 
which the negotiations relative to an understanding between 
England and Russia have been broken off, is absolutely incor- 
rect. On the contrary, these negotiations are being carried on 
still between the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the 
British Ambassador at Saint Petersburg. It is expected that 
the agreement will be signed in that Capital at no distant date, 
unless something unexpected happens. However, as questions 
relative to Afghanistan and Thibet are comprised in the negotia- 
tions, it is possible that some delay may occur before the agree- 
ment is concluded. In fact, certain of these questions have to 
be submitted to the Emperor of China and the Ameer of Afghan- 
istan. 

As to the relations between the two countries, it may be 
categorically announced that, even before the signing of any 
agreement a real and definite understanding exists which has 
permitted the two countries to act in complete harmony, as 
regards Persia ; and, but for this understanding it is hardly 
doubtful that recent events in Teheran would have led to grave 
complications. 

It is necessary to insist on this point that the Anglo-Russian 
agreement is by no means a menace to any other Power. It 
does not threaten the integrity of Persia, and interferes with no 
interests invested in this country. 

The existence of negotiations was therefore pub- 
licly recognized. On the 15th of June, 1907, the 
English Government showed their determination 
'^not to admit any mixing up of Russia's domestic 
concerns with discussions referring to the respective 
frontiers of the two countries and aiming at the 
prevention of difficulties that might otherwise 



ASIATIC AND EUROPEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 243 

arise." On the 31st of August, the agreement was 
signed at Saint Petersburg. This agreement dealt 
with Persia, Afghanistan, Thibet, and, under the 
form of some correspondence annexed, with the , 
Persian Gulf. In Persia, it fixed three zones of 
influence, a Russian one to the north, an English 
one to the southeast, and a third one, mixed in its 
character, between the two others; the eventual 
measures of financial control being left to future 
settlement by common arrangement. In Afghanis- 
tan, under reserve of the maintenance of the political 
statu quo and commercial liberty, Russia recognized 
the preponderant influence of Great Britain, and 
renounced the right to send diplomatic agents to 
Cabool. In Thibet, the suzerainty of China was 
recognized, as well as its territorial integrity. Rus- 
sians and English pledged themselves to abstain 
from all interference in the domestic administration 
of the country, and to seek no concession there. 
The letter relative to the Persian Gulf stated the 
agreement of the two Powers to the maintenance of 
the statu quo. 

Of interest to England as being one of the routes 
to India, Persia is of interest also to Russia, as being \ 
one of the ways capable of conducting her to the 
free sea. But on this ground, the nineteenth century 
was far from being equally favourable to English 
and to Russians. And, more especially in its last 
quarter, Russian preponderance extended itself 
over the greater part. In less than ten years, \ 
between 1890 and 1900, Russian importations into 1 



244 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

Persia doubled, increasing from ten millions of 
roubles to twenty-one millions. And exportations 
showed a similar progress. In 1904, the English 
Consuls at Bagdad, Kermanshah, and Teheran, as 
well as throughout the towns of the Iran, were; 
unanimous in acknowledging the success of Russian 
commerce, to the detriment of British. It was not, 
however, so much by commerce as by banking that 
Russia conquered and held Persia during the last 
years of the nineteenth century. The Russian Loan 
Bank, which had existed for long years at Teheran, 
acquired much more importance at the accession 
of Mouzaffer ed Dine, father of the Shah now reign- 
ing. With the support of the Saint Petersburg 
State Bank, of which it was a branch, it granted a 
loan of twenty-two millions of roubles without 
special guarantee, and on the sole condition that all 
the other creditors of Persia should be reimbursed. 
Thus it became the unique -creditor, with all the 
de facto, if not de jure, advantages attaching to this 
situation. Since the arrival of Lord Curzon in 
India, Great Britain had tried to react, not at 
Teheran itself, where the English bank, which was 
the '^Persian Imperial Bank," had made so many 
mistakes that its influence was lost, but towards the 
South and East, by Koweit and the Seistan. In the 
Viceroy of India's eyes, it was a course necessary to 
that defence of the Empire which, about the same 
time, induced him to send Colonel Younghusband 
to Thibet. The understanding established between 
those who were considered, at this moment, as 



ASIATIC AND EUROPEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 245 

probable or possible adversaries marked a great 
change, therefore. The two Governments had been 
inspired by a spirit of prudence, moderation, and 
restraint. And it was the same spirit which had 
already guided their financial arrangement of Octo-; 
ber, 1906, by which they pledged themselves to lendj 
Persia, on joint and equal account, the sum of 
£4,000,000 sterling. It may be further remarked 
that the convention provided for ulterior arrange- 
ments, particularly with regard to the eventual 
control to be established over the Persian revenues. 
The contracting Powers made a point of not onlyj 
liquidating the past but preparing the future. 

In Afghanistan, Great Britain's success was 
complete. England's relations with Afghanistan 
had been difficult for a long time past. But the 
Russians were not responsible for these difficulties, 
which they had profited by, even while they had 
not provoked them. Lord Roberts used to say, 
''The less the Afghans see of us, the less they will 
detest us." And, as a matter of fact, each forward 
movement of England, during a whole century, 
aroused Afghan resistance, generally followed by a 
Russo-Afghan rapprochement. The Burnes mission 
•of 1838 led to the Alliance between Russia and the 
Ameer and the massacre of the British garrisons in 
1841. In 1875, things turned out pretty much in 
the same way; attempts on the English side to 
resume negotiations resulting in the massacre of 
the Cavagnari mission, Afghanistan's policy, 
therefore, with regard to England seemed to be a 



246 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

policy of reaction. Lord Curzon's somewhat rest- 
less activity had increased rather than dissipated 
the distrust at Cabool. On the contrary, since 
1905, a real alteration for the better had occurred. 
In the course of his mission to Afghanistan, Mr. 
Louis Dane obtained from the Ameer a confirmation 
of previous pledges, and notably of the Treaty of 
1893. Already, in 1904, the Ameer's son had paid a 
visit to Calcutta, where he was received with the 
most flattering attentions. During the winter of 
1906-1907, the Ameer, Habib Hulla, in his turn, was 
entertained by Lord Minto, who displayed in his 
honour unprecedented magnificence. This visit re- 
assured Great Britain on the Afghan side. The 
Convention of the 31st of August reassured her on 
the Russian side. 

To tell the truth, Russia had not waited for this 
agreement to declare that she had no ambitions 
concerning Afghanistan. In the month of March, 
1869, Prince Gortchakoff wrote to the Russian 
Ambassador in London: '^You may repeat in the 
most positive terms to the Secretary of State 
Affairs of her Britannic Majesty that his Imperial 
Majesty considers Afghanistan as being completely 
outside the sphere in which Russia can be called 
upon to exercise her influence. Neither interven- 
tion nor interference of any kind detrimental to 
the independence of this State enter into his calcu- 
lations." In February, 1874, the Russian Chan- 
cellor renewed the same assurance to Lord Augustus 
Lof tus. In February, 1882, the Russian Ambassador 



ASIATIC AND EUROPEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 247 

in London affirmed to Lord Granville that his 
Sovereign's intentions had not varied. In October, 
1883, Mr. de Giers went further still; and, as the 
English Ambassador at Saint Petersburg asked him 
if it were true that a Russian envoy was to start for 
Cabool with a letter from the Czar to the Ameer, 
he replied: ''It is impossible. All measures are 
taken in order to avoid there being any relations 
between Russia and Afghanistan, that countryj 
being considered as belonging to the English circle' 
of influence." Certain apprehensions, however, 
still persisted. And traces of them may be found 
in the speech in which, on the 12th of January, 1905, 
Mr. Balfour identified ''the problem of the British 
Army" with that of the defence of Afghanistan. 
Such fears were destined to be appeased by the 
Convention of the 31st of August, which determined 
a zone of English influence in Persia beyond the 
Afghan frontier and explicitly recognized Great 
Britain's "special situation" at Cabool. It even 
went so far as to admit the hypothesis of England's 
energetic action, in case the Ameer should not keep 
his engagements to her. It was a sort of carte , 
blanche given her by Russia; and was valuable to 
England without costing the Czar's Government 
much. 

On the other hand, in Thibet, Great Britain made 
a halt, at any rate, with respect to her policy of 
preceding years. For rather more than two cen- 
turies, the Dalai-Lama, or pontiff, in whose person 
are supposed to be united the two halves of God, 



248 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

Pope and Emperor, had been China's vassal. He is 
assisted by a Chinese Resident Minister ; and China 
guarantees him the integrity of his States. In spite 
of this Chinese, guarantee, the British, in India, 
have always exhibited an indiscreet tendency to 
approach the Thibetan wall. They first subdued 
half a dozen petty principalities. Then, in 1890, 
they took the valley of the Tista in Thibet itself, 
with the consent of China. This annexation, which 
was insupportable to the proud patriotism of the 
Thibetans, definitely alienated from the English 
the sympathies they might eventually have secured 
among the people of Lhassa. Russia, on her side, 
all along the Siberian frontier, has, if not conven- 
iences, at least possibilities of approach as far as 
the ''Roof of the World," — an approach long and 
painful, but yet an approach all the same. More- 
over, she has numerous Buddhist subjects, who 
belong to the Buriat church, and whose chief receives 
a twofold investiture : the one temporal, at Saint 
Petersburg, the other spiritual, at Lhassa. On 
several occasions there have been Thibetan embassies 
despatched to Russia. In 1900, there were political] 
pourparlers, with a view to a sort of protectorate. ' 
True, there is nothing to prove that these pourpar- 
lers aimed ultimately at an attack on British India, 
which, indeed, is practically impossible of realiza- 
tion. But many English people, especially those 
in India, believed this or affected to believe it. 
Lord Curzon, in particular, proclaimed loudly the ^ 
necessity of raising British prestige, and, in order to 



ASIATIC AND EUROPEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 249 

succeed in this, the advisability of penetrating into 
Thibet ''by persuasion or by force." It was evident 
that such a proceeding risked provoking an Anglo- 
Russian conflict which in other parts of Asia had 
been prevented. 

In November, 1903, overcoming the Conservative 
Government's prudent reluctance, Lord Curzon 
obtained permission to send Colonel Younghusband 
to Thibet, his purpose being, so it was asserted, to 
open up commercial negotiations. However, he was 
soon joined by General MacDonald's troops. Russia 
did not disguise her displeasure. But three months 
later, the war in Manchuria drew her attention away < 
from Thibet. After encountering much opposition, 
and engaging in several combats, Colonel Young- 
husband reached Lhassa (September, 1904). He 
succeeded in getting — not from the Grand Lama, 
since the latter had fled, but from his Ministers — a 
Treaty opening the Thibetan markets to the British, 
making the promise of a large indemnity, and pledg- 
ing the Thibetan Government to neither sell, lease,- 
nor mortgage any portion of their territory to a 
foreign Power without the consent of Great Britain. 
The occupation of the Chumbi Valley was to serve 
as a guarantee. This was a success, which might, 
however, not be durable, and had been possible 
only owing to the Russo-Japanese war. Still, it 
marked on Great Britain's side a determination 
to play an increasingly active role in Thibet. In 
the light of what precedes, one is better able to 
understand the meaning of the Treaty of the 31st of 



250 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

August. In the matter of Thibet, England and 
Russia were two adversaries, both formidably 
armed for a struggle, the prize of which appeared 
to be uncertain. In such a case, it was best to treat 
before measuring strength. This was what was done. 
Great Britain abandoned Lord Curzon's grandiose 
projects. But the Standard was able to write that 
even before the Treaty, all ulterior profit from the 
Younghusband Convention had been renounced. 
On the other hand, Russia declared that she would 
abstain from all interference in the domestic ad- 
ministration of the country. Yet she retained many 
discreet and powerful means of action through her 
Buriat subjects; and, in addition, England's iden- 
tical promise of abstention was a precious security 
to her. It may, therefore, be concluded, without 
dwelling on useless comparisons, that the Treaty 
of the 31st of August, in the part relating to Thibet, 
was a work of Russo-English wisdom, and that 
it was happily inspired by the same conciliatory 
principles as those characterizing the whole agree- 
ment. 

There was no mention made in the agreement of 
the Persian Gulf question. But, in a letter addressed 
on the 29th of August to Sir Arthur Nicholson, the 
English Ambassador in Russia, and made public 
at the same time as the Treaty, Sir Edward Grey 
wrote: ''The arrangement concerning Persia is 
limited to the regions of this country that touch on 
the respective frontiers of Great Britain and Russia 
in Asia. The Persian Gulf is no portion of these 



ASIATIC AND EUROPEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 251 

regions, and is only partly in Persian territory. 
There seemed consequently no reason for introduc- 
ing into the Convention a positive declaration con- 
cerning the special interests possessed by Great 
Britain in the Gulf, — interests which result from the 
British action which has been exercised in these 
waters during more than a hundred years." Sir 
Edward Grey added that the Russian Government 
had explicitly declared, in the course of the negotia- 
tions, that "they did not deny Great Britain's 
special interests in the Persian Gulf." If the agree- 
ment said nothing about them, the reason was that 
the Persian Gulf question is intimately connected 
with that of the Bagdad railway, and that, to discuss 
the latter, there were four Powers necessary, instead! 
of two. 

As a matter of fact, England had not waited till 
the year 1907 before she asserted her particular 
situation and her privileged influence in the Persian 
Gulf. For more than a century, her ships have 
cruised there. And she claims the honour of having, 
thanks to them, caused order and peace to prevail 
in its periphery. It is correct to say that, during 
the whole of the nineteenth century, the British flag'; 
was almost the only one that appeared in the Gulf, 
bound either on voyages of scientific exploration 
or on expeditions of police repression. The sur- 
rounding country naturally underwent the action 
of successive British officers and consuls. Indeed, 
it may easily be seen that the lower valley of the 
Tigris and Euphrates is attached to India by eco- 



252 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

nomic ties that are indissoluble. In 1901, during 
the Koweit incident, Lord Curzon upheld its rights, 
or rather its claims, against suzerain Turkey and 
Germany, Turkey's ally. And, in 1903, Lord 
Lansdowne did not hesitate to declare that 'Hhe 
creation of any naval base or warlike stronghold 
on the Persian Gulf by any Power whatsoever would 
be a direct menace to British interests, and that the 
Government would offer every opposition possible 
to such creation." This decided language could not 
be gone back upon. And, in his letter of the 29th 
of August, Sir Edward Grey did not fail to write, 
''It is desirable to draw attention to previous 
declarations relative to the British policy, to confirm 
afresh, in a general way, what has already been said 
concerning British interests in the Persian Gulf, 
and to again assert the importance of maintaining 
the said interests." It is allowable to suppose that 
the Cabinet of Saint Petersburg — if one judges 
by this letter of Sir Edward Grey and also by the 
limits fixed by the zone of Russian influence in 
Persia — had resigned itself to England's claims in 
the Persian Gulf, and that the two Powers were 
ready to discuss together the negotiations destined 
to be opened, sooner or later, with regard to the 
Bagdad railway. No doubt this hypothesis was 
looked at in the course of the pourparlers between 
Mr. Isvolsky and Sir Arthur Nicholson. The prob- 
lem of the Gulf, which in the future is bound to 
attract the attention of the Chancelleries, seemed 
therefore implicitly settled between London and 



ASIATIC AND EUROPEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 253 

Saint Petersburg. When the discussion comes on 
about Bagdad, it will be taken into account. It is 
true that such discussion is perhaps remote. For, 
if the Germans assert that they are in no hurry to 
enter upon it, France, Great Britain, and Russia 
are still less so. 

At the close of these laborious negotiations, 
France was able to consider their product from a 
twofold point of view: that of the genesis, and that 
of the consequences. It is certain that the recon- 
ciliation of England and Russia was willed both 
on the side of Saint Petersburg and that of London ; 
and it would certainly have come about even if no 
foreign influence had been brought to bear in these 
two Capitals. But, for several years past, our 
country had not ceased endeavouring to effect a 
rapprochement; and the signing of the Franco- 
English Treaty of the 8th of April, 1904, may be 
considered as marking the commencement of the 
evolution which was completed in 1907. This 
Treaty was at first, in general, badly received in 
Russia. However, two days after its conclusion, 
Mr. Nelidow, in an interview, expressed quite 
different views. ''We are the allies and friends 
of France," he said. ''As friends, we rejoice at 
whatever good fortune befalls you. As allies . . . 
we are glad of an understanding that delivers you 
from many cares and frees you from certain restric- 
tions. . . . And, besides, is there not a proverb 
which says: 'The friends of our friends are our own 
friends.' Who knows if it will not be verified once 



254 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

again!" ^ More than one Russian newspaper re- 
proached the Ambassador for having uttered this 
language. And yet, three years later, he was to be 
justified by events. In so far as the press can facili- 
tate a movement of opinion parallel to diplomatic 
negotiations, our French press had seconded the 
efforts of our diplomacy. During three years, 
whether the question was Afghanistan, or Russia's 
domestic policy, or Persia, or the Far East, we had 
affirmed, in spite of passing clouds, the possibility 
and desirability of the Anglo-Russian understanding. 
On the other hand, at Algeciras, during the long, 
monotonous weeks of the Moroccan debate, our 
plenipotentiaries had not forborne to encourage 
the general conversation engaged in by Count 
Cassini, Sir Arthur Nicholson, and Sir Donald Mac- 
kenzie Wallace. Discreetly, but yet most usefully, 
we had avoided certain collisions: first, the mili- 
tary collision that the Dogger Bank cannonade 
might have caused, by suggesting the meeting of 
an International Commission of Inquiry in Paris ; - 
and next, diplomatic friction, either at the time of 
the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, or 
during the negotiations themselves, which, a year 
before, had prepared the Convention of the 31st of 
August, 1907. Our amicable intervention had been 
vigilant and continuous. Our interests justified it. 

As a matter of fact, the Anglo-Russian agreement '.^ 
completed the establishment of the Asiatic equilib- 
rium upon a durable foundation. Henceforward, 

* See our book, Diplomatic Questions of the Year 1904. 



ASIATIC AND EUROPEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 255 

five series of agreements, the Anglo-Japanese Alli- 
ance, the Russo-Japanese, Franco-Japanese, and 
Anglo-Russian agreements, and the Franco-Russian 
Alliance, converged towards the same object; to wit, 
the maintenance of the statu quo, which guaranteed . 
the independence and integrity of China. The >( 
disturbed situation of the Chinese Empire, of which 
France experienced the counter-effect on her Tonkin- 
ese frontier in the spring of 1907, added fresh im- 
portance to the collective guarantee expressed by 
these five agreements. The return to a policy of 
preserving China's territorial integrity, the only 
one calculated to avoid conflicts, received its most 
solemn sanction. From what precedes it plainly 
appears that such return constituted in itself a 
profit for France, a profit which, indeed, was about 
to be increased by the European development of 
some of these agreements. 

III 

During half a century, the rivalry between England 
and Russia had been Germany's favourite weapon 
against France. It would be easy to follow, from 
the Crimean War to that of 1870, Bismarckian policy 
in the web of work of which we were the victims. 
If Thiers' efforts to interest Europe in our cause 
failed, it was because, under the auspices of Bis- 
marck, Russians and English continued to pursue 
designs that were opposed. It needed Germany's 
formidable progress to unite in our favour the two 



256 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

constant rivals during the crisis of 1875. This 
cooperation was merely ephemeral. And, a few 
years ago, in 1904, Mr. Theodore Schiemann, one 
of the fiercest adversaries France has in Germany, 
wrote joyfully that the Anglo-French understanding 
was incompatible with the Franco-Russian Alliance, 
since a rapprochement between Saint Petersburg 
and London would never be possible. This rap- 
prochement was thereafter accomplished. Sup- 
ported by Russia, her Ally, and by Great Britain, 
her friend, and the Ally and the friend being recon- 
ciled, France was possessed in Europe of peculiar 
moral authority. And the new link that was riveted 
in the chain of understandings procured her — in 
the diplomatic order of things — the maximum of 
securities it was permissible for her to wish for. 

Neither by its text nor by its tendencies was the 
Anglo-Russian agreement a menace to any one. 
It was aimed at no one, and isolated no one. But it 
added one more element to the combinations which, 
since 1904, "had contributed to free the balance of 
power in Europe from the hold of Germany. Coming 
after the Franco-Russian Alliance, after the Franco- 
English, Franco-Italian, and Franco-Spanish under- 
standings, it fortified European liberty and, like 
them, dealt a blow to the Bismarckian system, to 
the edifice of preponderance which William II had 
striven in 1905 to restore, and which the Conference 
of Algeciras had shown to be so fragile. To resume, 
officially, in September, 1907, the attacks made two 
years earlier against the ^'isolators" of Germany 



ASIATIC AND EUROPEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 257 

would have been to discredit more clearly a 
manoeuvre already tried and found wanting. The 
semi-official press of Berlin took care not to at- 
tempt this, and Prince von Buelow even thought it 
advisable to say, in a speech he made during the . 
autumn, that neither the Empire's happiness nor ' 
its greatness were built up from the divisions of 
the other Powers. The Pan-German press was 
less prudent. Those papers which had denounced 
in the Franco-Japanese understanding a fresh essay 
of '^ encirclement " did not fail to discover another 
in the Anglo-Russian agreement. The Deutsche 
Tageszeitung asserted that '^Germany had no reason 
to be satisfied on seeing certain difficulties removed 
between the two nations, since, under given circum- 
stances, the continued existence of such difficulties 
might have been useful to her." The Frankfort 
Gazette itself wrote : ' ' The kingdom of English India 
has not for a long time been so secure from Russia 
as it is now. If England, therefore, without there 
being any immediate need for it, is coming to this 
understanding with her ancient adversary, the 
motive of her doing so must be sought elsewhere. 
Probably we are not making a mistake in seeking , 
for it in Europe." 

German recriminations in 1905 had sufficed to 
emphasize the character of the Franco-English ^l 
agreement of 1904. Those of 1907 likewise helped! 
to enlarge the scope of the Anglo-Russian one. 
At the outset, the negotiators of this agreement 
had not been thinking of Germany. They had 



258 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

done their best to liquidate old Asiatic quarrels, 
the possible revival of which was a source of anxiety 
to them. Gradually, under the state of mind created 
in Europe by the persistence of German ill-humour, 
it occurred to the Cabinets of London and Saint 
Petersburg that their colonial agreement might serve 
as the guiding principle of their further cooperation 
in Europe for the settlement of questions which 
certain oppositions rendered difficult of solution. 

In February, 1908, during a debate in the House 
of Commons, Sir Edward Grey gave a hint of this 
general value which he attributed to the Anglo- 
Russian understanding. In the ensuing month 
of June, Edward VII went to Revel on a visit to 
Nicholas II; and, in the toasts that were proposed 
when the Czar alluded to "the limited scope of the 
1907 agreements," Edward VII added, '^I believe 
that the Convention recently made will contribute 
to tighten the bonds uniting the people of our two 
countries; and I am sure that it will lead to a 
satisfactory, amicable settlement of some important 
questions in the future." On the same day, a 
semi-official note, telegraphed from Revel, empha- 
sized the meaning of this declaration: "The pour- 
parlers,^' it said, ''which have been carried on, for 
some time past, between the two Governments 
concerning Macedonian affairs, may be considered 
as about to result in a complete understanding. 
Nothing now is wanting but a definite form to be- 
given to the agreement, which, it may be hoped, 
will serve as a basis for a general understanding 



ASIATIC AND EUROPEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 259 

between the Powers interested in the work of reforms 
in Macedonia." Though couched in the most 
correct terms with regard to the other Powers, this 
note, in reahty, announced that the Anglo-Russian 
agreement of 1907 relative to the Far East had 
given birth to a new one, relative to the Near East,/ 
between the two countries. 

On the 27th of January, 1908, Baron von Aehr- 
enthal, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Austro- 
Hungarian Government, announced to the Delega- 
tions that he hoped soon to obtain the Sultan's 
assent to the proposal he had made of prolonging 
the Austrian railways as far as Mitrovitza. This 
was an initiative allowed by the twenty-fifth article 
of the Treaty of Berlin, but one which was calculated 
greatly to consolidate Austria's situation in the 
Balkans. In its spirit, if not in the letter, this 
initiative was contrary to the Balkan agreement 
concluded in 1897, and renewed in 1903 between 
Austria and Russia, with a view to the maintenance* 
of the statu quo. The almost exclusive place held 
by Asiatic questions in Russia's preoccupations 
between 1896 and 1905 had rendered the use of 
this agreement more profitable to Vienna than to 
Saint Petersburg. Under the nominal direction of 
the two ''Powers sharing in the understanding," the 
reform policy had been pursued but slackly under 
the real control of Austria, to whom Russia accorded 
in every case a docile approbation. As a warrant 
for their intervention, the other Powers retained the 
rights bestowed on them by the Treaty of Berlin. 



260 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

But their action, at first intermittent, remained 
purely diplomatic. Russia and Austria alone, 
through their ''civil agents," acting in conjunction 
with Hilmi Pacha, the Turkish Inspector-General 
of Macedonia, played a political role on the spot. 
It was only reluctantly that they had consented 
to the creation of the ''Financial Comptrollers" 
who superintended the management of Macedonian 
finances in the name of the other Powers. In real- 
ity, the Austro- Russian Syndicate's plan of reforms 
pledged no one to anything. And Great Britain's 
efforts to obtain more serious guarantees from the 
Sultan were rewarded with but poor success. It 
was quite clear that, benefiting by Russia's forced 
adhesion, Austria, taking thought for her own 
interests — at which no one need be astonished — 
was practising in the Balkans a policy that was more 
Austrian than European. 

The project relative to the Mitrovitza railway 
was merely a fresh manifestation of this policy. 
But, at the moment when it was announced by the 
Baron von Aehrenthal's speech, the situation was 
no longer the same as it had been in preceding years. 
After three years' peace, on the morrow of the sign- 
ing of agreements with Japan and Great Britain 
which liquidated the Asiatic dream, Russia made 
"her reappearance in Europe" and Mr. Isvolsky 
took no pains to hide the fact. "The Russians 
intended to recover their prestige, which had been 
diminished. They made it a point of honour with 
themselves to preserve the highest rank on the his- 



ASIATIC AND EUROPEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 261 

toric field of their military and diplomatic victories, 
on the territory they had sprinkled with their 
blood. They had renounced a direct domination 
over the Balkan peninsula. But they intended to j 
remain for the people they had freed old friends 
and protectors for always." ^ ' 

The Austrian scheme seemed to them a provoca- 
tion. Being anxious to modify the policy of re- 
nunciation which had been imposed upon them by 
their understanding with Austria, they found in^ 
Austria's own action a reason or a pretext for such \ 
modification. They seized the opportunity to free 
themselves, and, by breaking the pact of 1897, 
to replace the Macedonian question on its historic ; 
footing, that is to say, before the six Powers. 

Such was the object of Russian policy from the 
month of February, 1908. And the Anglo-Russian - 
agreement acted as its lever. On the 3d of March, 
Sir Edward Grey had proposed to the Powers a 
programme of reforms much more radical than all 
previous ones. On the 26th of the same month, 
Russia addressed to all the Chancelleries, and no 
longer to Austria alone, a project which, though 
less '^advanced" than the English one, yet showed 
a step forward, compared with previous proposals, 
issuing from the Austro-Russian understanding. 
This project, in fact, indicated the Saint Petersburg 
Cabinet's abandonment of the understanding. On 
the 4th of April, Great Britain, who had probably 

* See Rene Pinon's article, " Railways and Reforms," in the 
Revue des Deux Mondes for May 15, 1908. 



262 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

been advised beforehand, signified her adherence 
to it; and, by standing aside for Russia, allowed 
her the honour of resuming the moral direction of 
Macedonian reforms in the presence of all the Powers. 
Although every Government assented in principle 
to the Russian scheme, there were slight differences 
in the way in which the assent was given. 

Great Britain, France, and Italy were favourable 
to the Russian proposals without restriction. On 
the contrary, Germany and Austria were, above all, 
desirous of preserving and, indeed, of improving, the 
intimate relations with Turkey by which they had till 
then profited. Consequently, negotiations, in view 
of a definitive understanding, were bound to be 
long and difficult, when, in July, 1908, the revolu- 
tion broke out. This event could not but help, 
as the events of previous months, in turning Rus- 
sian policy more towards London and Paris than 
towards Vienna and Berlin. They, therefore, fitted 
in with the general tendency manifested in Europe 
since the Conference of Algeciras. 

This tendency was still further brought out in 
1907 by the dual agreement signed by Spain in the 
month of May with France and England. The 
Franco-Spanish and Franco-English rapprochements 
had, by this time, entered into the general course of 
things. Spain's treaties with France in 1904 and 
1905, and the marriage of Alfonso XIII to Princess 
Battenberg in 1906, permitted no doubt on the 
point. The agreements of 1907, though not con- 
stituting an alliance or involving military engage- 



ASIATIC AND EUROPEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 263 

ments, marked progress in the political intimacy 
of the three nations. They were drawn up as 
follows (the text of the Anglo-Spanish agreement 
being identical in its terms with the Franco-Spanish 
one) : — 

Animated by the desire to contribute by all possible means 
to the preservation of peace, and convinced that the mainten- 
ance of the territorial statu quo and of the rights of France and 
Spain in the Mediterranean and in the part of the Atlantic wash- 
ing the coasts of Europe and Africa should serve efficaciously to 
attain this object, while being profitable to the two nations, 
who, moreover, are united by ties of ancient friendship and com- 
munity of interests : — 

The Government of the French Republic desire to inform the 
Government of his Catholic Majesty of the following declaration, 
with the firm hope that it will help not only to strengthen the 
good understanding so happily existing between the two Govern- 
ments, but also to serve the cause of peace. 

The general policy of the Government of the French Republic, 
in the regions above indicated, aims at the maintenance of the 
territorial statu quo, and, in conformity with this policy, the 
Government are firmly resolved to preserve intact the rights of 
the French Republic over their insular possessions as well as 
their maritime ones situated in the said regions. 

In case fresh circumstances should arise, which, in the opinion 
of the Government of the French Republic, are calculated to 
modify or to contribute to modify the present territorial statu 
quo, the Government will enter into communication with the 
Government of his Catholic Majesty, in order to enable the two 
Governments to concert together, if judged desirable, as to the 
measures to be taken in common. 

A Spanish note, expressed in similar language, 
replied to the French note. Thus fresh precision 
was added to existing arrangements. Spain, France, 
and Great Britain have, all three of them, posses- 
sions in the Western Mediterranean and in the East 



264 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

Atlantic. Some are insular, others European, and 
others again African. The governments of Madrid, 
Paris, and London, being united by ties of friendship, 
have an evident interest in there being no modifica- 
tion, without their consent, of the statu quo in these 
regions. And still greater is the interest they have 
in maintaining constant communication with their 
respective possessions, if complications should arise. 
Their understanding helped them to procure this 
twofold security. The necessity of Franco-Spanish' 
cooperation in Morocco, resulting not only from 
bilateral treaties, but from the general provisions 
of the Algeciras Conference, was an additional 
reason for making an arrangement which, neither 
in reality nor yet in its form, was a threat or an 
attack against any one. 

The German Press, none the less, denounced the 
offensive intention of the dual declaration of the 
16th of May — just as, in the months to come, she^ 
was to denounce the aggressive character of the 
Franco-Japanese agreement, the Anglo- Russian agree- 
ment in Asia, and the Anglo-Russian agreement in 
Macedonia. Thus was pursued, in the same terms, 
and with parallel consequences, the diplomatic 
debate which we have seen arise and develop ; 
on the one hand, after twenty-five years' diplomatic 
servitude, Europe claiming the right to settle her 
own affairs and to guarantee her balance of power; 
on the other, Germany seeing in this activity a 
proof of hostile intention and an effort to isolate 
her. Bismarck had disappeared twenty years be- 



ASIATIC AND EUROPEAN UNDERSTANDINGS 265 

fore ; but still round him, and his work, his plans, 
his dreams, this world-game was played. The 
dead man continued ''to speak." And doubtless 
for long to come Europe will hear the muffled 
echoes of this great voice from beyond the tomb. 



CHAPTER VII 

FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES 

I. Sentiment and business. — Souvenirs of the Independence 
struggle. — Two Sister Republics. — Politics and the 
" imponderable." — Franco-American manifestations. — 
Words and deeds. — Franco-American commerce. — Com- 
mercial agreements. — Possible improvements. — France 
and the American financial crisis of 1907. 

II. Politics. — France and the Monroe Doctrine. — American 
affairs. — France and the " big stick." — Asiatic affairs. — 
United States and the "Open Door." — Mr. Hay and 
Russia. — United States and Japan. — Franco-Japanese 
agreement and the United States. — European affairs. — 
United States and the Moroccan crisis. — Conference of 
Algeciras. — Reasons of the American policy. — United 
States and the Franco-Russian Alliance. — United States 
and the Entente Cordiale. — United States and the balance 
of power in Europe. 



Between the United States and France there 
exist no poUtical ties in the form of an aUiance, just 
as there exists none between the United States and 
any other country in Europe. Such ties are forbid- 
den by the Monroe doctrine, which, at the same time 
that it proclaims the moral control of the Union over 
the whole of America, affirms, by way of counter- 
balance, the Union's indifference to European ques- 
tions. A similar prohibition comes from General 

266 



FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES 267 

Washington's political testament, which advised his 
fellow-countrymen never to contract alliances. How- 
ever, a nation of eighty million souls, materially or 
morally master of a whole continent, mingling with 
increasing activity in the economic life of the world, 
at present possessed of a first-class navy and of 
strength which is destined to grow still more, a na- 
tion animated by ardent patriotism and a lofty 
national pride, cannot live '' huddled up like a petty 
shopkeeper in a tiny shop." Whether they wish it 
or not, the United States have a policy of world 
importance. During the last ten years, they have 
been seen participating, sometimes in the first rank, 
not only in the solution of American problems, but 
in that also of Asiatic questions, and even of Euro- 
pean ones. It is therefore impossible to avoid giv- 
ing them a place, among our allies, our friends, and 
our rivals, in the aggregate tableau of our foreign 
action. 

Until now, at the base of relations established be- 
tween France and abroad, we have found there was 
interest. In the case of the United States the basis 
is in sentiment. Franco-American relations have 
developed in an atmosphere of reciprocal sympathy. 
And it is such sympathy which confers on them, still 
to-day, their best originality. To exaggerate the 
action of this 'imponderable" would be to expose 
one's self to errors. To deny it would be to run into 
them. If certain events had not occurred, if some 
others had happened which the march of history has 
thwarted, perhaps these sentiments would have lost 



268 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

a part of their sincerity and ardour. But, favoured 
by circumstances, they have flourished without let 
or hindrance ; and the twentieth century American 
not only feels no embarrassment in expressing them, 
but feels none either in inspiring himself with them. 
The American gratitude is a fact, and as, in the order 
of facts, nothing contradicts or hampers it, there is a 
readiness to translate it into deeds. As Elihu Root, 
Secretary of State, lately said, it is a reality with 
which one must count and on which we can rely. 

One of the most distinguished historians of Amer- 
ica wrote recently : — 

On two occasions, the conduct of the French Government 
was decisive in affecting the future of the Union, so much so 
that one may wonder what would have been its destiny if France 
had acted otherwise. Without the help of France, the thirteen 
revolted colonies would not perhaps have succeeded in conquer- 
ing their independence at the time they did, and, even if they 
had, would not perhaps have secured the boundaries which, in 
fact, were their guarantees. Without the purchase of Louisiana 
— and it must be remembered that France took the initiative 
of the transaction, — the movement of expansion towards the 
West, although inevitable in any case, would have brought 
about other results. If France had kept Louisiana long enough 
to settle there a considerable French population, there might, 
to-day, have been among the whites of the Southwest a strug- 
gle between two rival nationalities for the supremacy. Or else, 
if England had conquered it and added it to her possessions 
in Canada, what would have been the future of the United 
States ?i 

It may be said that the American people, in their 
aggregate, however much they are modified every 
year by immigration, have the feelings attributed to 

^ Archibald Gary Coolidge, The United States as a World Power. 



FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES 269 

them by their historians. The statues of Lafayette 
and Rochambeau standing opposite the White House, 
their portraits placed in the Congress Hall by the 
side of Washington's, are not the cold affirmation of 
an official courtesy, but the living expression of a 
national friendship. As Archbishop Ireland said to 
me: ''The United States have forgotten nothing. 
An American learns to love France when learning 
the history of his country. The past has not ceased 
to act on the present. American sentiment cannot 
detach itself from France. The immigrants that ar- 
rive on our shores are numerous, it is true. But in 
the air we breathe there is something that assimi- 
lates them in less than a generation. And the new- 
comers are like those that have American ancestors. 
When learning the history of their new country, they 
also learn to love France, the great benefactress of 
our Republic. During the first fifty years of our 
history, the souvenirs of French help and friendship 
were almost contemporary. They have now be- 
come definitely incorporated in our traditions." 

To patriotic gratitude Republican confraternity is ' 
added. In spite of profound and numerous differ- 
ences of temperament and constitution, the Ameri- 
cans respect in France the apostle of liberty. 
Thomas Jefferson was the friend of Lafayette, Bar- 
nave, the Lameth brothers, and all the chiefs of the 
Feuillants Club. From the very first day, he was 
in favour of the French Revolution; and even the 
counter sentiments called forth in the United States 
by the excesses of our Convention were not able to 



270 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

uproot the original sympathy arising from an iden- 
tity of principles if not of actions. In spite of tempo- 
rary difficulties, — the conflict of 1799, the Mexican 
expedition, the Panama affair, — this sympathy has 
persisted. When the "citizens" of America look on 
the side of Europe, they feel themselves drawn nat- 
urally towards the ''citizens" of France. By its 
duration, the Republic has borne witness in favour 
of our political stability, and her American elder, 
while blaming certain of her tendencies, particularly 
in religious matters, has accorded her an esteem 
which continues to grow as time goes on. No doubt, 
in the eyes of Americans, as of the rest of the world, 
we still carry the weight of our defeats. But the 
consistency of our action abroad, the amplitude of 
our colonial expansion, and the diplomatic combi- 
nations that we have succeeded in signing, have pro- 
cured us suffrages and assured us friendships which, 
in any estimation of international forces, must be 
appreciated at their value. 

Never, indeed, has Franco- American intimacy 
taken more trouble to manifest itself than in the 
course of the last few years. Following on the 
inauguration of the monument to Rochambeau, 
there was the Saint Louis Exhibition in 1904, 
which supplied the manifestation with the most 
magnificent of settings. In the month of Feb- 
ruary, 1905, Mr. Jusserand, the French Am- 
bassador, officially handed over to the Congress 
of the United States Washington's bust by David 
d'Angers, of which the original had been burnt in 



FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES 271 

1851, and the rough clay model had been recently 
found at Angers. In the ensuing month of July, an 
American squadron came to Cherbourg to fetch Ad- 
miral Paul Jones's coffin, which had been discovered 
in Paris through the investigations of the United 
States Ambassador; and the sailors of the two na- 
tions associated themselves together in brotherly 
homage paid to one of the most glorious combatants 
in the American War of Independence. During the 
same year, the retirement of General Porter was 
made the occasion of a spontaneous demonstration 
of affection, which contrasted with the official cere- 
mony usually accompanying the departure of a di- 
plomatist. In 1890, an American squadron came to 
pay a visit to our French ports in the Mediterranean. 
In the month of April following, one of our naval 
divisions, being invited to take part in the fetes 
given in honour of Paul Jones's memory, was tri- 
umphantly received in America. The second cen- 
tenary of Franklin, both in Paris and in the States, 
was solemnly celebrated with ceremonies in which 
the two Governments were united. In 1907, Admi- 
ral Stockton's visit to Brest, and the Tricentenary 
fetes of Jamestown again furnished an opportunity 
for publicly manifesting the reciprocal sympathy 
existing between France and America. 

The speeches made on these various occasions de- 
serve to be remembered, since they emphasize, often 
with happy stress, the special character of intimacy 
and confidence in the relations existing between the 
two Republics. In 1905, Mr. MacCormick, when 



272 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

handing his credentials to Mr. Loubet, said: ''Dur- 
ing the century and more that this Franco-American 
alhance has lasted, which, on account of the souve- 
nirs left in our minds by the services rendered to the 
cause of liberty, has a much greater solidity than if 
it had been inscribed in treaties, no cloud has come 
to trouble the amicable understanding subsisting be- 
tween the two nations." A few days later, in the 
farewell dinner offered to him. General Porter ex- 
pressed the same sentiments: ''As iron is welded in 
the fire of the forge, so friendships," he said, "are 
welded in the fire of battle. . . . America is still 
too young not to be grateful. . . . She will never 
fail to remember that, when Washington, Rocham- 
beau, and Lafayette met before the enemy at York- 
town, the contact of these great minds lighted th,e 
electric spark which showed the way to victory and 
led the new world once for all towards justice and 
liberty based on legal order and the rights of man." 
On this same occasion, Mr. Delcasse spoke, "of the 
two countries whom nothing separates at present 
and whose legitimate aspirations, however far one 
may look into the future, are not perceived to run 
any risk of being ever opposed to each other." In 
April, 1906, at the fetes given at Philadelphia in 
honour of Franklin's memory, Mr. Root added, 
as he handed to the French Ambassador for his Gov- 
ernment a gold medal struck by order of Congress 
after a special vote: "What we are offering is noth- 
ing compared with the immense service rendered to 
us by great French hearts. Yet, at least, it is a 



FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES 273 

token that, amid changing conditions and the afflux 
of citizens from all countries of the world, Americans 
have not forgotten their ancestors. You will thus 
know that, amongst Americans, there is a sentiment 
in favour of France that persists, and that such a 
sentiment, amongst such a people, is a real and great 
fact, which must be taken into account. As far as 
we are concerned, we remain true and loyal friends 
to France." Then there was Mr. Roosevelt, who 
telegraphed to Mr. Fallieres to assure him of the 
special place occupied by France in the heart of the 
United States, to whom she ''rendered invaluable 
services in what was certainly the most critical pe- 
riod of their history." Again, on the 23d of March, 
1907, Mr. Henry White, the Union's new Ambassa- 
dor, when entering on his functions, declared to Mr, 
Fallieres that the American Government esteemed it 
an honour to "strengthen" the ties of friendship bind- 
ing them to France. And, once more, he made use of 
the same language when assisting, on the 4th of July, 
at the celebration of the American National Fete. 

These speeches define the altogether peculiar na- 
ture of the bonds created between France and the 
United States by a tradition of more than a century 
old. True, one may wish these ties to become still 
closer, through a reciprocal, more complete, and bet- 
ter informed comprehension of the respective vir- 
tues of the two nations. The wish may be expressed 
that Americans, instead of merely seeing in France 
a country of elegance, literature, and art, might have 
a juster notion of her resources, strength, and aspira- 



274 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

tions. This is a progress to be desired and one that 
is reaUzable. But, while working with a view to its 
being brought about, there should be no under-esti- 
mation of what has already been achieved. If the 
French established in the United States are few in 
number and exercise but small influence ; if the Irish 
immigrants, not long ago our warmest friends, have 
been alienated from us by our religious policy, on 
the other hand, our ideas and our culture are the 
object of sympathetic curiosity all over the territory 
of the Union. The efforts of the Alliance Frangaise, 
which have been crowned with success, the ex- 
change of lectures and lecturers between the Sor- 
bonne, for instance, and Harvard University, have 
contributed largely to make us known and appre- 
ciated on the other side of the Atlantic. The cordial 
welcome given to French travellers in America, and to 
the American Colony in Paris, has added individual 
friendships to collective sympathies. In Franco- 
American relations, sentiment, which usually occu- 
pies so small a place in politics, plays an indispu- 
tably important role. It is the most active leaven in 
cooperations sometimes imposed by circumstances on 
the two peoples. There was no need of the Arbitration 
Treaty of 1908 to guarantee that questions arising 
between Paris and Washington will always be settled 
in a spirit of good faith, good grace, and good will. 
However, commercial interests, quite as much as 
ancient sympathies, justify the maintenance of cor- 
dial relations between France and the United States. 
Bismarck used to assert that history and politics 



FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES 275 

have nothing to do with trade; that tariff wars 
prevent neither aUiances nor friendships, and that, 
conversely, the consequence of the latter is not al- 
ways an increase of trade. The example of France 
and Italy has allowed it to be seen that this asser- 
tion is not strictly accurate. And the example of 
France and the United States tends also to discredit 
it, since there is no doubt that the two countries' 
intimacy has favoured and encouraged the exchange 
of merchandise between them. If the trouble is 
taken to glance at the sales made by France to the 
United States, it will be seen that the upward move- 
ment has been almost constant, showing an increase 
of about 75 per cent in less than forty years. In 
reality, these sales have passed through the follow- 
ing phases {Special commerce) : — 

In millions of francs 

1860 219 

1870 306 

1880 332 

1890 . . . ... . 328 

1900 355 

1907 402 

We sell to the Americans more than we buy from 
them. However, our purchases have gone up in the 
same proportion as our sales. 

In millions of francs 

1860 139 

1870 217 

1880 731 

1890 317 

1900 509 

1907 632 



276 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

In considering these figures, it must be boxne in 
mind that the development of such exchanges had 
to contend against the double obstacle of American 
and French Protectionism. France was the first 
nation to be favoured by the United States with a 
reduction in the duties on imported articles. By the 
Treaty of the 30th of April, 1803, which settled the 
terms of the cession of Louisiana to the States, cer- 
tain privileges were accorded to our ships and our 
products. In 1831, a second agreement, which re- 
stricted in various particulars the advantages of the 
previous ones, balanced the modification by lower- 
ing, during a period of ten years, the import duties 
on our red and white wines. After this, a long time 
passed without any further negotiations. When, m 
the year 1882, the United States began, by reason of 
their commercial development, to feel the need of 
having recourse to commercial reciprocity, the agree- 
ments they negotiated were applied first to the States 
of South America. The Dingley Tariff, which be- 
came law on the 24th of July, 1897, enlarged the 
possibility of fresh understandings. On the 28th of 
May, 1898, the Paris and Washington Governments, 
'^with a view to improving their respective countries' 
commercial relations," concluded a first arrange- 
ment comprising various reductions of duties. On 
the 24th of July, 1899, a Treaty of Reciprocity was 
signed. But it called forth keen opposition more 
especially on the part of the New York and New 
Jersey jewellers and goldsmiths. Indeed, none of 
the treaties negotiated, in virtue of Section 4 of the 



FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES 277 

Dingley Tariff, were ratified by Congress. Conse- 
quently, the agreement of 1898 had to be fallen 
back upon. On the 20th of August, 1902, an addi- 
tional protocol extended its provisions to Porto Rico 
and Algeria. Finally, in 1907, the United States 
having signed a commercial agreement with Ger- 
many which benefited, to the detriment of French 
champagnes, German sparkling wines arbitrarily 
called by the same name, France expressed the de- 
sire, at once acceded to by the Government of the 
Union, to enter into negotiations calculated to rees- 
tablish an equality of treatment. The Treaty of the 
28th of January, 1908, was the result. By the terms 
of this Treaty, which, as its preamble indicated, was 
intended to '' complete previous ones," French cham- 
pagne wines were to benefit by a reduction of twenty 
per cent in the import duty, France continuing to 
apply her minimum tariff to Colonial produce and 
articles of consumption coming from the United 
States and Porto Rico, exception made for tobacco, 
sugar, and things manufactured with them. More- 
over, a technical commission of six members, three 
being Americans and three French, was intrusted 
with the task of studying certain modifications to 
be introduced into the Customs regulations of the 
two countries. This friendly cooperation is likely 
to facilitate and develop exchanges between them. 
Indeed, if the nature of such exchanges is exam- 
ined in detail, it will be seen that they are capable of 
being increased in the case of numerous articles. It 
is true that our tissues, which form the most impor- 



278 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

tant portion of our sales, are threatened by the cre- 
ation of fresh manufactures. But, as in the case of 
our skins, our Paris articles, our wines, our comes- 
tibles, it lies in our power, by an improved organiza- 
tion of our sales, to secure them a larger market. In 
his excellent report on the Saint Louis Exhibition, 
Mr. Andre Lesourd writes: ''The French trader has 
certain false ideas which are hard to eradicate. He 
thinks that aU rich Americans come every year to 
Paris and can consequently buy in Paris. He thinks 
that, as his business house is well known in Paris, it 
is well known all over the world, and that those 
Americans who wish to give him orders can do so 
from America, simply from seeing his catalogues. 
Now, though the rich Americans who visit Europe 
every year are very numerous, still they do not con- 
stitute more than quite a small minority of the 
wealthy class." In the same order of ideas, Mr. 
Lucien Bonzom, our Deputy Consul General at New 
York, proposed in his 1906 report to create, in Fifth 
Avenue, a sort of maison d'art, where our artistic in- 
dustries might be all represented. He estimated 
that, from the very first day, ''the turn-over would 
be enormous." The equally enormous amount of 
general expenses and the cost of installation have 
so far caused French tradespeople to hold back. But 
there is nothing to prevent the hope that the idea 
will sooner or later be carried into effect. 

The economic crisis which, between the autumn 
of 1907 and the spring of 1908, raged in America 
was prejudicial to Franco- American commerce. As 



FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES 279 

might be expected, it diminished purchases and what 
may be called touring expenses. Moreover, it cre- 
ated some erroneous notions which needed expla- 
nation for them to disappear. In the month of 
November, 1907, being in want of specie, the Ameri- 
can market applied to the Bank of France. Acting 
in accordance with its statutes, the latter had already 
sent to the Bank of England eighty millions of Amer- 
ican gold eagles, which had naturally been despatched 
to New York. The direct operation which it was now 
asked to effect had a precedent. At the time of the 
Baring crisis, the Bank of France had lent the Bank 
of England seventy-five millions in gold, against 
which the latter, as a guarantee of its indebtedness, 
had handed in a check, being a British Treasury 
Bond payable at three months' date. The Bank of 
France replied, therefore, that it was ready to inter- 
vene on the same terms, that is to say, with the 
guarantee of the American Treasury. This condi- 
tion, as was most justly remarked, was all the more 
legitimate, since there exists no central Issue Bank 
in the United States similar to the Bank of England, 
and it is the Treasury which, in reality, acts as a 
State Bank with regard to the American market. 
There was, consequently, a double reason why its 
intervention should be stipulated. Having been in- 
formed of this reply, the American Government, for 
constitutional reasons, did not think fit to give the 
guarantee requested. The Bank of France, there- 
fore, being no longer in presence of a State guarantee, 
but of a private operation, was bound to obey its 



280 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

statutes, which forbade such a transaction. Not 
being correctly informed, the American press was 
annoyed and took no trouble to disguise the fact. 
''This refusal/' wrote the New York Herald on the 
17th of November, '4s a measure as shortsighted as 
it is useless." And yet we might say that it was 
somewhat unwarrantable to seek to impose a re- 
sponsibility on the Bank of France which the Ameri- 
can Treasury refused to join in assuming. More- 
over, no one could be ignorant that our Bank of 
France has no right to give gold against credit paper. 
On the other hand, how could it be supposed that 
the Bank would take part in the issue of the three 
per cent American Treasury Bonds, when it is for- 
bidden to buy securities on its own account and 
those that it can accept in guarantee of its advances 
are exclusively French? One ought here to add 
that, through the medium of the Bank of England, - 
the Bank of France sent, during the crisis, more 
than a hundred million dollars in gold to America. 
This appreciable service is sufficient to prove that, 
in conforming itself to its regulations, our National 
Bank was in no wise animated by hostile sentiments 
towards the American market. 

Indeed, it is a well-known fact that, for some years 
past, a more active share has been taken in Ameri- 
can business by French capital than in times gone 
by. No doubt, the scare of 1907 will, to some ex- 
tent, lessen this cooperation for a while, but it will 
not stop it. In spite of the competition resulting 
from the rapid progress of American industry, the 



FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES 281 

production of the two countries remains commer- 
cially, in a large degree, complementary. The cot- 
ton, cereals, tobacco, cotton-seed and oils, fruits, 
meat, wood, mineral oils, both natural and refined, 
and the machines that France buys each year, come 
to fill up the lack of her soil or of her industry. In 
return, French industry is distinguished so sharply 
by the finish of its manufacture from that of the 
United States that it is certain always to find on the 
other side of the Atlantic a market which can still 
be extended in notable proportions. Therefore, 
business as well as sentiment justifies the intimacy 
of our relations with America. How are these rela- 
tions to stand the test imposed on them by the ne- 
cessities of contemporary politics ? 

II 

On the 2d of December, 1823, President James 
Monroe wrote : — 

Seeing the free and independent attitude assumed by the 
American continents, they ought not to be considered by any 
European Power as a territory lending itself to more ample 
colonization. We owe it to the frankness and friendly relations 
that exist between the United States and the various European 
Powers to declare that we should consider as being dangerous 
for our peace and security any attempt on their part to extend 
their system to whatsoever portion of this hemisphere. 

We have never mixed ourselves up with the wars that these 
Powers have engaged in with each other on questions concern- 
ing themselves ; and it is not in our policy to do so. 

We have not intervened, and we shall not intervene, in the 
present colonies or dependencies of any European Power. But 
in the States which have declared their independence and have 



282 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

maintained it, and whose independence we have recognized, after 
mature reflection and in accordance with the laws of justice, 
we can only consider the intervention of any European Power 
whatsoever, for the purpose of oppressing them or controlling 
their destiny in any way, as being a manifestation of hostile 
sentiments towards the United States. 

These rules, which, in their author's mind, applied 
only to the special situation created by the revolt of 
the Spanish colonies, have become the guiding prin- 
ciple of American policy. The practice of non-an- 
nexation and, before long, of non-intervention which 
was thus opposed to the European Powers in matters 
affecting the New World, has assumed the value of a 
dogma. And, by the attitude of the Powers with 
regard to it, Americans have judged what sentiments 
were held respecting themselves. With but few 
exceptions, France has never caused them any anx- 
iety. The deplorable intervention of Napoleon III 
in Mexico was the only occasion of a dispute that 
risked bringing us into open conflict with them. No 
doubt, this conflict would have broken out, if the 
war of Secession, at the beginning of the Mexican 
adventure, had not monopolized the forces of the 
Union, and if the Emperor Maximilian's tragic end 
had not closed the incident later. However, it left 
a certain coldness between Paris and Washington, 
which made itself felt to our prejudice in 1870. 
Since that time no further difficulty has arisen. The 
making of the Panama Canal by France might have 
been the cause of some fresh unpleasantness, if we 
had carried it through. Being resolved on getting 
the control of the Canal into their own hands, the 



FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES 283 

United States would not have resigned themselves 
to see it managed by a foreign company. The fail- 
ure of the French enterprise, painful as it was to our 
national pride, spared us by its completeness any 
danger of future complications on this score. In all 
other circumstances we have contrived, without 
detriment to ourselves, to conform our action to the 
doctrine of Monroe. We keep our colonies of Saint- 
Pierre and Miquelon, with that of Guyana and what 
else belongs to us of the European possessions in the 
West Indies. But the United States do not threaten 
them. Each time that a dispute has arisen between 
us and a Latin Republic, the loyal and moderate 
character of our action has always been appreciated 
at Washington. Our controversy with Brazil re- 
specting the frontiers of Guyana was settled by ami- 
cable arrangement. In dealing with Venezuela and 
its dictator Castro, we have shown a patience that 
has been carried to excess, and has often been spoken 
of as inclining to weakness by the Americans them- 
selves. At any rate, they were gratified by our not 
joining in the naval demonstration against Venezuela 
undertaken in 1902 by the three Powers, Germany, 
Italy, and Great Britain. And satisfaction was ex 
pressed likewise when the Franco-English agree- 
ment relative to Newfoundland settled a question 
of difficulty in which American fishermen risked be- 
ing sooner or later implicated.^ 

In a general way, France may be said to accept 
the Monroe Doctrine. She accepts, at the outset 

^ See Coolidge's book, already quoted. 



284 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

of this twentieth century, even the larger scope of 
the doctrine, known under the nickname of the ''big 
stick." There is no need to explain this term; and 
every one, to-day, is aware of the causes that have 
brought about the gradual development of the orig- 
inal doctrine and made it what it is. The imme- 
diate object of the United States was to prevent all 
European military action in the Latin Republics, 
and, what is more, all European occupation of ter- 
ritory. They could not, however, claim to protect 
these Republics against the consequences of the 
disregard certain of them only too often manifested 
for their international engagements. The United 
States were, therefore, compelled to exercise a sort 
of preventive control over them, to act as an inter- 
mediary between them and Europe, and to assume 
the role, with regard to them, of a benevolent but 
vigilant gendarme. It was in this character that 
the Washington Government intervened in San Do- 
mingo ; and, similarly, they will probably be obliged 
to intervene in Venezuela. Having no desire to 
acquire fresh territory in any part of the New World, 
France is, consequently, without any motive for 
seeking to oppose a system which, while it has no 
juridical value, is of vital necessity to the Govern- 
ment of the Union. She is, on the contrary, quite 
disposed to acknowledge the "special interests" 
which the United States claim in America, the more 
so as she herself puts forward a like claim with re- 
gard to Northwest Africa. Moreover, the United 
States Government has never called on her to make 



FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES 285 

sacrifices incompatible with her dignity. And, when- 
ever she happens to be at loggerheads with any- 
one of the lawless Republics of South America, she 
is accustomed, of her own accord, to acquaint Wash- 
ington with her intentions ; and to have recourse, in 
the largest degree possible, to the good offices of 
American diplomacy. This attitude is so much 
the more agreeable to the Government of the Union, 
as they have not always met with it, to the same ex- 
tent, in the various other Powers. Bismarck used 
to characterize the Monroe Doctrine as an 'inter- 
national impertinence." And, a dozen years ago, 
Great Britain, who since then has adopted a more 
conciliatory tone, did not seem far from approving 
this sentiment. By repudiating any design in op- 
position to the principles that lie at the base of the 
doctrine, France has strengthened the favourable 
disposition of mind existing towards her in Wash- 
ington. 

Indeed, it is no longer on the American soil only 
that the various European Powers are to-day ex- 
posed to find themselves face to face with the United 
States. If the Monroe Doctrine has evolved in its 
reference to the New World, it has evolved also with 
regard to the Old. What Boutmy wrote is true: 
'^A nation of eighty million souls that sells wheat, 
and coal, and iron, and cotton, to the whole world 
cannot remain in an isolated condition. Her very 
power lays obligations upon her. Her strength 
confers on her a right. The right changes into a 
claim. The claim resolves itself into the duty of 



286 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

pronouncing on all the divers questions formerly 
settled by the agreement of European Powers alone. 
These Powers themselves, in critical moments, turn 
towards the United States, being anxious to know 
the latter's opinion. And the Government of the 
Union would lessen their influence in the eyes of the 
world, if they shut themselves up in negative ab- 
stention. Henceforward, the United States have a 
policy of world-wide reference." Said Mr. Roose- 
velt to me one day : "What is most lacking in our de- 
mocracy is the sense of their larger responsibility." 
This sense has developed with singular rapidity in 
the last ten years. In order to be on good terms 
with Americans, it is no longer enough not to inter- 
fere with them in America. It is also necessary to 
be in agreement with them in other parts of the 
world. ^ 

When they ceased limiting their policy to Amer- 
ica, they first extended their preoccupations to Asia. 
This was a foregone conclusion. The law of their 
expansion, in fact, carries them from east to west. 
When, under cover of their high tariffs, their indus- 
try needed outlets, they were obliged to seek them 
towards the Pacific, in Asia. They began by peo- 
pling California. Then they looked farther on. 
They conceived the dream of a Pacific which should 
be ''an American Mediterranean." On this ocean 
the Hawaiian Islands, Samoa, part of the Marianne 
Islands, the Philippines, and, last of all, the zone of 
the Panama Canal, all these have staked out for 

1 See our book, Notes on the United States. 



FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES 287 

them the routes of the future. ^'Our products," 
Mr. Shaw, Secretary of the Treasury, exclaimed one 
day, "will be transported over all the seas, and the 
United States will become in reality, as they are des- 
tined by nature to become, masters of the vast- 
est of oceans." As a matter of fact, American 
policy in the Pacific and in Asia has been, above 
all, an economic one. Between 1896 and 1905,. 
American importations into China increased from) 
thirty-five millions of francs to two hundred and 
sixty-five millions. In Corea, they rose, between 
1903 and 1905, from one million nine hundred and 
fifty thousand francs to no less than ten millions. 
Within ten years, they increased in Japan from 
forty to two hundred and sixty-five millions. 
In these different countries, it was commercial in- 
terests which held diplomacy in their leading strings. 
At certain times these interests may have seemed 
to clash with French ones. Not that France had 
intentions of annexation or monopoly in any region 
of the Far East, but because her alliance with Russia 
necessarily associated her with the projects of the 
Saint Petersburg Cabinet. These projects, which 
aimed at a Russian annexation of Manchuria, and 
after that, of Corea, had for some years past, caused 
anxiety in the United States. The latter advocated 
the "Open Door"; and, since Japan advocated the 
same thing, Americans espoused the cause of the 
"dear little Japs." As one of them wrote : "Japan 
represents in this conflict the civilized element, 
the modern, liberal principle of national policy, 



288 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

the promise of pacific development." This 'parti 
pris was further aggravated by the rancour existing 
against Russia among the American, PoUsh, and 
Jewish immigrants. And to some extent the Gov- 
ernment was influenced by it. In the early days of 
the war between Russia and Japan, Mr. John Hay, 
the Secretary for State Affairs, proposed to the Pow- 
ers measures for insuring that 'Hhe neutrality of 
China and her administrative entity should be re- 
spected." Under an appearance of impartiality, 
this was a precaution taken against Russia. As all 
the Neutral Powers were interested in the neutrality 
and the territorial integrity of China, the American 
proposal was adopted. In Saint Petersburg it was 
considered as not being very amicable in its inten- 
tion, even though it was correct in its form. And 
French opinion, which was favourable to Russia,, 
found itself on this account in opposition with Amer- ' 
ican opinion, which continued to be on the side of 
Japan. 

Since then, the situation has changed. Most 
prudently. President Roosevelt and his Ministers 
had abstained from mixing themselves up in the 
manifestations of public opinion. Did they, even 
then, foresee that the success of Japan would make 
her the future rival of the United States in the Pa- 
cific? The war was hardly finished before popular 
sentiment in both countries underwent a change. 
The Japanese reproached the Americans with the , 
role played by Mr. Roosevelt during the peace ne- 
gotiations of 1905. And the Americans were, in 



FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES 289 

return, astonished at the tone assumed towards 
them by the Japanese newspapers. A year later, 
the incident of the San Francisco schools called at- 
tention to the immigration question, which, after 
being the cause of animosity, twenty years previ- 
ous, against the Chinese, now aroused similar 
feelings against the Japanese, who were rivals far 
more to be dreaded. Between the autumn of 1906 
and the spring of 1908, the conflict went through 
its successive phases with alternating periods of 
agitation and tranquillity, fears of war and hopes of 
appeasement. The cruise of the American fleet 
and Mr. Taft's voyage to Japan were its last inci- 
dents. An agreement was subsequently established, 
the text of which was not published. In it was 
manifested the unanimous desire of the Americans 
for their country not to be over-run by Japanese 
coolies, and that also of the Japanese to keep their 
labour at home. The agreement was a purely 
opportunist one, since neither party abandoned the 
principles they upheld, — on the one side, the right 
to enter, on the other, the right to exclude. 

With this conflict France had nothing to do. 
However, she had to suffer its counter-effect. As a 
matter of fact, the Franco-Japanese Treaty, which 
was justified by the reasons that have been stated 
in a previous chapter, was signed on the 16th of 
May, 1907; that is to say, just when the Nippo-l 
American crisis was in its most acute phase. In 
spite of the restricted character of this agreement, 
a disagreeable impression was produced in the 



290 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

United States. The financial help granted by 
France to Japan, our engagement to respect and, 
in accordance with her, to see that others respect 
the territorial integrity of China, to join her in as- 
suring the maintenance of order in certain provinces 
of the Celestial Empire, not to speak of the guaran- 
tee we afforded to her own territorial situation in 
Asia, — all this caused the Americans to feel uneasy. 
^'Some among us," writes Mr. Coolidge (who, in- 
deed, refuses to share in these fears), "may see in the 
Franco-Japanese Treaty a proof that, in the rivalry 
of the United States and Japan on the Pacific, 
France is taking the side of Japan. If they should 
persuade themselves, besides, that, in the event of 
the United States vanquishing Japan in war and 
deciding to deprive her of Formosa, France would 
be bound to intervene by the terms of this Treaty, 
their irritation might be very great." Such irrita- 
tion has not yet been shown; but still there is a 
sort of hesitation, which France should have no 
difficulty in removing. In reality, the Franco- 
Japanese Treaty ought not to be considered alone, 
as we have already seen above. It belongs to a 
series of understandings constituted by the Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance, the Franco-Russian Alliance, 
the Entente Cordiale and the Russo-Japanese rap- 
prochement. Even though Japan were to form 
aggressive designs against the United States, — and 
this is not proved to be likely, as indeed for the 
moment it is impossible, — Great Britain, Russia, 
and France, who are all three against such designs, 



FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES 291 

would have, by reason of the ties that connect 
them with the Tokio Cabinet, much greater author- 
ity to restrain and advise the Japanese Govern- 
ment, with a firmness that could scarcely fail to 
produce its effect and to bring about a peaceful 
solution. Paris, London, and Saint Petersburg are 
equally concerned in the balance of power in the 
Pacific remaining what it is to-day, and equally 
concerned also in preserving the independence of 
China. Far from compromising this equilibrium, their 
agreements with Tokio confer on it an additional 
guarantee. Consequently, the relations of France 
with the United States cannot, under present cir- 
cumstances, suffer anything from our policy in Asia. 
This policy favours the elements of stability, and 
American efforts should tend to multiply them. 

The identity of views and interests existing be- 
tween the world-wide policy of the United States 
and the general policy of France has manifested 
itself in Europe even more clearly than elsewhere. 
On the 15th of January, 1906, the representatives 
of the various Powers met at Algeciras, at the re- 
quest of Germany, who wished this Assembly of the 
Conference to confirm our country's discomfiture. 
The United States occupied at the Conference a 
position that was altogether unique. Of the eight 
Powers participating in it, she alone was free of 
all pledges given to either side. Her Plenipoten- 
tiary, Mr. Henry White, had been instructed to 
share in the deliberations, first, because the United 
States Government had signed the Madrid Conven- 



292 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

tion of 1880, secondly, because it was interested 
in the maintenance of freedom and commercial 
equality, and, lastly, because it might be able to 
contribute to the adopting of conciliatory solutions. 
Save for an intervention which he had promised to 
the Jewish Societies in behalf of the Moroccan Jews, 
Mr. Root had not bound Mr. White to any particu- 
lar initiative. He left him free to appreciate the 
relative value of each different proposal and to sign 
the final protocol ad referendum. There is hardly 
any need to observe that, by the very force of 
things, this attitude of impartiality was destined 
to lead to the American Plenipotentiary's acting 
the role of a veritable arbitrator at Algeciras. A 
Power of the United States' rank and strength could 
not, in fact, take part in such a debate without its 
action making itself almost immediately felt. In 
spite of the Monroe Doctrine and the apparent ab- 
stention which was its logical consequence, the 
United States were about to play their part in the 
most important diplomatic encounter of the Chan- 
celleries that had occurred since the Congress of 
Berlin. 

It is no more than- a just homage rendered to 
American diplomacy to recognize that, on this oc- 
casion, it exhibited quite as much clear-sightedness 
as loyalty. We are pleased to think that America's 
sympathies towards France were not without some 
influence on her attitude. But it would be wrong- 
ing her to ignore the fact that her paramount desire 
was to decide equitably and to work in the cause 



FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES 293 

of peace. When the United States are in presence of 
Europe, they have only one preoccupation : to main- 
tain the balance of power, while opposing any at- 
tempt at one-sided domination. This was their 
first and decisive reason for showing themselves 
favourable to France, who, in this particular case, 
represented the cause of European equilibrium 
against German hegemony. Moreover, they were 
in a position better to understand than any other 
Power the nature of the double interest we claimed 
in Morocco, the negative one, that of removing all 
other European influence than our own from the 
Moorish Empire, the positive one, that of preparing 
the reestablishment of order. This double interest, 
in fact, was identical with that which had created 
the doctrine of Monroe. What we wished to do at 
Fez and Tangier, the United States, for similar 
reasons, had done in different parts of the world, 
notably in Cuba. If, therefore, faithful to our 
engagements, we offered every commercial guaran- 
tee in proposing reforms that respected the integrity 
of the Moroccan Empire, as also the Sultan's Sov- 
ereignty, we were favourably situated for being able 
to rely on America's support. From the first to the 
last day, this support was granted us. 

To tell the truth, it had not waited for the meet- 
ing of the Conference in order to show itself. In 
the month of June, 1905, on the morrow of Mr. 
Delcasse's resignation. President Roosevelt had 
personally asked William II to make the acceptance 
of the Conference, which at the same time he urged 



294 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

upon uSj an occasion for assuming a conciliatory 
attitude. When the debates were entered upon, 
Mr. Henry White, with all the frankness of his char- 
acter, expressed his opinion concerning the solutions 
proposed by Mr. Revoil (Franco-Spanish police). 
On the 5th of February, he declared himself favour- 
able to them, during a conversation he had with 
Mr. von Radowitz. When these proposals had 
been put aside by a first German refusal, it was Mr. 
White, again, who, approving of the further conces- 
sion made by France (Reports of the Italian Lega- 
tion concerning the Franco-Spanish police), under- 
took to introduce this combination, which was a 
sort of compromise (February 15). After sup- 
porting the first solution, Mr. Roosevelt also sup- 
ported the second, not because it emanated from 
France, but because it corresponded to the princi- 
ples proclaimed at the opening of the Conference. 
When, on the 3d of March, at our request, a vote 
was taken as to the advisability of placing the police 
question on the order for the day, Mr. White gave 
us his vote, still in the objective interests of an 
understanding, against which obstacles were being 
raised, not on the side of Paris. On the 7th of 
March, at the moment when, after this vote, Ger- 
many seemed, at last, disposed to make concessions, 
Mr. Roosevelt, for the third time, recommended to 
William II the combination adopted on the 15th of 
February. After the fall of the Rouvier Cabinet, 
the American policy did not vary one jot or tittle, 
remaining faithful at once to its aim and to France. 



FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES 295 

When William II sent his three telegrams (13th, 
15th, and 17th of March), urging the President to 
exercise pressure on us, Mr. Roosevelt opposed to 
him the most courteous, but, at the same time, the 
most resolute firmness, exhibiting, to the very end, 
his intention of executing, from the Moroccan point 
of view, a work of justice and good sense, and, from 
the European point of view, a work of equilibrium 
and peace/ 

Is there any need to recall what comments were 
passed upon the intervention of American diplo- 
macy? Attempts were made to explain it by ante- 
rior grievances against German policy. But it 
would seem that this interpretation cannot legiti- 
mately be maintained. It is quite true, that, dur- 
ing the last twenty years, Germany has often caused 
anxiety at Washington. Refractory to the Monroe 
Doctrine, she has allowed Americans to think, by 
her acts on several occasions, that she did not intend 
to be governed by it. Since the dispute that arose 
in connection with Samoa in 1888, which it required 
eleven years to appease, numerous incidents have 
occurred. In 1898, the enigmatic arrival of Ad- 
miral Dietrich's entire squadron at Manila, on the 
day after Dewey's victory, aroused lasting distrust 
in American political circles. Moreover, it is the 
fear of Germany which has recently given such an im- 
petus to the construction of warships in the United 
States. The occupation of Kiao-Chow, the pur- 
chase of the remainder of the Spanish colonies in 

* See our work, The Conference of Algeciras. 



296 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

the Pacific, Marslial Waldersee's behaviour during 
the Chinese crisis of 1900, the 1902 naval demon- 
stration against Venezuela, the project attributed 
to Germany of purchasing the Danish Islands in 
the West Indies, have alarmed and irritated the 
Americans. The restless activity of the Germans 
in South America, especially in Brazil, the hypothe- 
sis of territorial ambitions, of which immigration 
would have been only the preface, have caused appre- 
hensions still more precise. Last of all, between 
the two most modern "World Firms" — Germany 
and the United States — commercial rivalry is in- 
tense and cannot be otherwise. And yet, these 
things notwithstanding, it seems certain that, in 
1906, the remembrance of the difficulties they 
caused was to some extent less vivid, if not entirely 
wiped out. Prince Henry of Prussia's voyage to 
the United States; the frequent exchange of cour- 
teous messages between William II and Mr. Roose- 
velt, as, for instance, in 1906, at the time of the 
lectures delivered by Professor Burgess in Berlin; 
and, more recently, the signing of a commercial 
agreement which settled a long controversy, had 
all contributed to a better state of feeling between 
the two countries. And the Americans, who admire 
Germany on account of her strength and her me- 
thodic way of doing things, were quite willing to 
live on good terms with her. Consequently, the 
approval of French action during the Moroccan 
crisis was not to be explained merely by the exist- 
ence of a long-standing grudge against Germany. 



FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES 297 

It had political value and a more general signifi- 
cation. 

To the special reasons explained above, two other 
motives were to be added, which, since then, have 
continued to produce their effect. The first was that 
France, who herself possessed the sympathies of the 
United States, was thenceforward the ally or the 
friend of the two Powers with whom they have 
the most lively desire to maintain cordial relations. 
Russia, who, three years previously, had been an 
object of suspicion to the Americans, was now 
regarded by them as a necessary counterweight to 
the Japanese Power. The slow, but already, as it 
would seem, normal evolution of the Russian Em- 
pire towards a regime of legality facilitated this 
reconciliation, which was determined by common 
interest. To-day, except in Jewish circles, there is 
no longer any hatred against Russia. It appears 
even that, in Washington and Saint Petersburg, 
equal regret is felt for the neglect to profit by oppor- 
tunities of getting to know each other better in the 
past. As regards England, she has consistently 
sought, during the last ten years, to gain the friend- 
ship of the United States. The Venezuelan dispute 
of 1896 was the last vestige of a century-old quarrel. 
And by then accepting the haughty interpretation 
of the Monroe Doctrine, opposed to him by Mr. 
Richard Olney, President Cleveland's Secretary of 
State, Lord Salisbury rendered the rapprochement 
definitive. The war with Spain enabled Great 
Britain to make it more cordial. The Hay-Paunce- 



298 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

fote Treaty, which restored to the United States their 
liberty of action in Panama, and the subsequent 
settlement of the Alaskan frontier difficulty, were 
the outward and visible signs of this improved state 
of affairs. Nor has the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 
which, indeed, was concluded before any difficulties 
arose between Japan and America, done anything 
to hinder the rapprochement. It is most favourably 
regarded in Washington; and the Entente Cordiale 
has extended to France its advantages. Was it 
not, moreover, Mr. MacCormick, the United States 
Ambassador in Paris, who, in an official speech, 
made in 1905, said: "I am happy to notice the 
development of ideas which, in recent times, have 
gradually brought about an amicable understanding 
between France and the mother country of Ameri- 
cans. Rapprochements of this kind render powerful 
service to commercial and pacific interests, which 
are those of the world of work. For my part, I 
shall endeavour to encourage them." 

The second motive is more general than the first. 
Still more than by historic souvenirs, still more than 
by our intimacy with London and Saint Petersburg, 
our possession of the United States' good-will is 
favoured by the object which our policy constantly 
pursues. Our aim is peace; our means towards it 
is the balance of power. Both end and means 
correspond equally to American desires. Being in 
full economic progress, playing her part in the world- 
game, the United States would not be able to regard 
without apprehension the subjection of Europe to 



FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES 299 

any single Power. They are aware that William II, 
when he is not preaching a crusade against the 
Yellow Race or against England, takes pleasure in 
denouncing the American peril to the '' United 
States of Europe," which he would like to form 
beneath his rule. They are ready to respect Ger- 
many's legitimate interests whenever they meet 
with them. But, on the other hand, by reason and 
by instinct they are on the side of France, when, in 
defence of her diplomatic autonomy, the latter 
country undertakes, as a necessary condition, the 
defence of the balance of power in Europe. This is 
a moral guarantee for our policy as strong as any 
written engagements. Is it not for the said policy, 
at the same time, the best of justifications? 



CHAPTER VIII 



FKANCE AND PEACE 



In less than forty years, our diplomatic situation 
has undergone a thorough change. In spite of 
rapidly succeeding Ministries, and notwithstanding 
the mistakes that have been made, France has ac- 
complished the duty which history marked out 
for her to perform. By means of the Russian Alli- 
ance, she has broken out of the circle of solitude in 
which Bismarck had confined her. By means of\ 
her understandings with Great Britain, Italy, and 
Spain, she has restored the balance of power which 
the German hegemony had destroyed in 1871. By 
means of the Russo-Japanese, Franco-Japanese, and 
Anglo-Russian rapprochements, she has secured com- 
plementary guarantees to her reconquered liberty. 
But being now at the goal of this evolution, the 
policy, dictated to her by preoccupation concerning 
her future, places her more than ever in opposition 
to that suggested to Germany by this country's de- 
votion to Germany's past. 

It is useless to wonder at a conflict which every- 
thing rendered inevitable. Being vanquished, France 
could do no otherwise than strive to get back, if 
not her provinces by war, at least her autonomy and 
her safety in peace. And Germany, being victori- 

300 



FRANCE AND PEACE 301 

ous, could do no otherwise than take alarm at this 
effort. On the one side, the struggle was for equilib- I 
rium; on the other, for supremacy. Balance of 
power was necessary to France; supremacy was 
habitual to Germany. France was as fatally bound 
to claim the one as Germany was to endeavour to 
safeguard the other. The history of Europe has 
been working during the last quarter of a century at 
this problem of political psychology and seeking for 
its solution. In the conflict itself there is nothing 
of the contingent. It results from the very nature 
of things ; and has its origin in the Treaty of Frank- [ 
fort, not in the caprices of Sovereigns or in the 
passions of Peoples. 

In order for the peril to be removed, either France 
would have to sacrifice her interests or Germany 
would have to reform her state of mind. The first, 
hypothesis is inadmissible. On the contrary, the 
second contains nothing that is unacceptable. If, 
instead of looking ever to the past, the Germans 
would live more in the present, the irritation that 
acts upon them would thereby be appeased. The 
Germany of the twentieth century is no longer the 
dominating power in Europe. However, she holds 
among its various nations a rank that is still emi- 
nent. She has admirable economic resources. Her 
vigorous natality assures the necessary elements 
of her military organization, which, from above, 
made up of method and, from below, of discipline, 
is unsurpassable in solidity. She is allied with 
Austria and also with Italy, both of which Powers 



302 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

are anxious to preserve the Alliance. She is 
the pivot of the sole Triplice that exists in Europe. 
Germany is not isolated. Germany is not diminished. 
She has the right to be proud, in an equal degree, of 
her material strength and her moral authority. 

She is none the less uneasy; and is continually 
showing signs of her nervousness. The Emperor, 
although he sometimes blames those that always 
look on the black side of things (Schwarzseher), 
seems sometimes also to share in their pessimism. 
Even from the Chancellery words of bitterness are 
heard, no doubt because during the last fifteen years 
a number of agreements — alliances, understand- 
ings, friendships — have been concluded in Europe 
without Germany's being called upon to participate 
in them. These different groupings, while formed 
outside of her, have not broken up the one of which 
she is head. She has, however, the impression that 
an attempt is being made to isolate her. This im- 
pression is erroneous, yet it is easily explicable by 
history. When the habit has been acquired of 
reigning without any one to dispute the right, there 
is a tendency to find in the divisions of others a 
guarantee of the power one exercises. What Ger- 
many dreads is not being reduced to solitude, but 
to see her neighbours issue from theirs. She feels 
herself isolated, because they are ceasing to be so. 
The warrant of her peace is in their remaining alone. 
"UM solitudinem facit pacem appellat.^'^ 

1 The German Moroccan policy in August and September 1908, 
with regard to Muley Hafid's recognition, confirms the fact of the 
existence in Berlin of a systematic opposition against France al- 
ways and everywhere. 



FRANCE AND PEACE 303 

Who is there, however, that does not see the im- 
possibility of her intervening in these recent agree- 
ments? In the diplomatic order of things, as also 
in the military, she had managed to get too far ahead. 
As early as 1882, she reared up in the midst of 
Europe the "block" of her alliances. Was it likely 
that the new groupings would themselves also 
choose Germany as a pivot; that is to say, as a 
dictator? Was it not rather a necessity, in virtue 
of a law of equilibrium imposed in turn on Charles V, 
Louis XIV, and Napoleon I, that these groupings 
should constitute themselves outside of Germany's 
control? Against her? No. But without her. 
If what was wished at Berlin had occurred, Europe 
would have no longer been Europe. And since 
Europe did exist, it was necessary that diplomatic 
action should load the other scale of the balance and 
reestablish the equilibrium. Where Germans see a^ 
deliberate menace, there is nothing more than the! 
action of a law of political physics guiding inter- \ 
national elements towards a position of stability. 

If Germany would accept this conception of 
European equilibrium, if she would admit that a 
river which overflows returns sooner or later to its 
bed and that what it loses in width it regains in 
regularity, she would contribute the most powerful 
guarantee of durability to the world's peace and her 
own puissance. As a matter of fact, this is far from 
being the case. Germany has not resigned herself 
to the loss of her supremacy. It is true that, for 
thirty-seven years, she has continued to be pacific. 



304 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

But since, during twenty of them, she dominated 
Europe by means of peace, there was no real reason 
for her to declare war. More lately, she has allowed 
opportunities to go by of doing so which Bismarck 
would have seized. For this were responsible the 
Emperor William's honourable scruples, the fear 
of risking a glory that was already acquired, and the 
new way of thinking of people for whom war is no 
longer the only trade. But, during this same period, 
the German peace has been a nervous, enervating 
peace, reluctantly and ill-humouredly accorded, a 
precarious peace that no one is sure of, either in 
Germany or out of it. The doubts that agitate the 
minds of the Emperor and his Ministers, that incline 
them, one day, to accept the inevitable and, the next 
day, to try some decisive blow, have their counter- 
effect on Europe, which suffers from the morbid 
mentality of Berlin. 

If this state of things persists, the risks of war will 
soon become greater than the chances of peace. 
The less Germany is disposed to resign herself to the 
restored situation of diplomatic equality, the more 
the other Powers will apply themselves to fortify 
such equality and to keep it free from her attack. 
And the more also, in order to mate them, war will 
appear to her as the only solution. Experience 
is here decisive. Each time that Germany essays 
to regain Bismarck's sceptre, a fresh grouping of 
Powers rears itself in her way. The Russo-Japanese 
War, which was the outcome of her policy in Asia, 
renders her supreme in Europe ; the Entente Cordiale 



FRANCE AND PEACE 305 

reestablishes the equiHbrium. Mr. Delcasse's fall i 
is a German apotheosis ; the Conference of Algeciras 
reduces to a triumph of amour-propre what seemed, 
but lately, likely to be a lasting success. And, all 
at once, there is a creation of agreements that, 
both in Asia and in Europe, break the levers 
by means of which, a quarter of a century before, 
Germany had moved and manipulated the world.. 
By dint of such an exercise of pressure and counter- 
pressure, one ultimately drifts into war ; Prince von 
Buelow has said as much, and he was right to say it. 
But what should be added is that the pressure, in the 
first instance, came from Germany, and that the 
solution of the difficulty should come from Berlin, 
since Berlin is responsible. 

As a matter of fact, France has no offensive designs. 
Whether it be a matter for congratulation or regret, 
she has lost the vocation to attack. Her conscience 
forbids her to do anything which resembles an 
acceptance of the wound she bears in her side. But 
the sentiment of revenge has ceased to animate her. 
Having accustomed herself not to" speak of it, she 
has at length given up thinking of it. Nations that 
wish to avenge themselves do not wait forty years. 
Between Shimonasaki and Mukden, ten years only, 
intervened. France has shown less moral force, 
and has not known how to fix the goal of her national 
life in the prompt reconstitution of her territory. 
She is capable of making war ; but she does not desire 
it. She would be a redoubtable adversary, and no 
one has the right to underestimate her chances of 



306 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

success. But if her mobilization plans are formed 
in view of an offensive, her policy, on the other hand, 
is refractory to it. 

Her right, therefore, to require that this policy, 
such as it is, should be admitted, is all the more 
unattackable. Instead of seeking for her revenge 
on the field of battle, she has taken it in the Chancel- 
leries ; and this is the very least of what she owed to 
herself. She will, therefore, yield nothing of what 
she has conquered on this ground. She was de- 
termined not to remain the eternal vanquished. 
She was determined that peace, in default of war, 
should restore honour and independence to her. 
German threats have proved to her the necessity of 
being strong. She has repaired transient errors; 
and, having limited her designs, she is bound to 
carry them out without weakness. Henceforward, 
any ^' bluff," like that of 1905, would produce no 
effect. She will not allow the edifice of her alliances 
or her friendships to be touched. If, at any time, 
an attack should be made on it, the people, who have 
pledged themselves most deeply to peace, would, 
as the Socialists themselves have declared, all of 
them rise ready for war.^ 

However, in the Europe of the present day, a 
Franco-German dispute is not the only thing that 
might cause war. In the world-game of nations, 
it is no longer France, but England, who, at present, 
first faces Germany. Commercial rivalry, naval 
rivalry, hostility of minds, an equally uncompro- 

* Speech of Mr. Jaurfes, June 19, 1908. 



FRANCE AND PEACE 307 

mising attitude, everything indicates that a conflict 
is to be feared. It is true that, in such a conflict, 
France ought to wish to remain neutral. She ought, 
since she is not England's ally. She ought, because 
her geographic situation, by exposing her to the 
enemy's blows, bids her be prudent. She ought, 
because her patience in waiting to avenge her own 
quarrel forbids her to engage, except for this, in 
that of others. If England should attack Germany, 
France is not pledged to attack with her. If Ger- 
many should attack England, France has not 
promised to back up the British fleet by creating a 
diversion in the Vosges. Her intervention would 
be a contradiction to her past, and an act of heed- 
lessness with regard to the future. It would be her 
right and her duty to preserve her neutrality. 
But would she be able to exercise this right ? Would 
she be able to fulfil this duty ? 

She had formerly to encounter the hostage theory. 
This barbarous theory has since developed; and 
now, somewhat apologetically, it is taken up in 
another form. The German Army, we are told, 
being reduced to impotence by a naval war, would 
not put up with the first defeat. It would insist on 
fighting, — on fighting for the mere sake of fighting, 
at any cost, against the first persons to hand, against 
the nearest neighbour, in short against France. 
Consequently, our pacific intentions would not be 
sufficient to guarantee us peace. We should be 
attacked, not even as hostages, but without reason, 
without pretext, simply in order to find the German 



308 FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCES 

Army something to do. In vain we should have 
renounced waging a war of revenge, and sacrificed 
our sympathies for our friends to the higher claim of 
our interests. War would lay hold of us all the same. 

This hypothesis dictates our duty to us. As 
Clausewitz remarks, all war must cease whenever 
the conclusion of peace is less onerous than the con- 
tinuation of war. Turning this formula round, it 
may be said that the only way to avoid the outbreak 
of war is to render it more onerous to one's adver- 
saries than the maintenance of peace. If, in pres- 
ence of an Anglo-German struggle, France and Rus- 
sia were to be enfeebled so as to offer an easy prey to 
the aggressor, the German Army's need of action 
would doubtless be manifested at their expense, and 
this without much trouble. But if, on the con- 
trary, France and Russia are both strong, and are 
capable, each being sure of the other, of making any 
one pay dear for an attack on their neutrality, then 
Germany, however ardent for war, will prefer not to 
utilize her army, foreseeing that she would only fail in 
the attempt. She will shrink from a course of action 
the risk of which would be greater than the profit. 

The Franco- Russian Alliance, therefore, on condi- 
tion it holds itself ready for emergencies, is the sole 
guarantee, if not of the preservation of peace, at 
least of the circumscription of any war. It is the 
only foundation on which to establish the league of 
neutrals which will be, perhaps, the formula of the 
near future. In a period of crisis, the world's secur- 
ity will be gauged by the power of France and Russia. 



FRANCE AND PEACE 309 

Diplomacy has sufficed to restore the condition of 
equiHbrium. It cannot pretend to be sufficient for 
the avoiding of war. Our right to act politically de- 
pends on our capacity to act militarily. We can only 
safeguard the freedom of our alliances and our friend- 
ships if we are in a position to defend them on a field 
of battle. Our army would have been the key of our 
future if we had wished to render peace impossible. 
It is the key likewise, if we wish to maintain it. 

There would be a want of frankness in not looking 
these embarrassing contingencies plainly in the face, 
the more so as the uncertainty of mind that prevails 
in Berlin respecting the best course to be followed, 
and the increasing irritation caused by this uncer- 
tainty in London, may, at any time, in a few hours, 
transform such contingencies into facts. However, 
nothing yet proves that the bad is bound to change 
into the worse. Through a wholesome fear of the 
irreparable, an unstable situation may last for years. 
Who indeed can say whether Germany, being satis- 
fied with what is definite in her gains, will not aban- 
don all idea of compromising them by insisting on 
their increase, whether she will not rather make up 
her mind to consolidate by a durable equilibrium 
what was originally secured to her by an ephemeral 
hegemony ? Should she sincerely adopt this system, 
Germany might count on our help in preserving a 
peace which would be equal for all. And the agree- 
ment, by setting its seal to our recovered status, 
would become, among the nations of Europe, the 
natural leaven of reasonable reconciliations. 



INDEX OF NAMES 



Abd el Aziz, 109, 110, 177, 178. 
Aberdeen, Lord, 38. 
Aehrenthal, Baron von, 259, 260. 
Ahmed Ben Mou9a, 109. 
Alexander II, Czar, 6, 124, 125, 127, 

128, 129. 
Alexander III, Czar, 3, 5, 134, 137, 

147. 
Alexandra, Czarina, 15, 16. 
Alexeieff, Admiral, 221. 
Alfonso XII, King, 99. 
Alfonso XIII, King, 99, 106, 262. 
Almodovar, Duke of, 197. 
Andler, Charles, 132 n. 
Andrassy, Comit, 127, 128, 129. 
Andre, General, 181. 
Angers, David d', 270. 
Appert, General, 5. 
Aubin, Eugene, 111. 
Avellan, Admiral, 15. 

Balfour, Mr., 247. 

Bassermann, Mr., 207. 

Battenberg, Princess, 262. 

Baudin, Pierre, cited, 180. 

Beaconsfield, Lord, 42. 

Bebel, Mr., 176, 191. 

Benckendorflf, Count, 241. 

Ben Sedira, Lieutenant, 118. 

Ben Sliman, 119, 120. 

Berard, Victor, cited, 95, 96, 164, 

217. 
Eeresford, Lord Charles, 215. 
Berezowski, 4. 
Bertin, Mr., 233. 
Beust, Count von, 134. 
Bezobrazoff, 20. 
Bihourd, Mr., 174, 175, 201. 
Bilderling, General, 224. 
Billot, Mr., 84, 86 n. 
Birilev, Admiral, 15. 
Bismarck, Count Herbert von, 138. 
Bismarck, Prince, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 46, 47, 

55, 68, 83, 84, 85, 87, 91, 125, 127, 



130-149, 159, 162, 171, 180, 192, 203, 

206, 207, 209, 213, 255, 264, 274, 285, 

300, 304. 
Blanc, Baron, 84. 
Blowitz, Mr. de, 124. 
Boisdeffre, General de, 12. 
Bompard, Mr., 28. 
Bonchamps, Mr. de, 44. 
Bonnal, General, 153, 156. 
Bonzom, Lucien, 278. 
Bou Amama, 115. 
Bourgeois, Leon, 201. 
Boutmy, quoted, 285-286. 
Brandt, Mr. von, 213. 
Brazza, Savorgnan de, 41. 
Broglie, Due de, 5, 84. 
Buelow, Count von, 14, 50, 156, 160, 

165, 167, 168, 172, 173, 175, 176, 177; 

Prince von, 185, 190-198, 201, 205, 

207, 257, 305. 
Burgess, Professor, 296. 
Buscb, Maurice, cited, 132. 

Calchas, pseudonym, 237-238. 
Cambon, Jules, 99. 
Cambon, Paul, 62. 
Canrobert, General, 152. 
Cantacuzene, Prince, 136. 
Caprivi, Count von, 11, 148, 157. 
Carnot, President, 15, 86, 152. 
Cassini, Coimt, 215, 240, 254. 
Castro, dictator, 283. 
Challemel-Lacour, 40. 
Chamberlain, Joseph, 41. 
Charles X, 3. 
Chateaubriand, 3. 
Chatham, Lord, 36, 52. 
Chaudordy, Comte de, 5, 7. 
Cheradame, Andre, cited, 214. 
Cherisey, Comte de, 171. 
Chiala, Luigi, cited, 88. 
Clausewitz, 308. 

Combes, Prime Minister, 22, 179. 
Constans, Mr., 10. 



311 



312 



INDEX OF NAMES 



Constantine, Grand Duke, 14. 
Coolidge, Archibald Gary, cited, 

268,283; quoted, 290. 
Corsi, General, 87. 
Courcel, Baron de, 140, 198. 
Crispi, 85, 86, 134, 161. 
Curzon, Lord, 229, 244, 246, 248, 249, 

250, 252. 

Dane, Louis, 246. 

Daniloff, General, 224. 

Darcy, Jean, 37 n. 

Daudet, Ernest, cited, 9, 11. 

Deeazes, Due de, 6, 125. 

Delcasse, Mr., 15, 17, 20, 21, 23, 24, 
25, 44, 59, 62, 65, 68, 89, 90, 102, 118, 
119, 121, 171, 174, 179, 181, 182, 183, 
185, 186, 219, 223, 229, 272, 293, 305. 

Delaisy, Francis, cited, 164. 

Denbigh, Lord, 76. 

Depretis, de, 92, 130. 

Derby, Lord, 124. 

Deschanel, Mr., 60. 

Dietrich, Admiral, 296. 

Dragomiroff, General, 15. 

Dreyfus, 18, 156, 179. 

Driault, Edouard, cited, 211. 

Duclerc,Mr.,43. 

Edward VII, King, 57, 60, 61, 67, 62, 
69, 106, 160, 183, 207, 240, 258. 

Fallieres, Mr., 67, 273. 

Faure, Felix, 15, 152. 

Fergusson, Sir James, 92. 

Ferry, Jules, 39, 106, 133, 139, 140. 

Fiamingo, G. M., cited, 89. 

Floquet, Charles, 5. 

Flourens, Mr., 8. 

Forgemol, General, 84. 

Fournier, Captain, 119. 

Francis I, 26. 

Francis Joseph, Emperor, 127, 128, 

129, 134. 
Frederick, Emperor, 162. 
Fregosa, 83. 
Freycinet, Mr. de, 10, 12, 15, 140. 

Gaedke, Colonel, 49. 
Gambetta, 7, 82. 



Genlis, Madame de, 61. 
Gervais, Admiral, 11, 147. 
Giers, Mr. de, 8, 15, 136, 154, 247. 
Gontaut-Biron, Viscount de, 7 n., 

125. 
Gorst, Sir Eldon, 62. 
Gortchakoff, Prince, 3, 6, 7, 125, 127, 

145, 246. 
Granville, Lord, 40, 138, 247. 
Grenfell, Lord, 76. 
Grevy, President, 5. 
Grey, Sir Edward, 41, 241, 250, 251, 

252, 261. 

Habib HuUa, Ameer, 246. 
Hafid, Muley, 111, .302 n. 
Haldane, Mr., 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77. 
Hanotaux, Mr., 42, 154; cited, 6, 7, 

126. 
Hansen, Jules, cited, 12. 
Hardinge, Sir Charles, 229, 241. 
Hartmann, Mr., 4. 
Hassan, Muley, Sultan, 108. 
Hay, John, 288. 
Henckel of Donnersmarck, Prince, 

183. 
Henry of Prussia, Prince, 214, 296. 
Henry VII of Reuss, Prince, 128. 
Herbette, Mr., 140. 
Hicks-Beach, Sir Michael, 44. 
Hill, Mr., 65. 
Hilmi Pacha, 260. 
Hoskier, Mr., 9. 
Humbert, King, 56, 130, 157. 

Ignatieff, N. P., 135. 

Ireland, Archbishop, 269. 

Isvolski, Mr., 15, 27, 231-232, 240, 

252, 260. 
Ito, Marquis, 19, 219, 233. 

Jaray, Gabriel Louis, 59 n. 
Jaures, Admiral, 4. 
Jaures, Mr., 14, 26, 306. 
Jefferson, Thomas, 269. 
Jones, Paul, 271. 
Jonnart, Mr., 117. 
Jusserand, Mr., 270. 

Kalnoky, Count, 131, 134. 
Kaulbars, General, 224. 



INDEX OF NAMES 



313 



Ketteler, Baron von, 216. 
Kitchener, Lord, 44. 
Komaroff, General, 238.' 
Korff, General, 224. 
Koyander, Mr. , 213. 
Kropotkine, Prince, 4. 
Kruger, President, 47, 55, 206. 
Kuhlmann, Mr. von, 171, 175, 177, 

223. 
Kurino, Baron, 221, 234-235. 
Kuropatkin, General, 20 n., 168, 

222, 224. 

Laboulaye, Mr. de, 10, 11. 
Lafayette, Marquis de, 269. 
Lair, Maurice, cited, 48. 
Lambert, Mr., 65. 
Lamsdorff, Count, 15, 197, 203, 221. 
Lansdowne, Lord, 57, 62, 161, 229, 

252. 
Larras, Captain, 118. 
Lauriston, Colonel de, 36. 
Laval, Due de, 38. 
Le Flo, General, 6, 125. 
Lemaitre, Jules, 156. 
Leon y Castillo, Senor de, 100, 102. 
Leopold, King, 42. 
Lesourd, Andre, 278. 
Linevitch, General, 224. 
Lobanoff, Prince, 15. 
Loftus, Lord Augustus, 246. 
Loubet, President, 14, 15, 17, 61, 69, 

90, 94, 100, 153, 165, 272. 
Louis, Philippe, 36. 
Lvof , General, 224. 
Lyautey, General, 118. 
Lyons, Lord, 40. 

Maccio, Signer, 84. 
MacCormick, Mr., 271-272, 298. 
MacMahon, Marshal, 125, 152. 
Magenta, Duchess of, 152. 
Malet, Sir Edward, 55. 
Mancini, 130. 

Marchand, Captain, 44, 56. 
Marselli, Colonel, 1.30. 
Martin, Captain, 118. 
Matter, Paul, cited, 136, 142. 
Maximilian, Emperor, 282. 
Mazarin, 26. 



Mazzini, 83. 
Menebhi, 109. 

Metternich, Count Wolff, 190. 
Michael, Grand Duke, 135. 
Mille, Mr., 104. 
Millerand, Mr., 154. 
Minto, Lord, 246. 
Mizon, Lieutenant, 41. 
Mohrenheim, Baron de, 12, 15, 136. 
Moltke, Marshal von, 130, 147, 181. 
Monaco, Prince of, 199. 
Monroe, President, 281-282. 
Monson, Sir Edmund, 44. 
Montebello, Marquis de, 17. 
Monts, Count von, 197. 
Morocco, Sultan of, 204, 207. 
Motono, Mr., 225-226, 230-232. 
Mouravieff, Count, 15, 155, 219. 
Mouzaffer ed Dine, 244. 
Muhlberg, Mr. von, 175, 181. 
Miinster, Prince, 152, 153. 

Naples, Prince of, 85, 89, 157. 
Napoleon III, 3, 36, 83, 282. 
Nelidow, Mr., 253-254. 
Nicholas II, Czar, 158, 258. 
Nicholson, Sir Arthur, 240, 250, 252, 

254. 
Noailles, Marquis de, 153. 

O'Connor, General, 118. 
Ojetti, Ugo, 166. 
Olney, Richard, 297. 
Orloff, Prince, 6, 135. 
Ouroussov, Prince, 27. 

Pelletan, Camille, 181. 

Perdiccaris, Mr., 120. 

Perier, Jean, 58 n. 

Peter the Great, 2. 

Philippe d'Orleans, 2. 

Pichon, Mr., 234. 

Pinon, Rene', cited, 19, 83, 213, 261. 

Polignac, Prince de, 3, 38. 

Porter, General, 271, 272. 

Prinetti, Signor, 90. 

Radolin, Prince von, 153, 171, 181, 

186-187. 
Radowitz, Mr. von, 6, 196, 197, 199, 

200, 294. 



314 



INDEX OF NAMES 



Radzivill, Prince Anthony, 152. 
Raisuli, brigand, 120. 
Rennenlsampf, General, 224. 
Reuss, Prince of, 131. 
Reventlow, Count, 173, 175, 176. 
Eevoil, Mr., 115, 196, 199, 200, 201, 

294. 
Ribot, Mr., 10, 12, 13, 15. 
Richelieu, Due de, 3, 26. 
Richthofen, Baron von, 174. 
Ritchie, Mr., 44. 
Roberts, Lord, 75-76, 245. 
Robilant, Comte de, 87, 131, 134. 
Rochambeau, 269, 270. 
Rodjestvensky, Admiral, 23, 222- 

223, 225, 226. 
Rohlfs, quoted, 93. 
Roosevelt, President, 51, 198,200, 201, 

223, 273, 286, 288, 293, 294, 295, 296. 
Root, Elihu, 268, 272, 292. 
Rostand, Edmond, 16. 
Rouire cited, 238. 

Rouvier, Mr., 182, 185, 186, 187, 201. 
Rudini, Marquis di, 92. 

Saint-Hilaire, Barthelemy, 40. 
St. John, Mr., 39. 
Sakharoff, General, 224. 
Salisbury, Lord, 39, 43, 44, 45, 57, 

133, 297. 
Samsonoif , General, 224. 
Sassoon, Sir Edward, 59. 
Schamyl, Iman, 238. 
Schiemann, Theodore, 256. 
Schoen, Mr. von, 197. 
Sehouvaloff, Count, 126, 149. 
Segonzac, Marquis de, 96. 
Sermoneta, Duke of, 93. 
Shaw, Secretary, 287. 
Silvela, Senor, 98. 
Simon, Jules, 151, 152. 
Sinclair, Louis, 59. 
Skobeleff, 135. 
Sorel, Albert, 36. 
Soult, Marshal, 36. 
Staal, Mr. de, 136. 
Stackelberg, General, 222. 
Stockton, Admiral, 271. 
Struwe, Mr. de, 137. 



Stumm, Mr. von, 198. 
Suyematsu, Baron, 233-234. 

Taft, William H., 289. 

Taillandier, Saint-Rene, 24, 119, 

171, 175, 178. 
Talleyrand, 206. 
Tardieu, Andre, cited, 24, 67, 104, 

196, 254, 286, 295. 
Tattenbach, Count von, 197, 199. 
Thiers, 3, 84, 255. 
Toll, Mr. de, 137. 
Touchard, Admiral, 28. 
Treitchske, quoted, 51. 
Tschirschky, Mr. von, 201. 

Urquhart, Mr., quoted, 37. 

Vandal, Albert, cited, 2. 
Varley, Mr., 120. 
Victor Emmanuel, 83, 130. 
Victoria, Queen, 36. 
Villanueva, Seiior, 100. 
Vladimir, Grand Duke, 15. 

Waddington, W. H., 39. 
Waldeck-Rousseau, Mr., 179. 
Waldersee, Count, 51, 56, 156, 216, 

296. 
Wallace, Sir Donald Mackenzie, 

240, 254. 
Washington, George, 266-267. 
Weisgerber, Dr. F., 109 n. 
Wellington, Duke of, 38. 
White, Henry, 273, 291, 292, 294. 
Wichnegradski, Mr., 9. 
William I, Emperor, 99, 127, 130, 134, 

135, 151, 163, 168. 
William II, Emperor, 24, 25, 47, 49, 

55, 56, 67, 146, 147, 151-168, 175, 176, 

177, 184, 185, 195, 198, 200, 203, 205, 

207, 214, 216, 223, 256, 293-296, 299, 

304. 
Wimpffen, General de, 115. 
Witte, Count, 16, 18, 32, 34, 198, 200. 

Yacoub, Sultan, 238. 
Younghusband, Colonel, 244, 249. 

ZarubaiefE, General, 224. 



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The work is divided into the following seven parts : Part I, Ismail Pasha, 1863- 
1879; Part II, The Arabi Revolt, August 1879 to August 1883; Part III, The 
Soudan, 1 882-1 907 (including the story of Gordon's journey to Khartoum, the 
Relief Expedition, and the Evacuation of the Soudan) ; Part IV, The Egyptian 
Puzzle; Part V, British Policy in Egypt; Part VI, The Reforms; and Part VII, 
The Future of Egypt. 

" A record of practical and humane statesmanship for which it would be hard 
to find an exact parallel. The charm of these volumes is that the work is 
recounted by one who was a large part of that which he describes. . . . For rich 
content, as well as pleasing form, this work of a seasoned statesman is one to be 
not only read but pondered. In addition to a style notable for simplicity and 
point, we have sagacious reflections, remarks which light up whole principles of 
government, characterizations of individuals and of races which reveal a philo- 
sophical mind with a disciplined imagination. ... 

"In these volumes we get much more than' historical records and political dis- 
cussions; we get the overflow of a full and powerful mind. The book is so note- 
worthy because the intellect and the character which have gone to its making are 
so exceptional. Lord Cromer is not only a great administrator; he stands before 
us as a great thinker." — New York Evening Post. 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

Sixty-four and Sixty-six Fifth Avenue, New York 






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